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学位論文

**The Possibility for Existence and the Role of “Civil Social Capital”/ “Community”
in Rural Development in Contemporary Vietnam**

現代ベトナムの農村開発における
「市民社会資本」・「共同体」の存在可能性と役割

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Introduction

1. Existence and Role of Civil social capital or Community Institution in Vietnam, and Characteristics of the previous studies and Significance of this study on this subject

1. This research named: **“The Possibility for Existence and the Role of “Civil Social Capital”/ “Community” in Rural Development in Contemporary Vietnam”**, is a study on the development of rural economy related to economic institutions, particularly Community Institution (Community from now on). At the same time, it is also a kind of Vietnamese studies because it was carried out by taking Vietnam as the research object.

When talking about international cooperation activities since the early 1980s, particularly from the beginning of this new century, the scientists/ researchers in the field of development economics have been carrying out the researches of/ about economic institutions existing outside market institution and complementing market at the low development level.

Regarding the institutions complementing market, we can (basically) divide them into two types: government social capital as a formal institution and civil social capital as an informal institution. Both of those economic institutions can play a role/ act/ function as a kind of external effects so that they do not pass through market but still can solve uncertainty - a kind of market failure, particularly risk and imperfect information. It means that those two economic institutions can act/ function to improve economic efficiency or can contribute to economic development ⁽¹⁾.

In those two economic institutions, my research focuses on civil social capital, or Community, or to say more specifically, the existence and the role of cooperative activities at the civil level in rural development in Vietnam.

2. According to Mr. Meier, when we think of improving the level of economic development, in fact, it is very important to reinforce the role or enhance/ increase the “absorptive ability” of the government, or government social capital as a formal institution. According to the researchers on

endogenous economic growth theory, the government of developing countries needs to make efforts to increase the “absorptive ability” to promote the transfer of various types of capital, particularly knowledge capital through international trade and FDI in order to increase those capitals in their own countries, aiming at promoting/ realizing the scale and the agglomeration economy in industries and services there ⁽²⁾.

Even so, as Mr. Meier said, before studying the above issue, we need to clarify the existence and the role of civil social capital. It is because that the characteristics and the quality of civil social capital in each country will dictate/ decide to a certain extent/ degree the characteristics and the quality of government social capital itself there ⁽³⁾. Therefore, the study of civil social capital has a very fundamental and important role. At the same time, the study of civil social capital needs to be carried out as a study of history (or about/ on the historical dependency) of each country. Or according to Mr. Hayami and Mr. Hara, it is because the historical process of each country is different, depending on/ related to the characteristic of each of those regions or countries. Therefore, the study of civil social capital needs to be carried out as area studies, here is Vietnamese studies ⁽⁴⁾.

3. By the way, regarding the concept of civil social capital, until now, the usage of that concept has not been wholly/ entirely unified yet. Specifically, the usage of that concept in each field of scientific research, such as economics, sociology, etc. is often different (the World Bank). For example, for sociologists, civil social capital often means a kind of formal organizations as NGOs, mass organizations, etc. ⁽⁵⁾.

However, civil social capitals or cooperative activities that I mention in this research are not the above-mentioned formal organizations by sociologists, but they are traditional economic organizations, which are often called traditionally informal institutions by economists ⁽⁶⁾. For example: according to Mr. Hayami, those (specifically) are the peasants’ household at the family level, the local public goods at the village level, “multiple interlinked transaction relationships”, etc. ⁽⁷⁾. And Mr. Hayami often calls those (organizations) as cooperative activities in traditional economic organizations or the trust relationship of Community, or shortly called as Community ⁽⁸⁾. Meanwhile, Mr. Meier often uses the term of “civil social capital” to indicate a kind of those traditional economic organizations, but

indeed the meaning of that concept/ term is (basically) not much different from that of Community used by Mr. Hayami ⁽⁹⁾.

However, when talking about the role of civil social capital (as Mr. Meier) and Community (as Mr. Meier) for economic development, there are significant differences between those two concepts. It means:

Regarding the role of civil social capital, according to Mr. Meier, that role is sometimes good, but sometimes not good. It means that the comment/ evaluation of Mr. Meier about that issue (the role of civil social capital) have not been consistent ⁽¹⁰⁾, partly because his essay was written as “a kind of survey article”. Specifically, when Mr. Meier regards civil social capitals sometimes as good, but sometimes as not good for economic development, what he would like to emphasize is always that: when civil social capital works in good coordination with government social capital, or the government, it will always have a good impact on the economic development ⁽¹¹⁾. Meanwhile, Mr. Hayami, by referring to the experiences of the Japanese Management System in Japan, consistently/ always emphasizes the good side of Community consistently. According to him, because any countries always have the trust relationship of Community and all those Communities can contribute to economic development, so they need to utilize (adequately) those institutions for their economic development ⁽¹²⁾.

My research aimed at examining and clarifying the above issue, meaning that I would like to clarify the existence and the role of Community or the civil social capital for agricultural and rural development in social-economic development in rural areas of Vietnam, particularly that in the Northern rural areas of Vietnam in Doi Moi renovation (process). And here, I would like to say first that this/ my research will support the viewpoint of Mr. Hayami rather than Mr. Meier. Specifically, cooperative activities in the traditional economic organizations or Community located in rural areas of the Northern Vietnam have been existing and acting as important informal institutions in order to minimize uncertainty or share risk and even to solve imperfect information. Therefore, those institutions have enough potential to contribute to economic development in general, particularly to agricultural and rural development in Vietnam. If so, Vietnam or the Vietnamese government needs to utilize adequately that potential of Community, or both to actively use and efficiently manage that institution in the process of economic development.

4. Referring to the research of Community, particularly in terms of its economic functions, at present, this (researching) field in the world has had a number of/ some of the significant qualitative research results ⁽¹³⁾. But, until now, the researching work on the field of Community in Vietnam has been just at the beginning/ starting point, and the level of research has not been very high yet, specifically as follows:

4.1: In Vietnam, the researching work on civil social capital or Community has been carried out by some researchers in sociological research. And some of the outstanding research results are those in the articles published in the Journal of Sociology of the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. But those studies generally consider NGO and mass organizations as civil social capital and just mainly focus on those formal organizations, although there have been some of the studies in that field which have been researching on the household economies (the peasants' households) as civil social capital or Community at the household/ family level ⁽¹⁴⁾.

4.2: Meanwhile, the research on Community from the viewpoint of economics up to now, there have been not any remarkable results with the following few exceptions:

- In the Vietnamese textbooks on the history of economics in general or of development economics in particular, until now, there have not been any introductions about the economics of the New Institutional School, or the economics of institution - on which I am based - and the role of Community in economic development. In other words, regarding the theories of institutions, those textbooks so far only mention the Old Institutional School ⁽¹⁵⁾.

- The Communist Journal, the theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, which is the ruling political party in Vietnam, sometimes publishes articles about those 3 economic institutions of Market, Government and Community. But, while those articles have presented the role of market, or that of the government relatively clearly, as for the role of Community, the presentation of such articles has not been so far obvious/ has been so far a little bit vague ⁽¹⁶⁾.

- While the research results of Community from the viewpoint of economics are still limited as mentioned above, we can refer to some of the

works of Mr. Dao The Tuan and his colleagues, and of Mr. Dang Kim Son, which are relatively prominent/ significant (ones). Even so, in the research of Mr. Tuan, still just the same comment as the sociological researchers, he regards civil social capital or Community as NGOs, mass organizations, particularly agricultural cooperatives, etc. ⁽¹⁷⁾. Meanwhile, a work of Mr. Son is relatively good (one), but to my regret, his research is not the result of a specific investigation about actual cooperative activities of Community, but it just refers to a book/ work (named the Evolution of Cooperation) of Mr. Robert Axelrod to comment roughly and at random about some activities which he thought are Community ⁽¹⁸⁾.

- In the above situation, a textbook on the Vietnam's economy is currently used at the National Economics University, which may be the first textbook to define Community as the same as mine. That textbook correctly points out that civil social capital or Community is a kind of traditional economic institution. But unfortunately, because that book is just a textbook, it does not really/ entirely explain about Community in a specific and meticulous way ⁽¹⁹⁾.

Therefore, based on the above discussion, I regret to say that we only hope that the level of the research (in the field) of economic development related to Community in Vietnam will be improved further in the future/ next stages.

4.3: Regarding the research results about Community in Vietnamese studies in Japan, until now, the research results of Mr. Takeuchi are still almost solitary ones ⁽²⁰⁾. But, even Mr. Takeuchi has just paved/ opened the way, although his research works on Community still have not a few of points to be improved/ to be level up while depending on Mr. Hayami and Mr. Hara's comment, Mr. Takeuchi rightly points out that Community is an informal institution that can complement market in such fields as risk and imperfect information when the development level of market is (still) not high/ low.

5. In the above situation of the former research results on Community, my research, based on the reaching point of Mr. Takeuchi, made efforts to improve the researching level on/ of Community in Vietnam. Specifically, while his research results on Community in Vietnam is constituted by 3 parts: 1. Community in the North of Vietnam, particularly in rural areas of the Red

River Delta ⁽²¹⁾; 2. Community in the South of Vietnam, particularly in rural areas of the Mekong Delta ⁽²²⁾; 3. Community related to migration from rural areas to urban areas ⁽²³⁾. My research concentrated in more details and meticulously on the existence and the role of Community in rural areas in the North of Vietnam, or to be more precise, about Community in rural reform in the North of Vietnam since 1981, meaning the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation at the village (*làng*) level.

Compared to the above research result of Mr. Takeuchi, I can say that my research has succeeded in advancing the following aspects:

- Theoretically, this research does not only suggest that the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism is a kind/ form of the institution which can share agricultural risk and average the harvest and consumption level (as well as Mr. Takeuchi says), but it can also improve the situation in the allocation of resources, including in solving imperfect information (Section 4 of Chapter I).

- This research also explained clearer about the intimate relationship between that way of land allocation and the Cong dien system in the traditional society before, as Mr. Takeuchi correctly pointed out (Section 5 of Chapter I).

- My research uses the theory of evolutionary games and the theory of institutional complementarity in economics of institution in order to examine in detail/ precisely why peasants at the village level are determined to have been carrying out the above way of land allocation - Community, by studying/ researching specifically the period of collectivization of agriculture before the rural reform since 1981 (Section 1 and Section 2 of Chapter II).

- Regarding the period of the research object, Mr. Takeuchi only researched until the period when the land consolidation movement, a movement to overcome and abolish the above way of land allocation, began in 1993, and was officially carried out in 2002. But my study extended the period of the research until the last years of the 2010s when the land allocation movement basically ended - the timing that we can evaluate the whole period of the movement (the whole Chapter III).

Although my research is based on some basics in economics, mainly in the economics of institution, but partly because of the ambiguity of the

Vietnamese scientists/ researchers' works and the difficulty of conducting direct surveys in Vietnam, so the presentation/ description in this research is not entirely that of the economic research. Just as Mr. Nakakane, a famous researcher of Chinese studies in Japan, mentions that the studies on civil social capital or Community based on the economics of information or the concept of transaction costs (as my research) are a kind of development sociology⁽²⁴⁾. And in fact, in my research, there are also some parts that can be evaluated as more of socio-economic studies than a pure economic study. However, if I let myself try to describe my own research in this time, just as mentioned above, it is a kind of development economics' research, related to the rural economy of a developing country, and also a kind of area studies, in this research is a kind of Vietnamese studies.

2. Content and Structure of this study

1. The book titled *Introduction to the Chinese Economy, the fourth edition* compiled and written by Mr. Minami and Mr. Makino⁽²⁵⁾ is a work which is highly appreciated as a basic textbook on the Chinese economy. In that book, there is an article which is named "How has the rural China changed?" by Mr. Katoh, is one good article to understand the whole overview of the rural reform in China in the period of the Economic Reform and Open-door policy, which began in 1978. That article of Mr. Katoh succeeds in describing briefly and well the overview of agricultural and rural development in China in the current period, starting from the period of applying the products contract system to agriculture until the period of trying to implement the land concentration and accumulation.

To be frank, the contents of the rural reform in Vietnam since the Resolution of the 6th Communist Party Central Committee (of the 4th Session) of Vietnam in 1979 are not basically different from those in rural reform in China in the above period. If I can say so, I can also evaluate that the rural reform in Vietnam is that which just has the time gap compared to the rural reform in China, but in terms of the main contents, it has been basically following it.

Therefore, for the readers to understand the process of the rural reform in Vietnam easily, by tracing the way of expression/ description in the above

article of Mr. Katoh, I would like to write an essay to review briefly the whole process of the rural reform in Vietnam during the whole period which this research takes as the object, meaning that it started from the late 1970s and lasted until the end of 2010s. Although the essay may be rather long, it can be briefly described as follows:

1. The process of rural modernization in Vietnam

The origin of the rural reform in Vietnam since 1980s is the application of the products contract system to agricultural production (the Directive of No. 100 (*khoán 100*) in 1981; the Resolution of No. 10 (*khoán 10*) in 1988).

The application of the products contract system in Vietnam started from some poor rural areas, where the peasants started it secretly without the official recognition of the authorities (Vinh Phu from 1966 to 1968; Hai Phong from 1971 onwards).

During the period when agricultural cooperatives (cooperatives) existed in the agricultural collectivization from 1957 to 1988, the level of diligence of the peasants (cooperative members - co-op members) working on the land of those cooperatives was low. *It is said that* in the above situation, the application of the products contract system since 1981 has created a great incentive for those peasants to increase agricultural production. And in the process that the system has been immediately applied in the whole country ⁽²⁶⁾, the peasants have begun to shift from food/ staple crops' production to other kinds of agricultural products in agricultural diversification towards commercial agriculture. Not only that, the products contract system has also made an enormous change of the administrative structure in rural areas of Vietnam. Specifically, since the application of the products contract system to the household's members in rural areas in 1988, the local authorities at the commune level have gradually restored/ recovered the functions of People's Committee of their own, instead of those of the cooperatives (the economic subjects having those functions of administration, politics, security - defense, etc. before 1981/ 1988).

The remarkable results of that institutional reform can be seen in increasing the output of major/ primary agricultural products as follows: Food security has been basically solved. The output of commercial agricultural products of all kinds has increased positively/ prominently. The production rate of staple crops (of which rice is the main one), which had remained almost unchanged before 1979 with approximately 80% annually, in 1986-2005 decreased to 70% of the total production output of agriculture, forestry and fishery ⁽²⁷⁾. Meanwhile, forestry, (animal) husbandry and fishery all have overgrown, particularly the fishery developed outstandingly/ prominently.

Vietnam, particularly the Northern and the Central Vietnam, has hardly any conditions to reclaim further the unused land to the new land for cultivation, so the innovation of agricultural technology has been carried out only through increasing land productivity as major. As a result, the amount of main inputs such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc. with the labor force has increased relatively significantly ⁽²⁸⁾.

The current problem of Vietnam's agriculture to solve in the coming years is how to produce those agricultural products having higher value (Section 1 of Chapter III).

In this situation, the goal of Vietnam's agricultural development in the current period is to carry out the shift of the agriculture structure to a new structure, taking the commercial agricultural products as the main and to shift the agricultural organizations to those with a high level of specialization and the large scale to a certain degree, combined with the mechanization.

In order to carry out the large scale agriculture to achieve higher efficiency and increase labor productivity, it is necessary first to reduce the number of peasants working on food/ staple crops (rice) in the agricultural sector.

2. The change in peasants' life

Since the beginning of Doi Moi renovation in 1986 until the present, the number of poor people in Vietnam has decreased significantly. Compared to the per capita net income in urban areas, that in rural areas was still less than half that in 2006 ⁽²⁹⁾. Despite it, most of the Vietnamese peasants at present have basically achieved a standard of living-minimum, which can be called "enough to eat" (*đủ ăn*).

The cooperatives in the period of collectivization before 1986 (1988) had a lot of typical characteristics. One of those is that the cooperatives tried to implement a number of social policies in the field of education, health, insurance of the members'/ peasants' minimum living standard, etc ⁽³⁰⁾. But, *it is said that* from the beginning of the rural reform since 1981, the cooperatives, the former social safety system, which was based on the village community, have collapsed entirely and quickly ⁽³¹⁾. Although the Vietnamese government has been also making a lot of efforts to carry out a lot of social safety policies, until now, there have not been many results yet ⁽³²⁾. Therefore, in parallel with the implementation of those policies, the Vietnamese government is now encouraging people in the rural areas to promote "socialization" of the social safety system in the field of education, health, etc. (*"nhà nước và nhân dân cùng làm"*).

3. The existing problems (that need) to be solved in rural development

In 2008, the Party and the Vietnamese government proposed a slogan to improve

a lot of things in the rural areas, namely “Tam Nong” (*Tam nông*), related to agriculture (*nông nghiệp*), peasants (*nông dân*) and rural areas (*nông thôn*) and also began to formally implement the National Targeted Programs for New Rural Development (NTPNRD) (*chương trình Quốc gia Xây dựng Nông thôn mới*) since 2011. The goal of those programs is to build a lot of newly developed and modernized rural areas in parallel with the promotion of agricultural and rural industrialization/ modernization, as a part of the strategy of Industrialization and Modernization of the Country since 1994 (Section 1 of Chapter III).

The most serious problem in the rural economy of Vietnam in the current period is the rich and poor gap between urban and rural areas.

In order to solve that huge gap between those two areas, there is a need to carry out the industrialization/ modernization in rural areas in the direction of the solution which enables the peasants to move/ shift to work in other agricultural sectors outside food/ stable crop production and in the non-agricultural sectors, in order that their income can gradually increase. Regarding the development of industrial/ service enterprises in rural areas in line with the modern rural industrial/ service development, it requires the rural areas to develop modern rural industries/ services having the ability to create many more jobs for the peasants. In Vietnam, there is now hardly any possibilities for big cities to attract all surplus agricultural labor in rural areas. Therefore, the industrialization/ modernization in rural areas having been carried out under the expectation that it can help the above process give rise quickly and smoothly.

However, the extent to which agricultural and rural industrialization/ modernization is carried out partly depends on in what way and in what direction the reform of the household registration system and Land use rights will proceed.

Regarding the household registration system, that system started from the 1950s, but since Doi Moi renovation started, it had not had many effects ⁽³³⁾, and by the end of 2017, the Vietnamese government decided to abolish it officially ⁽³⁴⁾.

As for Land use rights, *it is said that* the Land use rights to the land of the peasants in rural areas have been functioning until now as a relatively strong kind of social safety net ⁽³⁵⁾.

In 1993, the Vietnamese government issued the “Land Law” (amended in 1998, 2002, 2014) to clarify the Land use rights in terms of the law, in order to promote the mobility of Land use rights, partly towards focusing the rights on the able peasants who will carry out the land concentration and accumulation, including the land consolidation. Based on it, the land market has been beginning to form towards the privatization of the

Land use rights (See the whole Chapter III).

At present, a certain amount of the agricultural land has been mobilized in the suburb of big cities, where a lot of peasants emigrate and immigrate to apply for new jobs in the non-agricultural sectors. Whether or not Vietnam can create those jobs and provide sufficiently public services to them and can improve its location to realize the scale and the agglomeration economy aiming at promoting economic development quickly and successfully depends on the Vietnamese government's efforts to improve its "absorptive ability" in order to absorb the successful results of developed countries in terms of various types of capital, particularly knowledge capital, etc. through international trade and FDI (36).

2. However, here I also would like to emphasize/ mention one more thing to avoid readers misunderstanding is that: although I used/ traced the way of expression of Mr. Katoh to describe the panorama/ overview of the whole process of rural reform in Vietnam as above, what I present in the following chapters (of this research) is not a more specific/ detailed presentation of the upper right section following the pattern of Mr. Katoh.

As I mentioned above, in fact, the article by Mr. Katoh is very excellent as an article describing the overview/ panorama of the whole Chinese reform. At the same time, I do not think that his article is entirely successful in presenting accurately and meticulously the role of the factors that have been determining the trend of rural reform. It is probably partly due to that the subject of that article is mainly the beginners, so the contents (of that article) were presented only in a general/ broad/ synoptic(al) way. That is why my essay more or less has those same characteristics. And I can say that the examples of that restriction in my article expressed/ written in places beginning with "*It is said that...*".

So, what are the essential/ important/ basic factors that have been deciding the overall trend of rural reform in Vietnam at present?

That factor is directly related to the main discussion of this research, namely Community, or informal cooperative activities and other relevant factors that can complement market in rural areas in the low development level of market. Faithfully based on the statements/ presentation in the following chapters of this research to say, that factor is the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation - a way of land distribution/ allocation in the rural area - an expression of the function of

common resource management at the village level which was actively carried out by the peasants of “village”, while the Vietnamese government intends to quickly shift the rural economy to market mechanism, including the formation and development of the land market in rural areas. That factor has been impacting significantly on the whole process of rural reform in Vietnam at present - since the Vietnamese government officially decided to expand the application of the products contract system to agriculture in 1981 until the period that the Party and the government began to advocate the implementation of Land use rights reform, meaning the land concentration and accumulation, particularly the land consolidation from 1993, 2002 to the latest/ not later than 2002.

Therefore, I can see the followings:

(1) It is not “the application of the products contract system since 1981 has created a great incentive for the peasant in agricultural production” but it is the above way of land allocation which was actively carried out by the peasants at the village level had a significant impact/ effects for the peasants in agricultural production through the implementation of sharing agricultural risk, averaging the harvest and consumption level and reducing the transaction costs (Section 4 of Chapter I).

(2) Besides, because the peasants actively carried out the above way of land allocation, the “social safety system which based on the village Community” did not really “collapse completely and quickly” (the same as the previous).

(3) Besides, because the peasants actively carried out the above way of land allocation, the “Land use rights (regime)” as a legal symbol of that way of land allocation “has acted until now as a fairly strong kind of social safety system” (Section 2 of Chapter III).

(4) Therefore, the reform of Land use rights, meaning the land concentration and accumulation, particularly the land consolidation, is still partly/ more or less unsatisfactory/ unsuccessful in a lot of localities. If that movement still needs to continue, it must also perform/ carry out more thoughtfully and firmly. It is because, as I just mentioned above, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism has been acting as Community to share the agricultural risk, average the harvest and consumption level and to reduce the transaction costs, aiming at contributing to the economic development, particularly to the agricultural and rural development in Vietnam at present

(Conclusion)

If so, we can say as follows: In parallel with the Vietnamese government's efforts to improve the "absorptive ability" to absorb various types of capital, particularly knowledge capital of developed countries, Vietnam still needs to actively take advantage of/ utilize the potential of Community in a given time, to a certain degree, at the same time to minimize the failures of that institution for economic development in general, at least for agriculture and rural development in a rapid and successful way (the same as the previous).

3. All of the things I will present below (in this research) are devoted to the survey and prove what I just presented/ mentioned above, in a more specific and meticulous way in all of the 3 chapters - chapter I, II and III. The contents will be presented in specific chapters, as follows:

(1) In chapter 1, I present the process of rural reform in the initial period, meaning from the beginning of the expansion of applying the products contract system in/ to agriculture, then the recognizing the products contract system at the family level, following by the identification of Land use rights in terms of legal from 1993, no later than the last years of the 1990s. Specifically:

In Section 1, before presenting the contents from part 2 onwards, I temporally follow the general comments on that process until now, in which briefly describe the period of agricultural collectivization, in the context where the Vietnamese government was forced to expand the application of the products contract system.

In Section 2, I present the rural reform process, starting with the extension of applying the products contract system, which has surpassed the prediction of the Vietnamese government and came to the state that the Vietnamese government was forced to admit that system to the peasants' households.

In Section 3, I explain the above process is that which not only recognized the products contract system for the peasants' households - Community at the family level - but also was different from the prediction of the Vietnamese government, specifically the peasants' households actively carried out a way of land distribution/ allocation at the village level which is called the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical

reallocation.

In Section 4, I explain that the above way of land allocation is a kind of informal cooperative activities, meaning Community, to complement the rural market in the low development level of market while some of the commentators often criticize it as an unreasonable way of land allocation.

In Section 5, I explain that way of land allocation - Community, which can share the agricultural risk, average the harvest and consumption level, and even reduce the transaction costs, is an institution that can achieve the economic efficiency as the (former) Cong dien system before.

In Section 6, I also mention one fact/ thing: therefore, the process of actively implementing that way of land allocation at the village level is also the process in which the village, through the commune gradually expanded the common land or the Cong dien, closely related to the implementation of periodical land reallocation at the village level.

(2) In chapter II, I go back to the past one more time and re-examine the period from the collectivization of agriculture to the expansion of the products contract system. Specifically, I rely on the theory of “historical dependency” in the economics of institution to try to investigate why the peasants in the North of Vietnam actively carried out the above way of land allocation, and why I can say/ evaluate that it has the same economic efficiency as the Cong dien system before/ in the past. Specifically:

In Section 1, before presenting the main content of this chapter, I briefly explain the theory of “historical dependency”.

In Section 2, based on that concept, I prove that: (1) The failure of the collectivization of agriculture basically belongs to the difficulties related to promoting the advantages of scale in agriculture, rather than that in business. (2) The period of focusing on the collectivization of agriculture, particularly in the late 1960s onwards is the period when Vietnam was forced to carry out the GR in rice production - a form of agriculture that can enjoy a high level of output/ harvest, but sometimes have to bear the high risk -, while the technological complementarity factors of the GR, particularly the completion of irrigation systems and ridges is not enough yet. And that is a big reason that the peasants were determined to actively carry out that way of land allocation to complement the shortage (on irrigation systems) for implementing agricultural risk sharing.

In Section 3, I explain in detail and meticulously that: that is why in

the process of expanding the products contract system, particularly in the initial stage, that products contract system or the above way of land allocation was often carried out into poor local areas where the Cong dien area was very high in the past and they were forced to carry out risk-sharing while the completion of irrigation systems and ridges is not enough. Therefore they still have not had enough conditions to carry out the GR.

(3) In chapter 3, I mainly present/ mention the process of implementing the land consolidation, which officially started from 2002 until the late years of the 2010s, taking the relationship between that movement and the above way of land allocation as the “center”. Specifically:

In Section 1, I briefly introduce the spontaneous efforts to carry out the land consolidation in some of the localities since 1993, then explain the reasons why those experiments/ trials did not become a widespread movement, including reasons related to the implementation of that way of land allocation in localities, until the Vietnamese government was eventually determined to implement the land consolidation and its main contents in 2002.

In Section 2, I make an effort to present and explain in detail the whole process of implementing the land consolidation movement, particularly the basic points/ characteristics of that movement in some of the localities which implemented it under the direct administrative guidance and monitoring of the local authorities

In Section 3, I make an effort to present/ describe the attained results of land consolidation briefly.

In Section 4, I will describe and explain the present/ current situation and the existing problems of land consolidation in detail. Specifically: (1) First of all, I explain that through that movement, the land concentration and accumulation in localities has also been carried out to a certain degree. However, in general, it is not the main reason contributing to the improvement of the living standards of the peasants or their households in those localities. (2) After that, I describe the situation of some of the typical localities after the implementation of the land consolidation movement and also point out the existing problems after that movement. Specifically, I emphasize that (2.1) For localities continuing to produce rice after the land consolidation, the process of implementing that movement was that of continuing to carry out the GR. Therefore, as I mentioned in (1) above, the

movement of implementing the land consolidation in those localities often did not contribute much/ significantly to the improvement/ increase of the living standards of the peasants or their households. (2.2) In not a few of localities, the land consolidation movement tried to overcome and abolish the above way of land allocation quickly - a kind of the institution with institutional complementarity to the GR - while the completion of irrigation systems and ridges is not enough, so that movement made the peasants in those localities feel dissatisfied/ insecure about the possibility that the risk of agriculture would be higher.

(4) In the last chapter - Conclusions, based on all of which mentioned above, particularly, on the present/ current situation and the existing problems of the land consolidation explained at the end of chapter 3, I present the conclusions and would like to give/ propose/ provide briefly (some of) the solutions. Specifically, Community, or the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, is an informal institution that can complement market, therefore it needs to be actively/ adequately utilized. At the same time, I would like to briefly to say that “the failures of Community” is an institution that sometimes cannot be omnipotent, even though I know that if I investigate and analyze that issue in more details/ specifically, I will need to carry out another research.

Notes of Introduction

1.

- (1) ジェラルド M. マイヤー；渡辺利夫・徳原悟訳（2006）『開発経済学概論』 東洋経済新報社（Gerald M. Meier（2004） *Biography of a Subject An Evolution of Development Economics*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York） 176～180 ページ、264～265 ページ。
- (2) 同上書 129～135 ページ、222～225 ページ。
- (3) 同上書 166 ページ、186 ページ、190 ページ, for example.
- (4) 速水祐次郎（2004）『新版 開発経済学』（第2刷） 創文社 319 ページ、原洋之介（2002）『開発経済論 第2版』 岩波書店 196 ページ。
- (5) マイヤー（2006） 前掲書 176 ページ。
- (6) 速水（2004） 前掲書 284～285 ページ。
- (7) 同上書 290～301 ページ。
- (8) 同上書 284 ページ、287～289 ページ。
- (9) マイヤー（2006） 前掲書 176～178 ページ。
- (10) 同上書 178～182 ページ、264～265 ページ。
- (11) 同上書 183 ページ。
- (12) 速水（2004） 前掲書 325～329 ページ。
- (13) マイヤー（2006） 前掲書 180～182 ページ。
- (14) See articles concerned in *Tap chí Xã hội học (Sociology)*, the official scientific magazine of Trung tâm Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn Quốc gia Việt Nam (Vietnam National Center for Social and Human Science).
- (15) As the relatively newer ones, see Mai Ngọc Cường, Trần Việt Tiến, Mai Ngọc Anh（2016） *Lịch sử các Học thuyết Kinh tế*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội; Bùi Ngọc Quỳnh, Đỗ Văn Nhiệm (Đồng chủ biên)（2017） *Hỏi-đáp Lịch sử các Học thuyết Kinh tế*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia Sự thật, Hà Nội, tr. 1-136, etc., for example.
- (16) Võ Trí Thành（2014） *Thế chế, Kinh tế học Thế chế và Cải cách ở Việt Nam*, *Tap chí Cộng sản số 864 tháng 10 năm 2014*, tr. 76-80, Phạm Việt Dũng（2014） *Bàn về Mối quan hệ giữa Nhà nước, Thị trường và Xã hội*, *Tap chí Cộng sản số 899 tháng 9 năm 2017*, tr. 48-53, for example.
- (17) Đào Thế Tuấn (chủ biên)(1995) *Khảo sát các Hình thức Tổ chức Hợp tác của Nông dân Nước ta Hiện nay*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội.
- (18) Đặng Kim Sơn（2004） *Ba cơ chế Thị trường, Nhà nước và Cộng đồng Ứng dụng cho Việt*

Nam, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội.

(19) Nguyễn Văn Thường, Trần Khánh Hưng (đồng chủ biên) (2014) *Giáo trình Kinh tế Phát triển (Tái bản Lần thứ 3)*, Nhà xuất bản Đại học Kinh tế Quốc dân, Hà Nội, tr. 36.

(20) 竹内郁雄 (2004) 「ベトナムにおける市場経済化を伴う経済発展の考察－北部のムラ・村にみられる“均等主義”の検討・評価を通じて－」(石井暁恵・五島文雄編 (2004) 『国際経済参入期のベトナム』 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構 アジア経済研究所) 167～219 ページ、同 (2006a) 「経済開発論的にみたベトナムにおける“国家”と“社会”との関係試論－古田元夫の描写から出発して－」(寺本実編 (2006) 『ドイモイ下ベトナムの「国家と社会」をめぐって』 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構 アジア経済研究所) 121～161 ページ、同 (2006b) 「ドイモイ下のベトナムにおける農村から都市への人口移動と「共同体」の役割試論」(寺本実編 (2006) 同上書) 163～199 ページ、同 (2011) 「ドイモイ下のベトナムにおける「共同体」の役割と「政府」の失敗－経済開発論的アプローチからみた“国家”と“社会”との関係」(寺本実編著 (2011) 『現代ベトナムの国家と社会 人々と国との関係性が生み出すくドイモイ〉のダイナミズム』 明石書店) 27～67 ページ。

(21) 竹内 (2004) 前掲論文、同 (2007) 前掲論文、同 (2011) 前掲論文。

(22) 同 (2007) 前掲論文、同 (2011) 前掲論文。

(23) 同 (2006b) 前掲論文、同 (2007) 前掲論文、同 (2011) 前掲論文。

(24) 中兼和津次 (1999) 『中国経済発展論』 有斐閣 340～345 ページ。

2.

(25) 加藤弘之 (2016) 「中国農村はいかに変化したか」(南亮進・牧野文夫編著 (2016) 『中国経済入門 [第4版] 高度成長の終焉と安定成長への途』 東洋経済新報社) 85～100 ページ。

(26) Refer to Section 3 of Chapter II, for example.

(27) Đặng Kim Sơn (2008) *Nông nghiệp, Nông dân, Nông thôn Việt Nam Hôm nay và Mai sau*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 42, 123.

(28) *Sách trên*, tr. 29.

(29) *Sách trên*, tr. 178.

(30) 竹内郁雄 (1999) 「ドイモイ下のベトナムの農業協同経営・協同組合運動試論」(白石昌也・竹内郁雄編 (1999) 『ベトナムのドイモイの新展開』 日本貿易振興会アジア経済研究所) 251 ページ。

(31) 古田元夫 (1998) 『ベトナムの現在』 講談社 163 ページ, for example.

(32) Đặng Kim Sơn (2008) , *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 149-151.

(33) 竹内 (2006b) 前掲論文 163～199 ページ。

(34) According to the Resolution No. 112 of the Vietnamese government on Oct. 30th, 2017, *Kiểm*

sát điện tử - Cơ quan của VKSND tối cao (KIEMSAT ONLINE) 03/11/2017 04:30

<https://kiemsat.vn/bai-bo-so-ho-khau-so-tam-tru-46677.html>

(35) 古田 (1998) 前掲書 197～199 ページ, for example.

(36) 加藤 前掲論稿 97 ページ, and also refer to マイヤー 前掲書 129～136 ページ.

Chapter I Appearance and Characteristics of The Way of Land Allocation in Egalitarianism

1.1 Management mechanism of agriculture in Vietnam before the expanding period of the Products Contract System

Vietnam, after spending 90 years as a French colony from 1856 to 1945, the year World War II ended, declared/gained independence and called its' official name the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

However, after that, Vietnam had to undergo a perpetual war (happened continuously) in the next 30 years (the period of the Anti-French Resistance War: 1945-1954 and the period of the Anti-U.S Resistance War: 1960-1975) during the period of the Cold War.

In the above 30-year period, the North of Vietnam was the territory directly controlled/ ruled by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The construction of the country towards socialism was carried out in the region, based on the support of the socialist camp such as the former Soviet Union, China...

The development of agriculture in the North of Vietnam in that period, the period before the Doi Moi reform process, started in 1986, was carried out in the following way:

(1) Reorganized the peasants as the independent economic subjects into the members of collective farms called agricultural cooperatives.

(2) Their agricultural production activities in those collective farms were carried out in the planned economy. This way of the activities was mostly similar to China's approach before Economic Reform & Open-door Policy since 1978.

1.1.1. Collectivization of agriculture - Towards large-scale socialistic production -

Collective farms, or agricultural cooperatives in the North of Vietnam were officially formed from 1958. After 1976, since the whole country had

been officially reunited, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam made an effort to apply the policy of collectivization widely across the whole territory of Vietnam (including the territory of the former Republic of Vietnam - the South of Vietnam today).

Mainly, the collectivization of agriculture in the North of Vietnam from 1958 aimed to perform the following two things:

(1) To gradually shift the forms of the private ownership toward the form of socialistic collective ownership, to be more concrete: in the initial period, the collectivization movement started from the formation of low-level agricultural cooperatives at the neighbor and the village level by converting the individual labor of peasants into the collective labor. Then from 1960 onwards, the government advocated these lower-level cooperatives to move up to the next stage, becoming the higher-level cooperatives at the commune level, by transforming the remaining production factors (land, capital goods such as agricultural tools, equipments, and machinery) formerly owned by cooperative members into the collective ownership. Therefore, the function of the village to manage and distribute land to the peasants' households (the household economy) carried out by the village became the function of agricultural cooperatives ⁽¹⁾.

(2) To realize large-scale agriculture combined with the mechanization of agriculture in parallel with the expansion of the scale of cooperatives towards the goal of building the cooperatives as an economic organization similar to the form of semi-industrial state-run enterprises. Because "in that period, this task was considered a common and inevitable trend of the whole socialist countries" ⁽²⁾. Through this process, the former lower-level cooperatives at the village level were reorganized as "production teams", which were a small unit of higher-level cooperatives and were in direct charge of agricultural activities of cooperatives.

Regarding the expansion of cooperatives, from 1975 (the year when the Vietnam War ended or from 1976, the year when the two regions of Vietnam were unified onwards), this movement was continuously carried out towards expanding the scale of cooperatives. It started from the commune level, followed by the inter-commune level ⁽³⁾ while trying to implement regional specialization of agriculture ⁽⁴⁾ by taking the district level as a fundamental unit of a combination of agriculture and industry ⁽⁵⁾.

1.1.2. Activities of agricultural cooperatives

According to Mr. Furuta, the success in popularizing agricultural cooperatives in regions and localities in that period was mainly due to the effects of the increasingly fierce Vietnam War from 1965 onwards ⁽⁶⁾. That is, the critical meaning of the collectivization of agriculture in the North of Vietnam in that period was: to build the cooperatives as a platform/ base to carry out the general mobilization in wartime ⁽⁷⁾. And cooperatives in that period attained outstanding success in the following two fields: (1) not only in protecting and constructing free/ liberated areas/ zones at the village level; but also in organizing youth at the village level to perform military service ⁽⁸⁾ and (2) in mobilizing the village to contribute food to the government.

However, according to Mr. Furuta, besides the successes mentioned above, agricultural production activities, the cooperatives themselves had had a lot of problems from the beginning. According to Mr. The Dat, in 30 years after independence, Vietnam's agricultural productivity doubled, agricultural production was more than doubled ⁽⁹⁾ and increased continuously from 1965 to 1974 ⁽¹⁰⁾ and from 1974 to 1979 ⁽¹¹⁾. However, the level of food production per capita in those years decreased and the level of food supply per capita was even severer ⁽¹²⁾, in the following situation:

During the process of expanding the scale of cooperatives: from the commune level, followed by the inter-commune level, until 1978, the serious situation/ problems occurred as follows:

(1) The scale of cooperatives was too large, and the speed of scale expansion was too fast ⁽¹³⁾.

(2) The efficiency of agricultural mechanization was also limited because most of the agricultural machinery in that period were imported while the North of Vietnam was in a shortage of foreign currencies ⁽¹⁴⁾.

Therefore, the whole Vietnam immediately after unifying the two regions in 1976, especially in the North, in 1978, 1979, dropped down to serious food shortages. Besides, the decrease in agricultural productivity per capita partly due to natural disasters and fluctuations of weather also lasted for three consecutive years ⁽¹⁵⁾. Moreover, the North also faced up with difficulties in all economic activities in/ following the planned economy. Particularly in the context of Vietnam advancing to Cambodia in 1978, followed by the Vietnam - China war in 1979, forcing the whole country to

turn into a half - war economic regime, those difficulties became even more fierce. At the same time, the international situation, in general, had deteriorated, accompanied by foreign aid for Vietnam increasingly reducing.

In this situation, the 6th Communist Party Central Committee of the 4th Session in 1979 issued a very essential resolution with the following principal contents:

(1) To make a switch to market economy at a certain level.

(2) To carry out appropriate management decentralization at the regional and local levels.

It means that the resolution addressed the need for deregulation (institutional reforms) to break through the economic difficulties in that period.

Therefore, the collectivization of agriculture was also required to find out urgent solutions towards the improvement and innovation of cooperative management.

1.1.3. Problems of agricultural cooperatives

Agricultural production activities of agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam had always tried to expand scale in parallel with mechanization to build large-scale agriculture, towards the socialistic economy as the style of the former Soviet Union. However, till that time, those activities had had some problems related to the inefficiency itself, moreover the severe nonconformity/ inadequacy in the agricultural situation of Vietnam in that period, a developing country located in Asia. Nevertheless, about this critical issue, I would like to explain it in more detail later. Here, I would only like to explain the inefficiencies that the Vietnamese government in that period realized that it should be rectified immediately by/ through the implementation of deregulation or the shift to the market mechanism. Those inefficiencies were mainly in the following two points:

1. The first inefficient point is the Diseconomy of scale in management ⁽¹⁶⁾. A diseconomy of scale means/ is a kind of inefficiency. It occurs even when we increase the types of production factors in a specific ratio/ proportion, but the production growth/ output productivity growth does not increase in the correct/ same ratio/ proportion. This diseconomy of scale

stems from the following 2 sources/reasons:

(1) Due to the expansion/ enlargement in the organization and management of agricultural cooperatives, when the scale of the cooperatives has expanded, the number of management boards in the cooperatives also has to increase. Therefore, the number of staff in those boards has to increase as well, and this increase in staff exceeds the increase in output ⁽¹⁷⁾. In fact, by the end of the 70s, those cooperatives had employed more than 100 staff specializing in working in the Cooperative Management Board ⁽¹⁸⁾. It was because, in that period, the number of planned targets, or the norms had been increasing, meaning that the amount of information that the cooperatives had to handle more and more increasingly.

(2) The then agricultural cooperative was lack of able human resources for management (lack of knowledge capital): It means that those cooperatives only had those staff who mainly knew paperwork but did not know the business. One reason for that situation was because increasing the number of highly qualified staff as knowledge capital in parallel with an increasing agricultural output is not easy ⁽¹⁹⁾. Fostering highly qualified staff at cooperatives was a significant and frequently emphasized task in the late 70s to increase agricultural productivity at the cooperative level ⁽²⁰⁾, but the implementation of that task was complicated. Because, just as the situation of People's Commune in the time of Mao Zedong in China, managing cooperatives itself was a very complex task. Besides, the educational level of cooperative members in that period was only the primary level ⁽²¹⁾, therefore, it was not easy to require those members to develop their ability as a knowledge capital.

2. The second inefficient point: The socialistic unified distribution system in/ according to egalitarianism.

This distribution system applied in that period had the following characteristics:

It was almost the same distribution system ⁽²²⁾ as that at the People's Commune level in China in that period, specifically.

This system determined the volume/ level of food distributed to each household member according to their per month needs. If the food production of cooperative members exceeded the above standard, the cooperative would usually buyback/ recover the part exceeding the above

standard by cashing back to them. On the contrary, if the food production of cooperative members did not meet the above criteria, the cooperative would apply an allowance to those cooperative members in order that those members could buy the missing amount at a fixed price ⁽²³⁾. It means that the system did not allow any cooperative member to keep any excess food, that was, the distribution system in egalitarianism.

Moreover, the reason the Vietnamese government in that period tried to make distribution under this distribution system was that: in that period, the “striving and winning” (“decided to win the war was regarded as the highest value standard”) ⁽²⁴⁾. In other words, the cooperative had to bear all the risks in agricultural production to ensure a minimum living standard for the social-weak by obligating the social active to sacrifice.

Therefore, this distribution system, according to egalitarianism, had a significant meaning for households of cooperative members during the Vietnam War.

However, precisely because this distribution system mode lacked an incentive mechanism to co-op members when the Vietnam War ended, they did not have to strive for war any longer ⁽²⁵⁾, so this system began to cause their “moral hazard”. Therefore, the situation that they did not have to take any risks at cooperatives more and more gravely.

Namely, in that period, those cooperative members did not make an effort to work hard on the land of the cooperative but follow the sub-business on the small plot of the land that they were permitted to hold ⁽²⁶⁾.

Therefore, the members of the Cooperative Management Board were forced to monitor down to their large-scale collective farms regularly, to monitor whether the members are working hard or not, aiming at preventing them from causing “moral hazard”. In other words, cooperatives in that period were forced to increase management costs, namely monitoring costs - a type of transaction cost according to economics of information. Furthermore, the increase of management costs made the inefficient situation of the cooperative in that period, the more serious/ formidable ⁽²⁷⁾.

1.2. Expansion of the application of the Products Contract System and Restoration of the peasants' household economy

In 1979, the Vietnamese Communist Party issued the Resolution of the 6th Communist Party Central Committee of the 4th Session, which advocated the need to implement a reasonable management decentralization and shift to market economy to a certain degree.

Those guidelines were a solution to remove difficulties in the economy in general, especially those in the agricultural sector in the situation of Vietnam in a semi-war regime and international isolation. Specifically speaking about the agricultural sector, those difficulties were as follows:

(1) The inefficiency of agricultural cooperatives in collectivization since gaining independence and unifying the two regions had caused the failure of food production, leading to food shortage, although the fact that the problem that Vietnam needed to solve most urgently in that period should have been the population - food problem.

(2) This resolution in the initial implementation period was considered only a temporary solution. However, if looking back from the current stage, it played a significant role as a resolution that opened the way toward the shift to market economy in a comprehensive way since 1986, the year that Doi Moi renovation began.

Regarding the above-mentioned period of shifting to market economy, that period can be divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1 (from 1979 to 1988, not later than 1993): the stage of deregulation (reducing the unnecessary interference in activities of economic subjects at the micro-level by the government).

Stage 2 (from 1988, 1994 to the latest until now): the stage when the government tried to form and develop market. But Vietnam, as a developing country, the development level of market is not high, meaning that market there often causes market failures, especially uncertainty, which could be: Risk and Imperfect Information. Therefore, this second period can be regarded as the period when outside market, besides the government (the government institution), there is another economic institution to complement market having been beginning to act/ function, in other words, being reborn/ restored.

Regarding this economic institution, if from the viewpoint of the historical dependency of economics of institution, I can say that it is described as the recovery/ rebirth of the Cong dien system (the common land system - the way of land allocation in the traditional Vietnamese society).

And by dedicating this entire chapter, I make an effort to present and prove that: the above economic institution can be called a cooperative activity or community institution that up to now still exists, has been playing a role in complementing market, contributing to increasing productivity, which means contributing to economic development, although the fact that the way of the above land allocation has been changing gradually in its expression in the whole process of rural reform till now. Therefore, if we see the vital meaning of this economic institution, then we need to utilize the potential of this institution in a certain period, with a certain degree for economic development in general and agricultural and rural development in particular in Vietnam.

1.2.1. Expansion of the application of the Products Contract System

De-regulation of Vietnam in that period aiming at solving a lot of economic difficulties in general and addressing food shortage in the rural economy started from the Resolution of the 6th Communist Party Central Committee of the 4th Session in 1979 and underwent a period of Doi Moi renovation, which began with the 6th Party Congress in 1986, mainly, since 1988, the Vietnamese authorities made an effort to promote economic reform, and then in 1993, this process/policy was basically finished.

About the deregulation in the rural economic sector, this activity started in January 1981. Specifically, starting from Directive of No.100 of the Secretary Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam with the policy of implementing the final products contract system (*khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng*) widely to agricultural production activities in agricultural cooperatives (*khoán 100*). After a certain period of implementation, until 1988, the Politburo of the Central Communist Party of Vietnam issued the Resolution of No.10 with the implementation of such policies to promote deregulation in rural areas as: (1) To recognize that the household of cooperative members is an independent economic subject; (2) To allocate long-term Land use rights to members of the household of cooperative members, etc. (*khoán 10*). By 1993, this deregulation in the rural areas mostly ended with the legal recognition of the Land use rights of peasants' households under the Land Law, enacted in 1993.

The process of implementing deregulation in the rural areas in Vietnam, especially in the Northern region of Vietnam, has contributed significantly to increasing food production. In this regard, according to the comparative study of economic systems, if only mentioning the results of deregulation, we can evaluate that: the deregulation here was the process of the shift of ownership through the process of shifting to market economy in Vietnam as a socialist country. Specifically, it is the process of the shift of the economic subjects doing agricultural production from cooperatives to the households. Therefore, it is also the process of shifting the form of ownership of production factors, particularly Land-use rights from agricultural cooperatives to the household economies.

However, if depending on the economic development theory of the economics of institution to assess, I can say that it is also a process of carrying out deregulation of Vietnam, as a developing country (no longer taking into account the socialist factor). And the reason why I need to explain and present this issue more profoundly is that: this process carried out where the level of economic development is still not high, so the development level of market is still not high, leading market to often cause a lot of market failures. Therefore, if we present that process as only a form of ownership transformation, it is not enough yet. Here, I would like to explain this more concretely as follows:

1. Before the Directive of No.100, according to the theory of economic development of the economics of institution, the reality of agricultural production in agricultural cooperatives is described as follows: The cooperative as the principal was the subject which should sustain all risks in agricultural production, because, before the products contract system was applied, the cooperative had been implementing large-scale agriculture on the distribution system in/ according to egalitarianism. During the period of applying that old distribution system, cooperative members lost incentive in increasing agricultural production. Thus, they would often cause “moral hazard”. Therefore, cooperatives in that period had to solve that situation, which meant creating incentives for co-op members’ not to cause “moral hazard” in agricultural production.

Therefore, the expansion to apply the products contract system in agricultural production according to the Directive of No.100 in 1981 was a

kind of incentive mechanism applied to cooperative members and their families to quickly increase food production/ yield to overcome food shortages in that period. According to the economics of information, the expansion of the application of the products contract system in agriculture is a measure to increase agricultural production and solve the food shortage problem rapidly in that period. By recognizing at some certain degree cooperative members that are economic subjects and replacing the solution of the monitoring with the solution of applying income by-products (solution through incentive mechanism ⁽²⁸⁾), it contributed greatly to solve the situation of imperfect information (in this case, to avoid “moral hazard” of cooperative members).

The main contents of the products contract system are as follows ⁽²⁹⁾:

(1) To shift the contracting level from the former “production team” (3 forms of contract) down to each cooperative member, or his/ her family, meaning that: to recognize that cooperative members are economic subjects even though they are still members of cooperatives, not individual peasants yet.

(2) Then, the cooperative and each cooperative member directly sign a contract of the final product output, instead of the above 3 forms of contract.

(3) Specifically, the cooperative allocates land to cooperative members or their whole family members in a certain period - usually about 3 years ⁽³⁰⁾ and entrusts them at least 3 of the whole eight necessary stages in food production - transplantation, cultivation, harvest ⁽³¹⁾. Those 3 are the stages in which cooperative members or their family members can perform alone, which means they do not necessarily have to be based on cooperative labor at the cooperative level, including in the harvest stage. Then, when it comes to saying how to implement the contract system at the harvest stage, the cooperative assigns food yield level as the norm to them, and this norm is decided by referring to the average output at the cooperative level in the nearest last 5 years ⁽³²⁾ (later 3 ~ 5 years ⁽³³⁾).

(4) And when it comes to saying how to distribute income to cooperative members, they do not follow the old distribution system any longer but apply the following new distribution system:

- For the food output that cooperative members assigned, the cooperative pays about 70% of the above output for them as their gross income, including 20% of the above output as their net income ⁽³⁴⁾.

- For the excess of the output (usually 20% ~ 30% of the assigned part⁽³⁵⁾), the cooperative accepts that cooperative members can handle freely according to their discretion.

Before this contract system, the income of cooperative members was mostly the same, whether they worked hard or not. However, once this contract system was applied widely, it became a kind of incentive mechanism to those co-op members or peasants because:

Following this new system, cooperative members now can enjoy two types of their income by-products: The first - the part of the contract - is the income at a certain level, and the second - the excess part of the contract - is that at the higher level than the first part. And if they fail to perform the first part of the contract, they will be punished by paying off the output value of the missing part to the cooperative. That is, this products contract system is a type of contract mechanism to create the incentive by means of the product income - the contract according to “the fixed amount of the products”⁽³⁶⁾.

Therefore, now the cooperative members are to be motivated to increase agricultural production, and at the same time, they are also to bear some of the risk related to agricultural production activities. In other words, if the cooperative members want to receive a lot of income by-products, besides completing the norm by the contracts, they have to make an effort or bear an equivalent risk with the income by-products exceeding the norm. By the way, regarding the role of cooperatives in implementing this contract system, the Directive of No.100 advocated that the cooperative should make efforts to enable cooperative members to complete the norm in this new system.

2. By the way, I would like to explain why the Directive 100 advocates “expanding the application” of the final products contract system into agricultural production in cooperatives. One reason is that: Before the Secretary Bureau issued this Directive, “many localities”⁽³⁷⁾ had begun to try to apply a form of the products contract system just like the one following the Directive of No.100.

In the former days, those experiments were often criticized as an “underground” contract system (*khoán chui*) partly because those trials in localities started informally before the Directive No.100. Some typical examples of those experiments can be described as follows:

(1) Rice: Vinh Phu province (now Vinh Phuc province) from 1966: Until 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party criticized and banned this experiment in the province ⁽³⁸⁾, but from then on, the province still continued this experiment in a secret way ⁽³⁹⁾; Hai Phong City since 1972: when talking about the experiment of this city, a work of Mr. Furuta accurately describes the case of Doan Xa commune, An Thuy district since 1974 ⁽⁴⁰⁾.

(2) Secondary crops: Vinh Phu province (now Vinh Phuc province) from the winter crop of 1978; Nghe Tinh province (now Nghe An and Ha Tinh province) from the winter crop of 1978 ⁽⁴¹⁾.

(3) Husbandry: Thai Binh Province since 1971 in Vu Tan Cooperative, Kien Xuong District; Hanoi City since 1971 at Phu Thuong Cooperative, Tu Liem district ⁽⁴²⁾.

Among the above-mentioned experiments of the localities, a lot of those experiments succeeded in increasing agricultural production quickly, including rice production. Therefore, the Directive of No.100 was eventually determined to implement a policy of “expanding application” of the products contract system comprehensively.

Since then, the application of the products contract system became a very enthusiastic movement throughout the country. According to Mr. Murano, until 1982, about 95% of all cooperatives in the North of Vietnam had applied or expanded to apply this new contract system ⁽⁴³⁾. From then on, in several successive years, this contract system became a “pulling force” to help the northern rural areas of Vietnam to increase agricultural production quickly and remarkably.

1.2.2. Appearance and Recognition of the Household Products Contract System

1. However, the process of widely implementing the above products contract system was not a simple process. It is because: (1) In fact, the economic subjects carrying out this contract system were the whole household members of cooperative members including those cooperative members rather than cooperative members themselves, although the policy of the Directive of No.100 was: The economic subjects implementing the products contract system in principle should be more cooperative members

than their household members, because the Directive of No. 100 states that the role of those household members is only to help co-op members implement the products contract system as a form of part-time job of those household members. But, in a lot of regions and localities, not a few of those household members were willing to actively apply the products contract system spontaneously to increase agricultural productivity/ agricultural production at those household level (the household products contract).

Besides that, this process was also the process in which those household members applied the contract system to many more stages than those provided by the Directive, (not just 3 of the 8 stages, which the Directive of No.100 provided). Therefore, in the process of carrying out this contract system, a relevant trend began to occur, that is: the whole family of cooperative members not only contracted the final products but also received the allocated land first and were also determined to contract all 8 stages of production on that land. That trend then was a phenomenon called the “whole stages contract” (*khoán trắng*), which the Directive of No.100 seriously prohibited ⁽⁴⁴⁾.

According to a Vietnamese book published ⁽⁴⁵⁾, the above situation (the popularization of the household products contract and the emergence of the whole stages contract) showed that: that phenomenon had been popular in a lot of localities when the Communist Party of Vietnam opened the 5th Party Congress in April 1982. At that Congress, the Party set out the policy: to reduce the scale of cooperatives whose size had enlarged day by day up to that time ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

The book I just mentioned above is about the Second Conference held by Nguyen Ai Quoc Institution in August 1982 on the final products contract system in agricultural cooperatives with the title (subtitled): “Practical and theoretical issues”, which Institution for fostering intermediate and senior cadres of the Vietnamese Communist Party (now is named the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy). And this book describes as follows:

(1) Of all of the 8 speakers participating in this Conference, 7 reported that: up to that time (August 1982), in a lot of localities, there are a lot of household economies or sub-household economies which have been involved in expanding the application of the products contract system. For example, one speaker reports that those household economies to implement the contract system have now become a movement of the families of

cooperative members ⁽⁴⁷⁾.

(2) 6 out of those 8 speakers highly appreciated the positive role of those household economies of cooperative members in expanding the application of the contract system. For example, one speaker states that: thanks to this contract system, the household economy of cooperative members has been motivated/ promoted to its inherent potential. Or another speaker says that: now, the cooperatives that are utilizing those household economies efficiently have become advanced cooperatives, etc. ⁽⁴⁸⁾.

The process of the above situation did not cease at those household economies of cooperative members actively participating in the contract system but moreover, just as some reporters in the above-mentioned conference stated, in some localities, the “whole stages contract” had also been carried out ⁽⁴⁹⁾. For example, there was a reporter saying that: there is a phenomenon that the household economies are determined/ “dared” to apply the contract system in 4 stages, rather than 3 stages, and then they continued to apply it in 5, then 6 stages... ⁽⁵⁰⁾. And there are also those cooperatives which want to entrust those household economies to do all the stages of production (the whole stages contract) ⁽⁵¹⁾. In localities that have been carrying out the whole stages contract, peasants are excited because they have succeeded in increasing their income ⁽⁵²⁾, etc.

Regarding the above situation, I can also recognize this situation through some research results conducted by Japanese researchers about/ on Vietnamese studies through direct surveys in some rural areas of Vietnam from the 1990s until now ⁽⁵³⁾.

Because of the Directive of No.100 prohibiting the whole stages contract in that period, among all the 8 speakers who reported in the above Conference, the number of positive/ appreciative reports on the whole stages contract was only 2 ⁽⁵⁴⁾. But since the Resolution of the 6th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1984 - to indicate the direction toward Doi Moi renovation process since 1986, the Party also began to encourage those household economies, and the household products contract there was officially authorized to develop in the following contexts:

2. Therefore, until 1988, two years after the beginning of Doi Moi renovation, in the situation that the incentive to expand the contract system began to disappear and the North of Vietnam experienced a shortage of food,

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam eventually recognized the household products contract and the whole stages contract in the Resolution No. 10 of the Politburo of the Central Communist Party ⁽⁵⁵⁾ with the following 5 specific contents:

(1) To recognize that not only cooperative members but also their family members are now independent economic subjects.

(2) To accept the allocation of Land use rights to the households for a long-term, namely 20 years to each number of those households (now 30~50 years).

(3) Besides, to contract with those households about not only the final stage of producing final products but 6 of all the 8 stages on the allocated land of their own.

(4) In terms of income distribution to those households, to replace the final products contract system with a new system as follows: to accept the households gain about 40% of the total output as their net income which they produce on their allocated land ⁽⁵⁶⁾, after deducting the equivalent of the agricultural tax and the necessary costs related to cooperatives' management. And for the beneficiaries (after completing the contract), they are free to handle according to their own wishes. It means that the Resolution of No.10, replacing the Directive of No.100, created the incentive mechanism under the contract system by applying a new form of incentive mechanism called "incentive of ownership" ⁽⁵⁷⁾ via allocating Land use rights. In summary, those households were to be authorized to have a stronger incentive mechanism to increase agricultural production, thus the level of effort/ risk that they will have to bear in agricultural production also increased.

(5) Regarding the roles of cooperatives when households implement this new contract system, the Resolution provides as follows:

- Cooperatives should not only allocate land to households but also transfer to them all types of capital goods of agricultural production in general such as machinery, tools... ⁽⁵⁸⁾

- At the same time, cooperatives should innovate their activities from as a type of production organizations to as a type of service organizations to serve household economies of co-op members. Specifically, cooperatives should be only responsible for 2 stages related to the input: supply electricity, plant quarantine... And if possible, cooperatives should do a new stage of support, that is: to help those household economies solve the consumption

stage ⁽⁵⁹⁾.

3. Thus, De-regulation, in other words, the shift to market mechanism in rural areas of Vietnam in the initial period started from the Directive of No.100 of the Secretary Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1981, with some main contents such as Cooperative members are supposed to (1) economic subjects; also (2) the subjects authorized to have the incentive mechanism according to products in 1988, was only finished the Phase 1 with the Resolution of No. 10 of the Central Politburo. Specifically, that Resolution contained the following contents: 1. All the household members or all the family members of cooperative members are recognized as independent economic subjects and 2. All of those household members also gain long-term Land use rights as a kind of incentive of ownership.

Based on those, the Vietnamese authorities in that period also advocated that: localities should implement land adjustment according to the above Resolution of No.10, aiming at helping each member of the household of co-op members, as the household economy to be allocated Land use rights for farming on that land in the very near future.

Meanwhile, for agricultural cooperatives, which were required to renovate their activities to service organizations: after the Resolution of No.10, cooperatives almost lost their function to perform agricultural production. At the same time, they also had to bear the budget cut down in a lot of fields by the Vietnamese Government. Therefore, right after the Party issued the Resolution of No.10, a lot of cooperatives fell into the situation of dissolution or had difficulties in the service business; it means: they did not fall into as the worst situation as dissolved but only continued to exist in principle ⁽⁶⁰⁾.

1.3. Agricultural development policy in Vietnam towards shifting to market economy and Appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

1.3.1 The land adjustment – Towards commercial agriculture on a large scale -

As I mentioned above, in 1988, in the Resolution of No.10 of the Politburo of the Central Communist Party of Vietnam, the Vietnamese authorities called on regions and localities to implement land adjustment to re-allocate the right of using land for the family members of cooperative members. In fact, a lot of regions and localities had ended this task in the process of expanding the application of the products contract system to their households through the whole stages contract. But, the Vietnamese authorities anticipated that through this task (adjustment of land), the regions and localities in implementing (formally) the land adjustment according to the Resolution of No.10 would certainly carry out both of 2 other tasks at the same time: 1. To increase agricultural labor productivity in particular; 2. To increase the productivity of the whole rural economy in general.

To be more precise, the Resolution of No.10 expected that regions and localities would allocate to households the smallest number of plots possible but with the vastest in area of each of those plots. It means that regions and localities would avoid the situation of small-scale dispersion of land in allocation ⁽⁶¹⁾.

Not only that, the Resolution of No.10 also aimed to realize the goal/task as follows: Through that land adjustment, households would start the exchange of their plots for each other to form those plots which would be larger in area with a smaller number of plots, and would then focus those vaster plots on those households who have a talent for agricultural business - “the land concentration and accumulation” ⁽⁶²⁾. In other words, the land market in agriculture would soon form and develop ⁽⁶³⁾, and through that, those households would replace cooperatives to continue developing large-scale agriculture to increase agricultural labor productivity.

Besides, the Resolution of No.10 also aimed to create favorable conditions for talented peasants specializing in agricultural activities to expand their business through the above process. Furthermore, meanwhile, those peasants who have a talent for non-agricultural economic activities would continue to do those activities to realize comparative advantages to improve the level of social labor division among people at their local level. Then it would contribute day by day to increasing the productivity of the whole economy in rural areas ⁽⁶⁴⁾.

Therefore, we can say that the Resolution of No.10 was an extremely

important document with the following meanings:

(1) To allocate land to households in rural areas.

(2) To form and develop the land market to develop the rural economy further, the most important task after de-regulation.

(3) With the prospect/ goal of large-scale agricultural development ⁽⁶⁵⁾.

As to why Vietnam in the shift to market mechanism needs to carry out at the same time both of 2 processes: (1) de-regulation; (2) market formation and development in general, one reason is that Vietnam's carrying out both of those tasks at the same time is inevitable, because, besides a socialist country, it is still a developing country.

By the way, about the land concentration and accumulation, I would like to comment as follows:

It seems that the Resolution of No.10 had the following optimistic perspective: once the de-regulation implemented, peasants would be willing to respond the good opportunities/ chance in market and carry out actively the land concentration and accumulation towards the implementation of large-scale agriculture combined with the mechanization of agriculture ⁽⁶⁶⁾.

Therefore, the Resolution of No.10 also advocated that peasants also would need to carry out bidding on unused land in the village to promote land concentration and accumulation in rural areas. And then, these plots would be automatically focused on those households who have a talent for agricultural business ⁽⁶⁷⁾.

The movement of land adjustment or land allocation (once again) to households had completed in 1993. And in 1993, the Vietnamese authorities issued the "Land Law of 1993", which provides peasants with enjoying the legal right of the land they are allocated as independent economic subjects.

1.3.2. Appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

However, the actual land adjustment process until 1993 in the regions and localities had been carried out in a direction completely different from the anticipation of the Resolution of No.10, as I explained above. It means that: the way of land allocation to households was not in the form of allocating households large plots in area but in the way of allocating in a small-scale dispersion.

Regarding this situation, Mr. Pham Xuan Nam, a Vietnamese

researcher on population issues, envisions roughly as follows:

“Since the Communist Party of Vietnam issued the Resolution of No.10 in 1988, the land that agricultural cooperatives previously held now begin to be allocated to peasants with long-term use. However, the way of land allocation that peasants in regions and localities have been carrying out is a way in egalitarianism, by allocating plots/ land to each member of their households. In this case, not a few of localities still follow the way of land allocation in the traditional village once existed before (the traditional Vietnamese society), re-allocating the land periodically, for example once every 3 to 5 years. This way of land allocation currently has had the following aftermath: Young people in rural areas often get married in their youth and separated their civil status from their parents’ family to establish their own households, in order to speedily increase the demographic in their new family, aiming at receiving much more plots” ⁽⁶⁸⁾.

If we call the above way of land allocation “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation” according to Mr. Nam, it will be described concretely as follows:

If there is a village in a rural area, then according to/ in the Resolution of No.10, this village is to certainly allocate land to all the households in the village in egalitarianism according to the number of members of each of those households. But “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation” in this case does not mean that the village will divide all of the village lands in absolute terms into the number of relatively large plots which is equal to the whole population in the village to allocate each relatively large plot to each member of those households on average. It does mean: they allocate land in egalitarianism by dividing each of relative large plots into a lot of smaller plots based on the assessment/ consideration of factors related to natural conditions of plots such as: the level of soil fertility, the location, the distance to plots (compared to the house of the household), etc., and then making an effort to allocate those small plots for all of the members of each household in egalitarianism. Therefore, after allocation, those plots which each member of those households are allocated would not be focused on the same place but as small-scale dispersion in a lot of different relative large plots located in different places in the village. Therefore, peasants’ households in the North and the Central of Vietnam often describe the situation of “the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism” as: “we

have/ are allocated good plots, bad plots, near plots, far plots... (*có chỗ tốt, chỗ xấu, chỗ gần, chỗ xa...*)” and sometimes as: “high plots, low plots... (*chỗ cao, chỗ thấp...*)”⁽⁶⁹⁾.

And when the above land allocation in egalitarianism was carried out, the villages often gave priority to those households who are the subjects of social policy, including those contributors for revolutionary activities. And those plots/ parcels which those families were allocated were usually those near their residence if they needed them⁽⁷⁰⁾. After that, the village went on land allocation to the remaining/ left households. Therefore, household members in general were often allocated a series of small plots on average. So, if they produce agricultural products on such allocated small plots, then their agricultural output/ harvest would be equal.

In the process of land allocation, there were also some cases where regions and localities did not hand over/ allocate a certain number of plots to household members in the village, but retained those plots as the common land/ the Cong dien of the village under the direct/ self-governing management of the village. Therefore, not a few of those plots as the common land/ the Cong dien were scattered in the village and were called “enclaves”⁽⁷¹⁾.

Besides, there were also some other cases: some regions and localities also periodically re-allocated land in case of the number of those household members was changed, for example: when some families have more children, some families move to or move from other regions or localities, or some families have lost their member(s)... After a specific time of land allocation, the village would periodically carry out land re-allocation. It is the meaning of the passage in the above excerpt of Mr. Nam, saying that: Not a few of localities carried out the land allocation periodically every 3 to 5 years (Also in that above extract, there was another section that wrote: “In this case, not a few of localities still follows the way of land allocation in the traditional village once existed before (the traditional Vietnamese society)...” (Regarding to what meaning of this sentence is, I would like to explain it later). Back to the periodical re-allocation of land, there were the following two types: Type 1: the village re-allocates all the small plots once again that had been allocated in the first time (but because that way was very complicated/ hard so), there still was another type (Type 2): when it is time to re-allocate land, the village usually took a part of the above-mentioned the

Cong dien (land) as land for re-allocation and allocated it for each household in case in need, according to the new number(s) of their family ⁽⁷²⁾.

In the above paragraphs, I demonstrated that the land adjustment task undertaken by the Resolution of No.10 in localities could be envisioned as a process of carrying out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation entirely different from the prediction of Resolution of No.10. As a result, there were also some cases in villages in the North and the Central of Vietnam where not a few of households were allocated a lot of plots, even more than 10 plots. Meanwhile, in mountainous midland regions with high and low elevation topography such as Vinh Phu province (now Vinh Phuc and Phu Tho provinces) in the Northern midlands or Ha Tinh province in the North Central region, there were also localities where peasants were often allocated many more plots with the number up to 30 plots or more than 50 ⁽⁷³⁾. In general, in the Red River Delta in the North of Vietnam, the number of plots allocated in the households in the middle Red River region tended to be more than that in the lower catchment-basin areas, such as those located in the mouth of a river, called a new plain going to the coastal area (for example in the provinces of Nam Dinh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh ...) ⁽⁷⁴⁾.

Thus, the bidding for land at the village level prescribed/ provided by the Resolution of No.10 was not considered to have been performing well, except the case of Thanh Hoa province. There was a survey of land allocation conducted in 4 provinces in the North and the Central in 1990, proving that truth. In there, the situation was as follows: Hoang Lien Son Province (now Lao Cai and Yen Bai provinces); Ha Nam Ninh province (now Ha Nam, Nam Dinh, and Ninh Binh provinces); Binh Dinh and Dak Lak provinces (now Dak Nong and Dak Lak provinces) carried out the bidding activities but the unoccupied land, or the unused land's number prepared for bidding by those four provinces after the Resolution of No.10 was very small, just 10% percent in those total land area of those 4 provinces. Specifically, that percentage number in Hoang Lien Son Province was only 1.52%, Ha Nam Ninh province 0.37%, Binh Dinh province 0.08%, Dak Lak province 1.48% ⁽⁷⁵⁾.

Therefore, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism or the way of land allocation of small-scale dispersion carried out by localities in the Northern rural areas during the implementation of land adjustment under the

Resolution of No.10 made it more difficult to implement the Agriculture and Rural Development Strategy according to the Resolution of No.10's predictions, for example: if peasants work in small-scale dispersion's plots according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, then that way of farming compared to that in a larger scale of land will make it more difficult to bring/ use agricultural machinery into the field to increase agricultural labor productivity.

It is because that way of land allocation of small-scale dispersion would be a barrier to the implementation of large-scale agriculture toward the increase of more surplus agricultural products, which was considered as the immediate task by the Vietnamese authorities in that period. Besides, the periodical land re-allocation in egalitarianism that many localities had carried out would also cause the following other additional difficulties:

(1) In determining Land use rights for the above-mentioned small plots (belonging to which peasant).

(2) In carrying out 5 rights of Land use rights as: assignment, purchase - sale, lease - for lease, security, inheritance of small plots.

Thus, it would also make the land concentration and accumulation into those households who have a talent for the agricultural business, following by formation and development of the land market ... would also face up with difficulties.

Therefore, some commenters in the Party, the government and the research organizations have so far been criticizing the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism popular for a long time in the rural areas of the North of Vietnam as “inefficient”, and sometimes as “irrational”. Some of those commenters even say that the way of land allocation is a remain of the former socialist unified distribution system ⁽⁷⁶⁾, which agricultural cooperatives implemented in the period of collectivization.

And perhaps partly acknowledging those critical opinions, from 1993 onwards, the authorities tried to implement a series of land policies to promote the land concentration and accumulation, quickly forming and developing land market in rural areas according to the below process, with such some examples as follows: (1) The Decision of No. 64 of government was issued in 1994, based on the Land law of 1993, aiming at identifying the legality of land use rights of households. (2) And based on it, the issue of Certificate of Land use rights was accompanied for the lands allocated to

households, and the Decision of No. 64 also states that: localities should adjust their lands one more time along with the process of issuing Certificate of Land use rights for households ⁽⁷⁷⁾.

1.4. Characteristics of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

Although the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation has often been described, criticized, and advocated that need to be overcome as I mentioned in the previous Section, but if we accept the following facts, that way of land allocation will be an institution sometimes rational and efficient. Those facts are:

(1) Besides a socialist country, Vietnam is still a developing country, where the development level of the market is not high, meaning that the market there often causes a lot of market failures ⁽⁷⁸⁾.

(2) As Mr. Todaro and Mr. Smith clearly stated in their textbook named *Economic Development* ⁽⁷⁹⁾, peasants with their households in developing countries, including Vietnam are economic subjects always trying to maximize their living opportunities more than maximizing their income ⁽⁸⁰⁾. Because the development level of the market in their country is not high yet, they are the economic subjects avoiding risk ⁽⁸¹⁾ - a kind of market failure in agriculture depending on the “uncertainty” of natural conditions. But once the above risks and uncertainties ⁽⁸²⁾ are minimized, they are also the economic subjects ready to respond to economic incentives and economic chance ⁽⁸³⁾, meaning that they are also “rational” ⁽⁸⁴⁾ economic subjects.

In this Section, I would like to discuss this issue - the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation will be an institution sometimes rational and efficient. Specifically, I briefly explain the following 3 things:

(1) The way of land allocation in egalitarianism will be an institution that is sometimes rational and efficient because it is an institution that can share risks and maximize the expected utility of peasants, meaning that it can improve their economic status or economic efficiency.

(2) The above way of land allocation is also an institution that can be described as a kind of cooperative activity or community institution formed at the village level.

(3) The above way of land allocation is also an institution that plays a role in minimizing the risks associated with implementing the products contract system as I explained in Section 2 of this Chapter, to help the peasants to actively respond to economic incentives and economic chance in the market, aiming at helping them in minimizing risks in implementing the products contract system.

1.4.1. The way of land allocation in egalitarianism as an institution to share risk and improve the economic situation at the individual peasant level

The first/ Firstly,

(1) The way of land allocation in egalitarianism is an institution that enables peasants, as economic subjects avoiding the risks, to share risks related to agricultural production ⁽⁸⁵⁾ - the activities are often influenced by the uncertainty (in agricultural production activities).

(2) Therefore, that way of land allocation is an institution that can minimize the fluctuation of the level of harvest or consumption ⁽⁸⁶⁾, meaning that it can average their harvest and consumption level.

(3) As a result, that way of land allocation can also maximize the expected utility of peasants, so it is also an institution that can improve the economic efficiency of peasants ⁽⁸⁷⁾, meaning that it is an institution complementing the market (at the low development level), which often causes market failures.

Below, I would like to explain the above things by/ through building a simple qualitative model according to the assumption of the expected utility, which is often assumed in the economics of risk:

Supposing that: There is a traditional and poor village here, and the villagers/ peasants there only know how to make rice. For simplicity, let me assume that there is only one crop/ season per year in the village, and there, there are only 2 types of land, called field A and field B. The area of both of those fields is 1 ha, so the total land area there is 2 ha. And field A is at a low position, and field B is at a high position. Because field A is in a lowland area/ place, with favorable conditions for “watering” (water supply), the harvest when a peasant farms on this land is usually about 4 tons of rice a year. But when the rainfall level is too high, it is because field A is not eligible

for “drainage” (drainage), so the peasant can only harvest 2 tons of rice a year (on that field). Meanwhile, field B is in a high place and does not have enough conditions for “watering”, so with a normal rainfall level, they can only harvest 2 tons of rice a year. But when they get enough the rainfall amount, they can get 4 tons of rice that year. Thus, the average of the expected harvest on each of the above land/ field types is 3 tons (per year):

$$\text{Field A} = (4+2)/2 = 3 \text{ tons}; \text{Field B} = (2+4)/2 = 3 \text{ tons}$$

By the way, I also assume here that: Every year, at least one of the following two cases is bound to happen: The year has either normal/ average rainfall amount or too much rainfall amount, and those two phenomena are independent of each other (the independence axiom).

Now, let me continue to assume that: Currently, in the village, there is a peasant, and he wishes to harvest 3 tons of rice per year to continue to live/ for life. In this case, if the peasant is an economic subject who wants to avoid risks, he will be most likely to follow the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, which means the method/ way only keeps half of field A and half of field B to be able to yield 3 tons of rice per year with more certainty, rather than keeping only field A or just field B to produce and harvest rice. It is because that the peasant wants to avoid “risk” or dislike the fluctuation in his harvest and consumption level, so if he follows the 1st way of land allocation, he can share the risk or average the harvest and consumption level, meaning that he can surely maximize his expected utility. And as a result, he can have a higher economic efficiency than follows the 2nd way of land allocation.

Through the above assumptions, we can understand the reason why the peasants, the economic subjects avoiding risks, follow the way of land allocation in egalitarianism when the development level of the market is not high yet and the market often causes a lot of market failures. We can say that the way of land allocation in egalitarianism can share agricultural risks, so it is an institution that acts/ plays a role as a kind of (informal) agricultural insurance or social security net, or an institution can ensure the minimum standard of living for peasants ⁽⁸⁸⁾ - the economic subjects who often/ want to avoid risks. It means that it is the institution that enables peasants to maximize their chance of continuing to live, not maximize their income. At the same time, because it can maximize peasants’ expected utility, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism is a rational institution. Moreover,

because it can improve peasants' economic efficiency, it is also an efficient institution in complementing the market with a low development level, causing the failure to minimize/ share risks.

1.4.2. The way of land allocation in egalitarianism as an institution of cooperative activities, or Community Institution at the village level

The second/ Secondly,

Regarding the fact that the way of land allocation in egalitarianism is an institution which is sometimes rational and efficient, just as I discussed in Section 3 above, it is an institution always realized at the village level - as a result of a cooperation as a behavior in common of a set of peasants more than a behavior of a single/ individual peasant. To be more precise, although it may be a little bit abstract, that way of land allocation is an institution which can be described as a kind of cooperative activity or community institution formed as a result of "the infinite non-cooperative game" with tit for tat strategy (or trigger strategy in economic models) in game theory ⁽⁸⁹⁾.

Just as in 1.4.1 above, we here again assume that: There is a village in a place, and that village has some peasants and their households. If all the peasants in that village are subjects avoiding risk, every one of them/ everybody will be willing to follow the way of land allocation in egalitarianism. Specifically, when allocated land, they are willing to agree/ accept the (land) plots allocated according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism to be allocated the plots in the situation of small-scale dispersion. (If we follow the example assumed in 1.4. 1. above, assuming that there are only 2 peasants in the village then, those 2 will surely agree to divide field A and field B into 2 equal plots and each of the peasants will keep half of each of the field. With that way of land allocation in egalitarianism, both the peasants in that village can share risks and average their harvest and consumption level to maximize their benefits, meaning maximizing his/ her expected utility.

As I explained in Section 3 of Chapter I, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism sometimes carries out to re-allocate periodically. And as we can easily see, the periodical reallocation of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism is a thorough solution to maximize the expected utility of the peasants at the village level by realizing risk-sharing and averaging their

harvest and consumption level.

However, practically speaking, when carrying out the land allocation at the village level, the peasants in the village may sometimes have difficulty in reaching an agreement (in a good way), in particular, who may be allocated those kinds of the set of plots which have slight differences in terms of natural conditions (for example: near, far, high, low...), or in the case of 2 slightly different sets of each, a peasant may get first one set of those 2, and the other peasant will have to take the other/ the left set, etc... In fact, it is said that: In the process of expanding the implementation of the products contract system since 1981 (in some localities, this work has started before that year), not a few of peasants or peasant's households did not like to be allocated such plots as can only be cultivated in the winter-spring season, because it was very difficult to cultivate rice on those plots in winter ⁽⁹⁰⁾. In this case, to avoid the conflict between peasants, or to avoid a situation where some peasants can get more benefits than the resting ones, etc., the village would need to apply a certain regulation/ discipline, like a lottery, and everyone in the village must follow that lottery results, for example.

In fact, in the process of expanding the implementation of the products contract system, the lottery was a very fair kind of village regulations/ disciplines in the land allocation ⁽⁹¹⁾, and local peasants would often follow that regulation and not reveal their dissatisfaction with the result of the lottery ⁽⁹²⁾. I should think that one reason why peasants at village level agree with such a regulation of their village, specifically here is the lottery and the acceptance of the lottery results, is: This regulation is usually carried out at a closed and low-mobility traditional village level, therefore everyone in the village has no other way without accepting it. Besides, until the end of the 2010s, in rural Vietnam, it had been still difficult for peasants in those villages to migrate freely to other places, with one reason that the Vietnamese government at that period implemented the regulations of the household registration system and did not encourage the above free migration ⁽⁹³⁾. Therefore, for those peasants, it would be even more difficult to disobey the regulation of the above lottery in their own villages.

Therefore, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation is an institution formed as a result of the infinite game, as peasants in the localities at that period would (must) continue to regularly interact/ communicate with other peasants in the above closed and low-

mobility village. And it is also an institution formed as a result of the game with a tit for tat strategy because if peasants in this case do not comply with the above regulation, they will surely get retaliation/ revenge by the other peasants in the village. Therefore, that way of land allocation is an institution of cooperative activities, or Community Institution as Mr. Hayami says ⁽⁹⁴⁾, and that institution was formed as a result of the non-cooperative game, because the peasants in the village, everyone who obeyed the above regulation, was allowed to be allocated land with the small-scale dispersion's plots (which can share agricultural risks).

1.4.3. The way of land allocation in egalitarianism as an institution to maximize the economic incentive in implementing the Products Contract System and the Household Products Contract System

As I explained in 1.4.2. above, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism is a kind of an institution of cooperative activities or Community at the village level. But, if we look at the relation between that way of land allocation and an individual peasant again, we will see further that: the above way of land allocation is also an institution that can create favorable conditions for a peasant to focus his efforts on increasing agricultural (production) output by minimizing the risks (in this case is the agricultural risks) that peasants may incur when implementing the products contract system. If we follow Mr. Todaro and Mr. Smith's approach to say, that way of land allocation is described as an institution that helps peasants be willing to respond to the economic incentives and economic chance.

As I mentioned in Section 1 of this Chapter, when implementing the products contract system according to the Directive of No.100 in 1981, or the household products contract system according to the Resolution of No.10 in 1988, if the co-op members can complete/ reach the fixed harvest level contracted in the contract, that peasant can get about 70% of the total level contracted as their gross income. And if his output exceeds the harvest level contracted, he will get 100% of that excess as it. But, if he does not reach the level contracted, he must bear/ compensate for that part which he cannot perform according to the fixed level in the contract. And in the worst case, he will have to compensate for the entire fixed amount in the contract due to the lack of output.

Thus, if we describe the expected level of harvest as x and the expected level that he can get by y , and also assume that the expected yield productivity per hectare in the case is 1 ton, then the relation between the expected level of harvest and the expected level of consumption in the worst/ the most extreme case, when the peasant will have to bear/ compensate for the entire/ whole level contracted that he has not reached/ completed, will be indicated as follows:

$$y = x - 0.3 \quad (y = 0.7 + (x-1))$$

In this case, if the peasant is contracted to produce 1 ton of rice per 1 hectare of field and cultivates in only one type of field such as field A mentioned in 1.4.1 above, then the year when the normal rainfall level (rainfall amount), that peasant can harvest 1.2 tons. In those 1.2 tons, the peasant will be entitled to 0.9 tons (with 0.7 tons being the level contracted, and 0.2 tons being the excess output outside the contract). But the year when the rainfall level is too high, that peasant maybe only have/ harvest 0.8 tons. And if in the worst case, for example, such as the Cooperative Management Board judges that the above result is not due to the “uncertainty” in agricultural production etc., that peasant can get only 0.5 tons of rice because he can only harvest 0.8 tons - that is 0.2 tons less than the contracted level of 1 ton as agreed in the contract. Therefore, after compensating for that 0.2 ton missing from the 0.7 ton he would enjoy, the level he gets, in the end, would be only 0.5 ton.

But, meanwhile, if that peasant is to be allocated land according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism and produces rice on half of field A and half of field B (as I mentioned in 1.4.1.) then: Whether the normal rainfall level is normal or too high, that peasant can harvest 1 ton of rice (average of 1.2 and 0.8 tons) every year and will also enjoy at least 0.7 tons (which is 70% contracted level of 1 ton of rice as their gross income).

If we understand the above example clearly, we can say that: in case the peasant who is assigned/ contracted by the products contract system intends to reach and exceed the level contracted, that peasant must at least have to bear to a certain extent/ degree of efforts or risks. But if the peasant cultivates in land allocated according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, that way of land allocation can act/ play a role as an institution that can minimize the efforts or risks associated with the level of productivity affected directly by the uncertainty in agricultural production.

As a result, that peasant no longer has to pay attention to the above risks and can focus all his efforts on producing and harvesting maximum yields/ output to enjoy high levels of harvest and consumption. Therefore, by following the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, the peasant will get an incentive towards increasing productivity (see Section 1 of Chapter I). With this meaning, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism in this case, is an institution that helps peasants to be willing to respond to the economic incentives and the economic chance.

It can be said that, since the products contract system was implemented extendedly to agricultural production activities, Vietnam, particularly the North, has been successful in increasing agricultural output/ productivity remarkably, and it is not only the result of the incentive in terms of wage and the incentive in terms of ownership (see Section 2 of this Chapter) but also the result that peasants are allocated land according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism.

I here would like to add that the meaning/ significance of the periodical land reallocation in the land allocation in egalitarianism in this case, is also the same as I mentioned in Section 1.4.1 above.

1.4.4. The way of land allocation in egalitarianism as an institution that the peasants avoiding risks are willing to follow/ carry out

In this opportunity, I here would like further to share the following story:

In 2001, when the land re-adjustment according to the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 1994 had ended, the National Center of Social Sciences and Humanities of Vietnam conducted a direct survey about the peasants in the Red River Delta in the North of Vietnam. The results of that survey, as a source of Vietnamese documents, are very valuable/ useful for me, because through those results, I can determine that: one of the main reasons that the localities of the Red River Delta region had been carrying out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation by that period is because: that way of land allocation in egalitarianism is very suitable for those peasants or households in the region, because those peasants or households, as mentioned above, are economic subjects to avoid risk, so they want to share agricultural risk and average their harvest and

consumption level at their household level respectively.

Specifically, according to the above survey results, 96.5% of the surveyed peasants in the Red River Delta say that they are no longer interested in land re-adjustment ⁽⁹⁵⁾. It means that that 96.5% of those peasants in the region had been satisfied with the small, dispersed plots of land allocated as a result of the land adjustment in the way of land allocation in egalitarianism since the Resolution of No.10 issued in 1988.

Regarding the results of the above investigation, Mr. Dao The Anh and his colleagues say in their report in 2004 that: Because the very peasants in the region wanted to be allocated land in that way, so after their desire/ wish was accepted, they were allocated the land in egalitarianism (It means that: the way of land allocation in egalitarianism is the desire/ wish of the peasants). And a lot of localities in the Delta also basically carried out that way of land allocation to allocate land to their local peasants ⁽⁹⁶⁾.

Regarding the reason why a lot of localities carried out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, Mr. Dao The Anh and his colleagues point out 5 reasons, in which the first 4 reasons are all related to the fact: the function of sharing risk or averaging the harvest and consumption level in the way of land allocation in egalitarianism is very suitable for those peasants or households to avoid risk. To make sure, I would like to translate all those four reasons as follows:

(1) Every household needs to have plots located in near, far, good, bad, high, low places because the way of land allocation is fair.

(2) The land needs to be allocated to those peasants in egalitarianism because each land has different natural conditions. (For example, the level of soil fertility, the type of soil...)

(3) The land needs to be allocated in egalitarianism because the economic efficiency of each part of the land will be different, depending on the way of land using.

(4) Risk-sharing among all the households is an essential condition in land allocation because each large land often has some plots located in unstable/ unfavorable places and those are usually waterlogged, drought, acidic... plots ⁽⁹⁷⁾.

Of the above four reasons, saying the reason (1), the authors only mention that the way of land allocation in egalitarianism is a way to ensure fairness. But, about the reason (2), (3) and (4), the authors show that: the

difference of natural conditions of the land can lead to risk, and that is the very reason why the localities in that region carried out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism. Particularly, the reason (4) shows that the difference of natural conditions is related directly to agricultural risk, especially to irrigation in general, an irrigation system to cope with such problems as flood, drought, acidity... Therefore, I can surely say: sharing risk and averaging the harvest and consumption level is one of the most important reasons that those localities with the peasants in the Red River Delta carried out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism in the process of land adjustment since the Resolution of No. 10 issued.

1.5. The Cong dien system and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

As I mentioned above about the comment of Mr. Nam in the previous part, in 1990s, not a few of localities still follow the way of land allocation in the traditional village once existed before (the traditional Vietnamese society). Therefore, the scenery in rural areas in the Northern Vietnam carrying out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism reminded a lot of Vietnamese people then easy of the landscape in those rural areas in the past, the scenery of lands allocated according to the Cong dien system.

It means that: “Whether the land adjustment has been carried out consciously or unconsciously, the land allocated in the North of Vietnam, which is now not only in terms of land areas but also in terms of the substance divided into a lot of small and dispersed plots and then allocated in egalitarianism, is just the same as that in the period that Mr. Pierre Gourou surveyed this region’s land in 1936”⁽⁹⁸⁾.

1.5.1. Process of formation, development and change of the Cong dien system

As for the Cong dien (the common land) or the Cong dien system, it is a land distribution system with periodical reallocation which started in the 15th century, then continued at the village level (natural village) in Vietnam, particularly in the North and the Central of Vietnam until the period of the

Land Reform in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the 1950s ⁽⁹⁹⁾.

According to Mr. Furuta, this land distribution system originated from the time when the Hau Le dynasty (*triều Hậu Lê*) was established in the early 15th century, which tried to build the state with the Centralization of Power, aiming at directly controlling all small peasants of the family size formed until that period ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾.

According to Mr. Ishii and Mr. Sakurai, at the beginning of the 15th century, while the Hau Le dynasty provided that the lands that had been opened (by the peasants) in the middle basin of the Red River were private lands, as to the people such as (1) the landless were a result of population growth; (2) the returned soldiers from the front; (3) the exiles, the Hau Le dynasty made them to quickly settle on the exploiting lands or the wasteland, and called those lands the Cong dien (sometimes called the Quan dien - the equal land). At the same time, after allocating those common lands to those people, the Hau Le Dynasty took them as subjects of taxation and military service ⁽¹⁰¹⁾. Because of the above situation, the Cong dien was generally the poor land, and those regions/ localities which had a lot of the Cong dien were often poor ones.

The Cong dien, under the direct management of officials at the central government, was usually reallocated every 6 years to all people at the village/ village level according to their social status, specifically: firstly is for seniors (elders in the village), retired bureaucrats, village officials, followed by the ordinary peasants or their households in egalitarianism. But for the peasants or the households who had to perform military service, they were given priority in the land allocation compared with other peasants of this group ⁽¹⁰²⁾.

But the control power of the feudal dynasty during the period of the civil war of Vietnam (the period that the country was divided into 3 regions) starting from the 16th and 17th centuries became weaker and weaker. Till the 18th century, the villages had firmly grasped the actual management power of the Cong dien ⁽¹⁰³⁾. And by the beginning of the 19th century, when the Nguyen Dynasty (*triều Nguyễn*) was just established, in the rural areas of Northern and Central Vietnam, the Cong dien, which was formerly the state land, had changed into the common land at the village level or the village community with strong/ durable, self-contained properties/ strong, self-controlled power. In other words, in that period, the village, rather than the central government, directly managed all the Cong dien. Specifically, the

Village Council itself of the elders, which was formed/ constituted by the seniors, retired bureaucrats, village officials..., carried out the land allocation and land reallocation every 6 years to all the villagers, while maintaining the principle of prioritizing the land distribution to the peasants or the households who had to perform military service ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾. Thus, the implementation of tax obligations and military obligations at the village level had been also transformed into a collective activity of the village or the Village Council, which directly contracted to the state/ the government. Therefore, the laws of the state related to the periodical reallocation of the Cong dien also mostly recognized the autonomy of the reallocation at the village level and was just provided in principle that the Cong dien belong to the state/ government by law ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾.

During the period of French colonialism from the middle of the 19th century until 1945, the Cong dien system continued to exist strongly, meaning that the ratio of the Cong dien in the whole land area in the Red River Delta region in 1930 was still 20%, in Central Vietnam from 20 ~ 25% ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾.

However, according to a lot of Vietnamese documents, after declaring/ gaining independence in 1945 and undergoing the period of the Anti-French Resistance War, followed by the Land Reform in the North and the North Central regions from 1953 to 1956, the Cong dien was almost all allocated for the peasants classified as the poor and the landless, primarily in the liberated areas/ free zones, next in the whole areas of both the 2 regions ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾. Then, during the whole period of the Anti-U.S Resistance War, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam carried out/ applied the agricultural collectivization in the North of Vietnam from 1958, followed by the whole country from 1975 (the year of Vietnam War ended) and 1976 (the year of the reunification of Vietnam), the Cong dien was turned into the land directly used and managed by collective farms - agricultural cooperatives.

That is the whole process that the Cong dien system went through.

1.5.2. Similarity in terms of the economic function of the Cong dien system and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

Talking about the method of those common land distribution, Mr. Vu Van Hien, based on a feudal central government document about the

implementation of distributing “the equal land” (the Quan dien) in the fourth year of King Gia Long of the Nguyen Dynasty (although the Nguyen Dynasty in that period only recognized and allowed the actual management rights of the Cong dien by villages), provides roughly as follows:

(1) The Cong dien should equally be distributed to all people (officials, soldiers, laborers, and ordinary private people).

(2) The Cong dien should be distributed to all people by allocating to them as such all types of the lands, as type 1, type 2 and type 3, meaning that each of those people should be equally allocated both infertile and fertile land to prevent any of them from having more privilege in the land distribution and also prevent the elders, etc. in the village from having the whole fertile land.

(3) The period of periodical land reallocation should be every 3 years in any localities ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.

In my standpoint, the above contents have the following meanings:

(1) When distributing the Cong dien, it needs to thoroughly apply the way of land allocation in egalitarianism to all people in the village.

(2) There is no discrimination between any people in the land distribution.

(3) All the people should be allocated both bad and good plots by dividing the whole village land into 3 types, such as type 1, type 2, and type 3.

(4) Besides, the above three things should be repeated in the shortest every 3 years via/ by carrying out periodical land reallocation.

Regarding the above document, it can be considered that the government in that period certainly tried to build the above document in an ideal way, because in the North of Vietnam in that period, in addition to the above way of the Cong dien distribution, there were a lot of other types of the way of the land distribution also existing ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾. Even so, we can describe that if the way of the Cong dien distribution mentioned above had been done ideally at the village level in that period, then it is clear that the above way of the land distribution had basically at least the same socio-economic functions as the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation or that way of land allocation of small-scale dispersion that localities in the North of Vietnam which had been carried out after the Resolution of No.10 in 1988:

(1) Regarding “having the same function”, it means that it has the same function to share risk or average the harvest and consumption level at the household level and at the collective households’ level in the village.

(2) Regarding the “way” with the above “function”, it also means that it is a cooperative activity or Community Institution with a function of sharing risk and averaging the harvest and consumption level, formed at the village level.

(3) And in the North and the Central Vietnam in that period, any of the village there could have Community Institution (village community), a regulation/ discipline (*huong woc*) of the village ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ to make all the households follow/ admit the function of common resource management at the village level - in this case, that of the land distribution.

Talking about the priority of the land distribution to such people as seniors, retired bureaucrats, village officials... then I would like to comment that in more detail at the end of this article. Here, I would only like to point out the difference between the Cong dien system in the former days and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism at the present stage. The difference is that: while the Cong dien system was basically applied to young male peasants as the object of the land distribution in the system ⁽¹¹¹⁾, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism now does not any discrimination like that, meaning that all household member in the village, both men and women, are the objects of the land allocation. Although there is the above difference, we can easily point out a lot of similarities in the economic/ social aspect between the Cong dien system and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism at the present stage. For example, in the Cong dien system, peasants or households who were those subjects to military service had priority to the land allocation. That characteristic may be basically relevant to that in the way of land allocation in egalitarianism at the present stage, that is: those households who are the subjects of social policy, including those contributors for revolutionary activities given priority to allocate land, as mentioned in the previous part.

1.5.3. Significance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

Therefore, we can say that: As I wrote in the previous section/ part, the first stage of the shift to market mechanism in rural areas in Vietnam was a

process of deregulation indeed. Specifically, this process began with the extension of the application of the final products contract system according to the Directive of No.100 in 1981, through the land adjustment according to the Resolution of No.10 in 1988, and ended in 1993 - the year in which the 1993 Land Law enacted and acknowledged a legal basis for Land use rights of households. This process was also that which the Vietnamese government aimed to form and develop the land market in rural areas as early as possible. But in fact, that process was also the process in which the household became an independent economic subject (beyond the initial prediction of the government). In addition, the allocation of land to those whole households was also carried out through the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation (completely unintentional by the authorities).

(1) The process of carrying out deregulation in rural areas of Vietnam has been the process of emerging an informal institution - a cooperative activity or Community Institution. This informal institution here has a role in complementing market, when it is still at a low level of development, meaning that market there often causes a lot of market failures, particularly agricultural risk. It is because Vietnam is a socialist country, but it is still a developing country with a low level of economic development in general and the low level of agriculture and rural development in particular, therefore, the development level of market is still not high yet, particularly in rural areas in the self-sufficient situation. Therefore, the shift to market mechanism in those rural areas has not been leading to the rapid formation and development of market but leading to emerge an informal institution instead.

(2) It means that, that process is a process that makes/ helps households - a kind of cooperative activity - form Community Institution spontaneously at their family level, based on mutual trust in all members of the family, as an institution to minimize monitoring costs - a type of transaction costs, and also helps the collective of those households - also a kind of cooperative activity - form Community Institution spontaneously at their village level. It is the very way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, which helps all those households in the village share risk and average their harvest or consumption level.

(3) In particular, talking about Community Institution at the village level - in this case, the way of land allocation in egalitarianism - the above

process is not totally that process in which the function of the land distribution did start to operate immediately according to the market mechanism, but in that process till now, the function has been still carried out as one of the functions of public resource management at the village level.

Following the above meaning, the above-mentioned whole process can be considered to be an innovative process of the economic institution, specifically: if we can describe that the above process that households became independent economic subjects was a process of restoration or regeneration of “family community” at the family level, then we can also describe the carrying out of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation is also a process of restoration or regeneration of “village community”, which has the function of the public resource management in general and that of the land distribution management in particular at the village level.

And if I can emphasize the similarity of the way of the present land allocation in egalitarianism and that of former Cong dien system, particularly in socio-economic aspect, that process of carrying out the present land allocation in egalitarianism is also the process of emergence of “a modern version” of the Cong dien system. And what is also important, in the above village community, “a modern version” of the Cong dien system - the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, as well as the family community mentioned above, has become a significant contributing component in agriculture and rural development in Vietnam since the beginning of deregulation.

1.6. Restoration of the function of the land distribution at the village level through the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

As I mentioned in section 4 above, through the implementation of Land use rights assignment to households in regions and localities, the function of public resource management at the village level, particularly the function of land distribution (at the village level) expressed/ shown by the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, had been restoring. Thus, the subjects carrying out the above things, of course, were households or villages performing them as a collective of those

households. The reason that I (dare to) evaluate like that ⁽¹¹²⁾ is because of the following 3 reasons:

1.6.1. Village - Which carries out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

Formal subjects of the land adjustment according to the Resolution of No.10 in 1988, of course, were agricultural cooperatives in localities ⁽¹¹³⁾. But it was actual that the adjustment was carried out actively by villages themselves - or more easily speaking, the households in those villages through agricultural cooperatives as the organizations representing all the people in those villages.

As I mentioned in Section 5 of this Chapter above, since the Resolution of No.10 issued until the end of 1992, the one year before the Land Law was enacted in 1993, a lot of cooperatives were dissolved or automatically disintegrated. There were even a lot of cases where those cooperatives still existed but were left in a permanent stagnation and only existed in principle. That situation was partly due to the fact that since the family members of cooperative members were recognized as economic subjects in direct charge of agricultural production activities, they were not only authorized to gain long-term Land use rights but also quickly take over such production means as agricultural tools, including cattle, etc. which used to belong to cooperatives. It made the strength of cooperatives weakened. At the same time, the State's financial support for cooperatives through subsidies had also begun to decrease significantly ⁽¹¹⁴⁾.

In that situation, the agency replacing the cooperative began to be in charge of administrative services ⁽¹¹⁵⁾ directly related to the village level, was the People's Committee at the Commune level (the PCC) - a state agency that hardly played any important roles in the former era of collectivization. In this process of the replacement ⁽¹¹⁶⁾, there were also some cases where those leaders who used to be the chairmen of the Cooperative Management Board often shifted to the Chairpersons or Vice-Chairmen, etc. of the PCC ⁽¹¹⁷⁾. Even so, even the PCC in that period up to now has been suffering from deregulation, that is, administrative reform (meaning reduction of the state budget) at the whole rural level of Vietnam. Therefore, the PCC by now/ up to now does not have enough abilities to be in charge and handle all those

tasks which the cooperative did before. Therefore, in reality, the PCC has so far been forced to try to implement what is called socialization of the tasks, such as (1) requesting people in the commune to bear a part of the budget related to education and training; (2) entrusting some organizations/ mass organizations affiliated to the Vietnam Fatherland Front to be in charge of some social welfare service activities, etc. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾

1.6.2. Peasants - Who need the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

As I mentioned above, on the basis of the 1993 Land Law, which includes the legal recognition of land allocated to households, in 1994, the government issued the Decision of No. 64 of the government, which states that: Localities should adjust their land again to create favorable conditions for issuing Certificate of Land use rights to households who are allocated land. But in a lot of localities, this land readjustment was just done in the following manners:

(1) Local authorities only reconfirmed the Land use rights to households, whose land had been allocated to them before 1993.

(2) Even in localities where land readjustment was carried out, it was only adjusted to some degree, mainly at the micro-adjustment level ⁽¹¹⁹⁾.

The above things prove that peasants or households basically had been satisfied with the results of land adjustment in the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation spontaneously carried out from 1988 to 1993. In other words, the above way of land allocation - an informal institution to (at least) share agricultural risk and average the harvest and consumption level - was the very way of land allocation carried out by the village or the collective of households in the village to comply with their wishes, as economic subjects avoiding agricultural risk. In Section 4 of this Chapter, I mentioned a work by Mr. Dao The Anh and his colleagues on a direct survey of peasants in the Red River Delta conducted by the Center for Social Sciences and Humanities in 2001. This direct survey is also a document that can partly support my above comments.

1.6.3. Expansion of the Cong dien area - Restoration of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation

The most important thing is that: in the process of households in the village carrying out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation since the Resolution of No.10 issued in 1988, in parallel with this process, the area of the common land or the Cong dien in the village/ at the village level has also been expanded and not a few of those part of the common land have been also used as the land for periodical land reallocation, in order to carry out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism thoroughly.

Regarding that area of the common land, in fact, the Land use right of the common land is legally owned by the commune, meaning the PCC. However, this legal use right exists only in a formal/ principle form, and the actual right to manage the common land is entirely owned by the village⁽¹²⁰⁾. And until 1993, the year when the land adjustment in the localities had temporarily ended and the government of Vietnam enacted the Land Law in 1993, the above phenomenon was still ongoing. And since 1994, the year the government issued the Decision of No. 64 of the government advocated that localities should continue to conduct adjustment to the land once again, this phenomenon becomes even more prominent.

1. As I explained in Section 3 of this Chapter above, those plots retained for the common land are not just located as the “enclaves” among small-scale dispersion’s plots allocated to households in the land adjustment process, but also located as such the lands as unused, unoccupied, or unmined land... in the village. Such the lands that should have been allocated to those households who have a talent for the agricultural business according to the Resolution of No.10 were turned into the common land. And the fact that not a few of those common land which localities try to keep was mainly used for periodical land reallocation, not for bidding.

About a few concrete examples of the above phenomenon, as I also mentioned in Section 2 above, in 1990, the total area of unoccupied land or unused land prepared for bidding in the four provinces: Hoang Lien Son, Ha Nam Ninh, Binh Dinh, Dak Lak accounted for only 1.52%, 0.37%, 0.08%, 1.48% of the total land area of each of those provinces. And most of the small-scale plots were scattered as the above-mentioned enclaves among a lot of small-scale dispersion’s plots allocated to households in the land

adjustment process, were not used for bidding purposes to allocate to those who have a talent for the agricultural business but kept for the soldiers returning from the battle-fronts in Cambodia and at the Vietnam-China border back to those 4 provinces, to help them start farming again as members of the households in the villages ⁽¹²¹⁾.

By 1993, the above phenomenon that the use of the common land or the Cong dien for periodical land reallocation became so prominent that the government of Vietnam, on the occasion of the promulgation of the 1993 Land Law, had to think about the restrict of all the entries on the common land in the Law. However, because the localities, virtually the village level, maybe expressed their unwillingness, the Central Government of Vietnam issued the Decision of No. 64 in 1994 ⁽¹²²⁾ to enact the 1993 Land Law with the following items related to the common land: the total area of the common land used by the commune level (which is actually the village management level) cannot exceed 5% of the total agricultural land area in the commune, except for some exceptional cases, the localities are permitted to promulgate the respective regulation at their local level ⁽¹²³⁾.

(Even so) But in the process of land readjustment one more time since the government issued the Decision of No. 64 in 1994 onwards, in fact, not a few of communes, those are, not a few of villages did not follow the items in the 1993 Land Law and made an effort to retain more than 10% of the total agricultural land in the commune for the common land ⁽¹²⁴⁾. For example, taking the case of Thai Binh province in 2000 as a typical example, “all localities in the province kept/ had the common land with an area exceeding 5% in the total land area in the province” and “in a lot of localities, the ratio of the common land exceeded from 15 to 20%”. In terms of the above 15 to 20% percent ratio ⁽¹²⁵⁾, this is quite a high rate, but if we assume that that period was still the colonial period when the Cong dien system was strong, those localities would be certainly categorized into such localities as were classified as those maintaining a high percentage of the common land or the Cong dien.

As for the above common land, it is sometimes also referred to by the law as the land for official use or the public land. The main uses of the public land prescribed by the 1993 Land Law are 1. For the construction of welfare facilities at the commune level, including infrastructures such as irrigation systems, roads, etc. (especially irrigation systems) and 2. If the communes

do not need to use the public land to build those welfare facilities or further, the commune authorities can use the public land as agricultural land to carry out bidding for cooperative members fairly following regulations (of the communes) in the right way ⁽¹²⁶⁾.

However, most of the land for official use was actually allocated to households in the commune (actually allocated to those in the village) for the purpose of the above 2. through bidding in principle, but it would often continue to be used for the periodical land reallocation (as the Cong dien) actually. In some localities, the periodical land reallocation would be regularly carried out in the following manners:

(1) The village firstly took some of the public land in the village for conducting bidding the land for members of the households in the village (to be allocated with different ratio) (bidding in principle).

(2) After that, the village re-allocates the bidding land in egalitarianism to each member or each household that conducted/ participated in the bidding (actual bidding).

(3) Then, after a few seasons or after a few years, the village would conduct the bidding again following the procedures in Article 1. and 2.

(4) In this case, those members or households who were prioritized to participate in the bidding would be often “those households who have given a new birth having the right to be assigned the Land use right”, in particular, those households who had more children born after the land readjustments in/ according to the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 1994 and until then never had a chance to be allocated plots ⁽¹²⁷⁾.

(5) In addition to the above-mentioned households, there were also other households that were prioritized to participate in bidding by local governments were different in categories for each locality, but those were generally: the households who are the subjects of social policy, including those contributors for revolutionary activities in a village, the households who have just transferred their civil status from another place to the village, the households with those members who previously worked as officials - retired state officials having returned to the village, the households with those members who complete military service just having returned to the village, etc. ⁽¹²⁸⁾

In the above situation, some localities carried out periodical bidding in the right way and allocated more land to those households who had offered

the highest price in the bidding, but the number of those localities was not large ⁽¹²⁹⁾. In those cases, only a small number of households were allowed to take part in the bidding, but the bidding in those cases was only on the area of the pond, the area for raising fish or the land converted into the land by changing the purpose of land use, and those small number of those households were mostly wealthy, or those related the staff or the very members of those staff currently working in the commune authorities, etc. ⁽¹³⁰⁾.

As I mentioned above, the public land with legal use right takes the form of the commune-level, but in fact, it was usually converted into the common land directly managed by the village level. Therefore, it was “very difficult” for the PCC to directly control the common land. Because the common land or the Cong dien is “the land directly managed by villages”; and “is distributed and dispersed among a lot of small plots allocated to the households in those villages as enclaves”, so when the PCC wants to use the common land for the construction of welfare facilities, etc., “the PCC is always forced to negotiate with the villages and the households” and “that job of the PCC is very hard every time” ⁽¹³¹⁾.

The above things showed us the following: the process of land adjustment from 1988, the year that the Resolution of No.10 was issued so far, particularly the process of land readjustment since 1994, the year that the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 1994 was issued, was the period when the “modern version” of the Cong dien system - the function of the land distribution, was a form of the function of public resource management through the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation - of the village, not “agricultural cooperatives”, and not of the “Commune People’s Committee” regenerated prominently.

2. One of Mr. To Duy Hop’s works also mentions the essence of the above process clearly. However, the significance of the book is not only in that point, because the work enables us also to see that: the commune or the PCC - forced to put itself in a delicate position - sometimes even acted as an agency representing the village interests rather than an agency of the central government. And in this case, the PCC along with the village even expanded the area of the common land. It was because some of the products from those land which were allocated to households through bidding - actually,

periodical land reallocation - also became a part of the PCC's budget, although "those products are insignificant" ⁽¹³²⁾.

"One of the problems that the commune had a lot of headaches in that period was the problem of newly born children in households in villages under the administration of the commune. If those new members were born after the land adjustment in 1994, they would not be principally allowed to be allocated the land because the land allocation stipulates that it is only to be done every 20 years. But those households which increased their membership are forced to contribute to the public activities and social movements on average in proportion as the number of members in each of those families. Therefore, young couples having newly born children are very disadvantageous in implementing those state policies properly/ rightly, compared with other couples/ families such as families with 2 elderly parents, families who are authorized to inherit the lost parents' plots, etc. Therefore, some of the leaders of communes and villages in the Red River Delta do adjust the land in their localities by applying the provisions of the Land Law and make an effort to hand over some small plots of land to the new members born to the above families. However, at this time, according to the 1993 Land Law, the public land that can be used by communes for bidding is only 5% of the total agricultural land area, so the land area for such land readjustment is limited. Therefore, some communes take twice the area of the regulation (equivalent to 10%), and some communes take more than twice the area of agricultural land compared with the regulations (more than 10%) in order to use it as the common land or the Cong dien. But, the possibility to meet the above land needs of the people in the commune is still limited because while the area of the land allocated to the new members is too small, the total number of new members in the village is too large..." ⁽¹³³⁾.

In Vietnam, there is a proverb, "the king's rule cannot defeat the village's rule" to express the strong independence and closeness of the village in the traditional society that firmly grasped the real autonomy of the common land or the Cong dien at the beginning of 19th century. It can be said that the phenomenon of using the common land to carry out the periodical land reallocation at the village level that I explained above is a very typical/ symbolic phenomenon which can prove that: the situation of "the king's rule cannot defeat the village's rule" has undoubtedly been restored or regenerated through the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with

periodical reallocation during the whole period of deregulation in the Northern agricultural area of Vietnam.

Notes of Chapter I

1-1.

- (1) Refer to 竹内郁雄 (1999) 「ドイモイ下のベトナムの農業協同経営・協同組合運動試論」 (白石昌也・竹内郁雄編 (1999) 『ベトナムのドイモイの新展開』 日本貿易振興会アジア経済研究所) 250-252 ページ, for example.
- (2) Thế Đạt (1981) *Nền Nông nghiệp Việt Nam từ sau Cách mạng Tháng tám Năm 1945*, Nhà xuất bản Nông nghiệp, Hà Nội, tr. 83.
- (3) *Sách trên*, tr. 139, 古田元夫 (2013) 「ベトナムにおける社会主義とムラードイモイ時代の北部・中部農村と集団農業経験」 (南塚信吾・古田元夫・加納格・奥村哲編 (2013) 『シリーズ「21世紀歴史学の創造」第5巻 人々の社会主義』 有志舎) 232 ページ.
- (4) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 178-180.
- (5) *Sách trên*, tr. 99.
- (6) 古田元夫 (1998) 『ベトナムの現在』 講談社 39 ページ。
- (7) 同上書 38 ページ。
- (8) 古田 (2013) 前掲論文 325 ページ。
- (9) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 100.
- (10) *Sách trên*, tr. 137.
- (11) *Sách trên*, tr. 184.
- (12) *Sách trên*, tr. 224.
- (13) *Sách trên*, tr. 268.
- (14) *Sách trên*, tr. 159.
- (15) 桜井弓躬雄 (1989) 『ハノイの憂鬱』 株式会社めこん 119 ページ。
- (16) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 229-237.
- (17) 奥野正寛・鈴木興太郎 (1985) 『ミクロ経済学 I』 岩波書店 85 ページ。
- (18) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 230.
- (19) 倉澤資成 (1988) 『入門 | 価格理論 第2版』 日本評論社 168~169 ページ。
- (20) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 231-234.
- (21) 古田 (1998) 前掲書 40 ページ。
- (22) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 237-238.
- (23) 古田 (2013) 前掲論文 321~322 ページ。
- (24) 同上論文 325 ページ。

(25) 同上。

(26) Refer to 古田 (1998) 前掲書 40~41 ページ, 白石昌也 (1993) 『東アジアの国家と社会 5 ベトナム 革命と建設のはざま』 東京大学出版会 102~105 ページ, for example.

(27) ジョセフ E. ステイグリッツ (藪下史郎/秋山太郎/金子能宏/木立力/清野一治訳) (1981) 『ステイグリッツ ミクロ経済学 (第 2 版)』 東洋経済新報社 (Joseph E. Stiglitz (1997) *Economics 2nd Edition*, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York) 146 ページ。

1-2.

(28) ジョセフ・E・ステイグリッツ (2000) 前掲書 599~600 ページ。

(29) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Một số Văn kiện của Đảng về Phát triển Nông nghiệp*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 9-19.

(30) Lê Xuân Tùng (1993) *Khoán sản phẩm trong Nông nghiệp và Vấn đề Thực hiện các Lợi ích Kinh tế*, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm và Chế độ Quản lý mới trong Nông nghiệp*, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật, Hà Nội, tr. 65.

(31) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 14.

(32) Khoa Minh (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm, Một động lực Mạnh mẽ để Phát triển Sản xuất và Đưa Nông nghiệp Một bước lên Sản xuất lớn Xã hội Chủ nghĩa*, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr.59.

(33) Ban Quản lý Hợp tác xã Nông nghiệp Trung ương (1985) *Hỏi đáp về Khoán sản phẩm trong Hợp tác xã Nông nghiệp*, Nhà xuất bản Nông nghiệp, Hà Nội, tr. 10.

(34) Nguyễn Sinh Cúc (1991) *Thực trạng Nông nghiệp, Nông thôn và Nông dân Việt Nam 1976 – 1990*, Nhà xuất bản Thống kê, Hà Nội, tr. 54.

(35) Lê Xuân Tùng (1983) *Bài viết đã dẫn*, tr. 76.

(36) See 原洋之介 (2002) 『開発経済論 第 2 版』 岩波書店 112~114 ページ。

(37) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 9.

(38) Trần Đức (1994) *Hợp tác trong Nông thôn Xưa và Nay*, Nhà xuất bản Nông nghiệp, Hà Nội, tr. 93-94.

(39) Phương Chi, Từ “Khoán hộ” đến Những đổi mới trong Nông nghiệp. *Báo Đầu tư (Đầu tư Online)* 26/01/2020 17:36 <https://baodautu.vn/tu-khoan-ho-den-nhung-doi-moi-trong-nong-nghiep-d115035.html>

(40) 古田 (2013) 前掲論文 333~337 ページ。

(41) 村野勉 (1987) 「ベトナム農業における生産物請負制 その仕組みと実態」(『アジアトレンド 1987-IV』) 66 ページ。

(42) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 260.

(43) 村野 (1987) 前掲論文 66 ページ。

- (44) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 13, 15.
- (45) Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Sách đã dẫn*.
- (46) Hội đồng Trung Ương Chỉ đạo Biên soạn Giáo trình Quốc gia Các Bộ môn Khoa học Mác-Lênin, Tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh (2018) *Giáo trình Lịch sử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (tái bản có sửa chữa, bổ sung)*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia Sự thật, Hà Nội, tr. 258.
- (47) Đào Xuân Nam (1983) Khoán sản phẩm và Việc Đổi mới Chính sách Kinh tế, Đổi mới Cơ chế quản lý trong Nông nghiệp, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 97.
- (48) Nguyễn Đức Bình (1983) Tiếp tục Suy nghĩ về Khoán Sản phẩm trong Nông nghiệp, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 18, Lê Bàn Thạch (1983) Khoán Sản phẩm và Việc củng cố, Tăng cường Cơ sở Vật chất-Kỹ thuật trong Hợp tác xã Nông nghiệp, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 107.
- (49) Nguyễn Đức Bình (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn, tr.30.
- (50) Bài viết trên.
- (51) Bài viết trên, tr.31.
- (52) Lê Văn Sùng (1983) Về Cách Đánh giá Khoán Sản phẩm trong Nông nghiệp, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 142.
- (53) 岩井美佐紀 (2001) 『ドイモイ前後におけるベトナム紅河デルタ村落の変容－バックニン省チャンリエット村における農業生産合作社を中心に』一橋大学博士論文, for example.
- (54) Nguyễn Đức Bình (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn, Lê Văn Sùng (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn.
- (55) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 49-90.
- (56) Nguyễn Sinh Cúc (1995) *Nông nghiệp Việt Nam Agriculture of Vietnam 1945-1995*, Nhà xuất bản Thống kê Statistical Publishing House, Hà Nội, tr. 37.
- (57) ステイグリッツ (2000) 前掲書 597～598 ページ。
- (58) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 64.
- (59) *Sách trên*, tr. 69.
- (60) 竹内 (1999) 前掲論文 255 ページ。

1.3.

- (61) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 67.
- (62) *Sách trên*, tr. 67, 71.
- (63) Nguyễn Sinh Cúc (1991) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 103.
- (64) Also refer to 竹内郁雄 (2004) 「ベトナムにおける市場経済化を伴う経済発展の考察－北部のムラ・村にみられる‘均等主義’の検討・評価を通じて－」(石田暁恵・五島文雄編 (2004) 『国際経済参入期のベトナム』 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構 アジア経済研究所) 177～179 ページ.

(65) If the above-mentioned process described about the primary contents of the Resolution of No.10, it will remind us of the situation in rural areas in Japan in the 1960s, when the Japanese government promulgated the Basic Law on Agriculture in 1960, to mobilize/ encourage Japanese peasants to carry out the land concentration and accumulation, toward the realization of larger scale of agriculture with higher agricultural productivity.

(66) 竹内 (2004) 前掲論文 178 ページ。

(67) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 67-68.

(68) Phạm Xuân Nam (1997) *Phát triển Nông thôn Rural Development*, Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr. 117.

(69) 竹内 (2004) 前掲論文 179~180 ページ。

(70) It was originated from one of the necessary requirements which the Resolution No. 10 itself had appealed in 1988 (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 68-69) .

(71) Đào Thế Anh/ Lê Đức Thịnh/ Đinh Đức Tuấn/ An Đăng Quyên/ Lê Sơn Thành/ Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Đồn điền Đồi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA/Trung tâm Tin học Nông nghiệp và Phát triển Nông thôn, Hà Nội, tr. 62.

(72) Also refer to Tô Duy Hợp (2000) *Sự biến đổi của Làng - Xã Việt Nam ở Đồng bằng sông Hồng*, Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr. 203-204.

(73) Đào Thế Anh/ Lê Đức Thịnh/ Đinh Đức Tuấn/ An Đăng Quyên/ Lê Sơn Thành/ Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 37-38.

(74) *Sách trên*, tr. 39.

(75) 竹内 (2004) 前掲論文 181~182 ページ。

(76) 同上論文 182~183 ページ。

(77) Bộ Nông nghiệp và Công nghiệp Thực phẩm (1993) *Chủ trương Chính sách của Đảng, Nhà nước về Tiếp tục Đổi mới và Phát triển Nông nghiệp, Nông thôn*, Nhà xuất bản Nông nghiệp, Hà Nội, tr. 168-175.

1.4.

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(79) マイケル・P・トダロ/ステファン・C・スミス/森杉壽芳監訳・OCDE 開発経済研究会訳 (2010) 『トダロとスミスの開発経済学 [原書第 10 版]』 株式会社ピアソン桐原 (Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith (2009) *Economic Development Tenth Edition*, Pearson Educational Limited, London)。

(80) 同上書 558~559 ページ。

(81) 同上書 559 ページ。

- (82) 同上書 558 ページ。
- (83) 同上書 561 ページ。
- (84) 同上。
- (85) Refer to 青木昌彦/瀧澤弘和・谷口和弘訳 (2003) 『比較制度分析に向けて 新装版』 NTT 出版株式会社 (Masahiko Aoki (2001) *Towards A Comparative Institutional Analysis*, MIT Press, Massachusetts) 51 ページ, for example.
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- (87) 荒井一博 (2008) 『ファンダメンタル ミクロ経済学 (第2版)』 (株) 中央経済社 285 ページ、294 ページ、佐々木宏夫 (2008) 『基礎コース [経済学] -3 基礎コース ミクロ経済学』 株式会社新世社 135~136 ページ。
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- (89) Refer to R・アクセルロッド/松田裕之訳 (1998) 『つきあい方の科学：バクテリアから国際関係まで』 ミネルヴァ書房 (Robert Axelrod (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Perseus Books, LLC, New York) particularly. Also refer to 西村和雄 (2011) 『ミクロ経済学 第3版 現代経済学入門』 株式会社岩波書店 200~203 ページ。
- (90) Nguyễn Văn Sơn (1983) *Khoản Sản phẩm trong Nông nghiệp là Hiện tượng Phù hợp với Quy luật*, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr.124.
- (91) See 岩井 (2001) 前掲論文 134~137 ページ, Đào Thế Anh/ Lê Đức Thịnh/ Đinh Đức Tuấn/ An Đăng Quyên/ Lê Sơn Thành/ Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 113, 119.
- (92) Based on the interview with a person from Q village, Duy Tien district, Ha Nam province conducted by Mr. Takeuchi Ikuo in September 2018 in Hanoi, Vietnam.
- (93) Also refer to 竹内郁雄 (2006b) 「ドイモイ下のベトナムにおける農村から都市への人口移動と「共同体」の役割試論」 (寺本実編 (2006) 『ドイモイ下ベトナムの「国家と社会」をめぐって』 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構 アジア経済研究所) 163~199 ページ, particularly 第1節.
- (94) 速水佑次郎 (2004) 『新版 開発経済学』 (第2刷) 創文社 第9章。
- (95) Đào Thế Anh/ Lê Đức Thịnh/ Đinh Đức Tuấn/ An Đăng Quyên/ Lê Sơn Thành/ Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 41.
- (96) *Sách trên*.
- (97) *Sách trên*.

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(99) 桜井由躬雄 (1999) 「公田制」(石井米雄監修/桜井由躬雄・桃木至朗編 (1999) 『東南アジアを知るシリーズ ベトナムの事典』 株式会社同朋社) 136 ページ。

(100) 古田元夫 (2017) 『アジアの基礎知識 ベトナムの基礎知識』 株式会社めこん 78, 84, 86 ページ。

(101) 石井米雄・桜井由躬雄 (1999) 『新版 各国世界史 5 東南アジア史 I (大陸編)』 株式会社山川出版社 187 ページ。

(102) 桜井 (1999) 前掲論稿 138 ページ、石井・桜井 (1999) 前掲書 187~188 ページ。

(103) 古田 (2017) 前掲書 99 ページ。

(104) 桜井 (1999) 前掲論稿 137 ページ、石井・桜井 (1999) 前掲書 223~224 ページ、古田 (2017) 前掲書 99 ページ。

(105) 石井・桜井 (1999) 前掲書 223 ページ。

(106) Phạm Xuân Nam (1997) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 78.

(107) Hội đồng Quốc gia Chỉ đạo Biên soạn Từ điển Bách khoa Việt Nam (2000) *Từ điển Bách khoa Việt Nam I A-D*, Nhà xuất bản Từ điển Bách khoa, Hà Nội, tr. 582.

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(110) As a Tit for Tat strategy of infinite repeat game in Game theory.

(111) Nguyễn Đồng Chi (1977) , *Bài viết đã dẫn*, tr. 50.

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(112) Refer to 古田 (2013) 前掲論文 349 ページ。

(113) Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 67.

- (114) Also refer to 岩井 (2001) 前掲論文 127 ページ.
- (115) Refer to 竹内 (1999) 前掲論文 251 ページ.
- (116) About the detail, see 白石昌也 (2015) 「ベトナム農村社会における中間組織：歴史的視点からの試論」(秋葉まり子編著 (2015) 『ベトナム農村の組織と経済』 弘前大学出版会) 43~46 ページ.
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- (118) Also refer to 古田 (1998) 前掲書 163~164 ページ.
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- (120) Đào Thế Anh/ Lê Đức Thịnh/ Đinh Đức Tuấn/ An Đăng Quyên/ Lê Sơn Thành/ Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 81.
- (121) 竹内 (1999) 前掲論文 181~182 ページ。
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- (123) Quy định trên, tr. 174, điều 14.
- (124) Đào Thế Anh/ Lê Đức Thịnh/ Đinh Đức Tuấn/ An Đăng Quyên/ Lê Sơn Thành/ Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 81.
- (125) *Sách trên*.
- (126) *Sách trên*, tr. 80.
- (127) *Sách trên*.
- (128) *Sách trên*, tr.80, 83.
- (129) *Sách trên*, tr. 81.
- (130) *Sách trên*, tr. 83.
- (131) *Sách trên*, tr. 81.
- (132) *Sách trên*.
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Chapter II The Way of Land Allocation in Egalitarianism as a Result of Institutionary Evolution

The function of land distribution - a form of the function of common resource management at the village level - according to the Cong dien system in Vietnam, particularly in the traditional rural areas of the Northern and Central Vietnam, was minimized after the independence, specifically through the period of the Land Reform, followed by the period of collectivization of agriculture. However, as mentioned in Chapter I above, the process of deregulation in the North and Central regions since 1981 led to the appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, in which the function of the land distribution that appeared in those regions was very similar to that of the Cong dien system. In other words, the function of the land distribution there called by the way of land allocation in egalitarianism did recover and regenerate as “a modern version” of the Cong dien system.

If my above comment is correct, then when conducting this discussion by depending on the economics of institution, we cannot avoid referring to the concept of *historical dependency*⁽¹⁾ related to economic institutions, here informal economic institutions, which have passed through in the whole historical process of institutionary evolution in each country, here Vietnam.

As I will explain in more detail later, historical dependency is the concept of how economic institutions have been influenced by historical conditions available in the past⁽²⁾. Based on that understanding of the economics of institution, in this section/ part, we need to examine some historical factors or reasons that affected the collectivization of agriculture leading to the appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism.

In Section 1 of Chapter I, I have explained roughly causes of collectivization of agriculture that led to the deregulation in the rural areas since 1981. Those are:

- (1) The diseconomy of scale in management
- (2) The socialistic unified distribution system in egalitarianism
- (3) The mutual impact of the above two things

But as I did excuse in the very Section 1 of Chapter I, I there only mentioned some direct causes that led to the expanding application of the products contract system or the restoration or the regeneration of the household economies in the process of deregulation since 1981.

But once we consider some of those causes that led to the appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism by using the concept of the above *historical dependency* and *institutional complementarity* ⁽³⁾, I think that it will be easier for me to explain more consistently, comprehensively and systematically the reason why led collectivization of agriculture to the appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism.

Therefore, in this Section 2, I would like to present those above historical reasons by the concept of historical dependency and the concept of institutional complementarity of comparative institutional analysis of the economics of institution.

The description below is a kind of attempts which explain consistently, comprehensively and systematically not only the reasons why the household economies restored or regenerated, but also the collectivization of agriculture led to the appearance of the very way of land allocation in egalitarianism - a function of land distribution, a form of the function of common resource management at the village level, very similar to that of the former Cong dien system.

2.1. Relation between two technical types of agricultural production with the advantage of the scale economy

If we depend on the theory of institutional evolution using the evolutionary game in the economics of institution, we can define that the shift of institution is that from any of Nash equilibrium to another Nash equilibrium in the evolutionary game having a lot of Nash equilibriums ⁽⁴⁾.

And the theory emphasizes that: In this case, the shift of institution is usually to be carried out in *historical dependency*. As I explained above, historical dependency means “the concept of how economic institutions have been influenced by historical conditions available in the past”. In particular, in the “conditions available” above, if the expected pay off of any of Nash equilibrium or of an institution is less than that of another Nash equilibrium

or another institution, then the shift from the former institution to the latter institution will occur or will be carried out, but otherwise, the shift of institution will not occur and the institution shifting will return to the first institution, and finally/ lastly the first institution will continue to exist ⁽⁵⁾.

Therefore, it can be described that the attempt of the shift of institution toward the planned economy in rural areas in the North of Vietnam from the period of the Land Reform to that of the collectivization of agriculture was actually not profitable enough to abolish the socio-economic function of the Cong dien system - the function of the land distribution - completely. It is because that just as the recovery and regeneration of the household economies, the above attempt finally led to the appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, which basically has the same socio-economic function of land distribution of the Cong dien system. Or we can also describe that: the attempt of abolishment of the above socio-economic function of the Cong dien system through the Land Reform and the collectivization of agriculture was that which had more “costs” than pay offs or “benefits”. Therefore, the collectivization of agriculture could not be completed successfully, and finally led to the appearance of “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism”, or the “modern version” of the Cong dien system.

The reason why the attempt to the collectivization of agriculture finally had such high costs is that, as I explained in Section 1 of Chapter I, the collectivization of agriculture towards the expansion of the scale of cooperatives, or the realization of large-scale agriculture combined with the mechanization of agriculture made the scale of cooperatives become so large that those cooperatives caused the diseconomy of scale in management. And the distribution system in/ according to the egalitarianism of those cooperatives also made cooperative members lose their incentive or cause “moral hazard”. Therefore, the cooperatives were also forced to increase monitoring costs, a kind of transaction costs in managing or monitoring cooperative members, which made the inefficiency situation in those cooperatives more and more serious.

During presenting the above issue in Section 1 of Chapter I, I explained that the above diseconomy of scale is the diseconomy of scale in management. However, in the concept of diseconomy of scale, there is another type of diseconomy of scale ⁽⁶⁾. It can be called “the diseconomy of

scale originated/ derived from specific technological characteristics in agricultural production”. This type of the diseconomy of scale (arising) from the process of agricultural collectivization also caused a lot of costs/ inefficiencies for agricultural production in cooperatives and those costs were no lower than those of “the diseconomy of scale in management”. And it is also possible that “the diseconomy of scale originated/ derived from specific characteristics in agricultural production” was a more fundamental reason than “the diseconomy of scale in management” in leading to the appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation - the “modern version” of the Cong dien system.

Regarding the characteristics of agriculture, the way of production and business of cooperatives in that period aiming to realize large-scale agriculture combined with the mechanization of agriculture through the expansion of the scale of cooperatives was not totally/ completely an appropriate way ⁽⁷⁾ for Vietnam, which was in the process of building a socialist country, but still a developing country. Because, in the process of expanding production scale towards large-scale agriculture, unlike manufacturing industries, agriculture is not always able to take advantages of scale, specifically for the following reason: Due to the typical type of crops and particularly the high ratio of population per land (the high ratio of land per capita), there are a lot of cases where agriculture only produce a certain level of harvest or produce consistent return to scale (meaning that: up to a certain level, the harvest will only increase in the same ratio of the increase of production factors). Therefore, when thinking about increasing agricultural production, it is not always necessary to expand the scale of production/ scale of farms and cooperatives. And rice production not only in the North of Vietnam but also that in the whole of Vietnam so far is the very type of agriculture like that.

The difference between (1) the type of agriculture which can take scale advantage and (2) the type of agriculture which only gains a consistent return to scale is also closely related to the issue/ fact whether those 2 types of agriculture are suitable for the mechanization of agriculture or not. Because type (1) of agriculture can increase agricultural productivity through increasing labor productivity deriving from mechanization (M Technology (machinery technology)), it means that such type of capital intensive agriculture is suitable for agricultural activities in those regions with a low

population per land ratio ⁽⁸⁾, typically such activities as wheat production in the USA, cotton production in Russia, etc. Meanwhile, type (2) of agriculture does not only bear biological risk but also has to increase agricultural productivity through the increase of land productivity by adding fertilizers, pesticides... periodically, not through that of labor productivity (BC Technology - Biologistic and Chemical Technology), meaning that if we take account of additional obstacles such as weeding ... in the process of growing rice, that type of agriculture is labor-intensive agriculture and it will be suitable for agricultural activities in those regions with a high ratio of the population per land ⁽⁹⁾. Therefore, this type of agriculture is also an unavoidable choice for agricultural activities in those regions, typically rice production regions in Asian countries, including those in Vietnam.

In explaining type (2) of agriculture further, I would like to give the following specific example: Let's assume that there are 4 peasants input into 1 hectare of land used for the type (2) of agriculture and the agricultural output of the land in this case is 4 tons of rice, then even if they add another 4 peasants to that 1 hectare of land, they will still get only 8 tons of rice. Therefore, if their goal is to produce 1 ton of rice for each peasant, then they do not necessarily have to expand the area of the land or the scale of their agricultural production. It means that the type (2) of agriculture can be considered very suitable for agricultural activities of the small household economy rather than that of the large scale farm like the former agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam.

Therefore, the attempt/ efforts of realizing the large-scale agriculture combined with the mechanization of agriculture in the period of collectivization in Vietnam were not totally/ completely suitable for agricultural activities there because Vietnam is a country that needs to increase the productivity of rice production by means of labor-intensive agriculture to increase land productivity.

Besides, in the period of collectivization, it was very difficult for cooperatives to carry out agricultural mechanization because in that period, the North of Vietnam had to import a lot of agricultural machines in the shortage of foreign currencies, therefore the efficiency of mechanization was very limited ⁽¹⁰⁾ and it can be said that: it (that issue) also reduced pay offs or "benefits" and increased costs of collectivization of agriculture.

Specifically, in the rural areas of the Northern Vietnam in 1975, the

level of mechanization in cooperatives were still such a low level as was only realized in the process of soil turning and in other production processes, manual labor was still popular⁽¹¹⁾. Meanwhile, nearly half of all cooperatives did not have handy any conditions for using agricultural machinery even in the process of soil turning, so they still had to depend on cattle as before⁽¹²⁾. But about the number of buffaloes in that period: it did not increase, while the number of cows decreased seriously because the production of food sources for animal husbandry was not stable⁽¹³⁾. Thus in most of those cooperatives, the land area in which buffaloes played a role as “tractors” was only from 30% -35% in the total agricultural land area in the North in that period⁽¹⁴⁾.

2.2. The Green Revolution according to a technical type of increasing land productivity and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

However, if we talk about another underlying cause leading the inefficiencies or “the diseconomy of scale originated/ derived from specific characteristics in agricultural production” to become more serious and finally leading it to the appearance of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, the “modern version” of the Cong dien system, I have to mention/ emphasize the cause that is originated from the very situation of agricultural production itself in Vietnam in that period. Specifically: (1) In that period, in the context of the increasingly fierce Vietnam War, the requirement of expanding the scale of cooperatives became accordingly more and more urgent. Right after the independence in 1945, Vietnam, as a developing country, often suffered food shortages and in the above period, Vietnam also had to experience the 2nd highest population growth with more than 3% each year (3.24 % from 1965 to 1976 after 3.93 % from 1956 to 1960)⁽¹⁵⁾, partly causing the more and more increase of the ratio of the population per land. That is, Vietnam in that period needed to solve the food and population problem through the Green Revolution (the GR)⁽¹⁶⁾ (a most typical intensive agriculture, specifically, which is a modern or scientific agriculture that helps peasants enjoy much more agricultural output immediately, but even so, the level of the risk is also sometimes much

higher than that of traditional agriculture ⁽¹⁷⁾ (That is, the GR have 2 contradictory aspects - both beneficial one and unbeneficial one).

2.2.1. Concept of institutional complementarity between the peasants' household economy and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism in carrying out the Green Revolution

1. At present, we have a theoretical concept that is useful for explaining those above things logically. It is the concept of institutional complementarity of comparative institutional analysis ⁽¹⁸⁾, using the theory of institutionary evolution of the economics of institution. As mentioned in the above of this Chapter II, comparative institutional analysis also often use game theory and it assumes that: (1) The economic system of a country is constituted by different economic institutions; (2) And those different economic institutions are suitable for and complement each other, or they are mutually complementary. That analysis also emphasizes that the evolution and the diversity of those economic institutions of each country is the result in which the economy has reached a state of a certain equilibrium according to historical dependency, thus the equilibrium status of each country is ordinarily different. And it also emphasizes that, in this case, the stronger is the institutional complementarity among those institutions in a certain economic system, if the institutional reform is just carried out only in one field, and not done in other fields at the same time, the higher cost the attempt to reform will totally pay (the smaller benefits, or the smaller pay offs the reform will gain). And in the most extreme case, even that institutional reform itself will not be implemented/ carried out successfully at all ⁽¹⁹⁾.

2. As we know, the GR in rice production in developing countries generally began in 1965 owing to the success of the invention of a high yield rice variety called IRRI 8 at the International Rice Research Institute (the IRRI) in Manila, Philippines, then the GR was quickly transferred to those developing countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia. And by the early 1970s, this revolution had been popularized in those countries very widely ⁽²⁰⁾.

This high yield rice variety (IRRI 8) (in Vietnamese called: *nông nghiệp số 8*) also began to be introduced in Vietnam, not only in the Republic

of Vietnam since the mid-1960s (the Southern Vietnam at present) but also in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the Northern Vietnam at present) from 1969 through China and achieved some outstanding results in the shift of rice production structure in that period ⁽²¹⁾ as follows:

In the North of Vietnam in general, there are usually 3 crop seasons: the winter-spring crop, the autumn crop and the winter crop. The winter-spring crop and the autumn crop are usually specialized in rice production and the winter crop are in crop production (besides, in the South of Vietnam, there is also the summer-autumn crop, which is specialized in rice production). About IRRI 8, this high yield rice variety started to be used/planted in the winter-spring crop, and by the end of the 1980s, IRRI 8 had completely replaced the traditional rice variety (called *lúa chiêm*). It means that IRRI 8 now has turned the winter-spring crop into an agricultural crop season that can gain a rapid high yield ⁽²²⁾ (while in the South of Vietnam, thanks to the GR, the peasants there can ensure enough time for producing the summer-autumn crop, so they have increased their rice production even more prominently). In general, by the end of the 1970s, the time before the beginning of the deregulation, the land area cultivated for high yield rice varieties, including IRRI 8 in the Northern Vietnam had accounted for about 30 % of the total land area and regarding only the winter-spring crop, the Northern peasants used high yield rice varieties on more than 70% of their total cultivated area ⁽²³⁾.

3. For more understanding about the GR, I would like to provide some things/ information about the GR as follows:

If peasants want to gain high rice yields by using modern high yield rice varieties such as IRRI 8, etc. then the GR requires them to do the following two things:

- (1) To complete the irrigation system (pre-condition).
- (2) To provide enough inputs such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc. (post-condition) ⁽²⁴⁾.

Compared with the traditional agriculture, the GR type of agriculture requires peasants to carry out intensive labor agriculture to enable their land productivity to be higher. For example, peasants in this case need to know when to start irrigation, when to use chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc. It means that this type of agriculture requires economic subjects themselves to

carry out this type of agriculture to be suitable for the type of small-scale agriculture like households. In other words, for Asian countries in that period, including Vietnam, which had to deal with population and food problem, the GR emerged as the very type of agriculture that is both beneficial and unbeneficial. Specifically, if the rural areas of those countries, particularly of Vietnam, can solve the above two necessary conditions, the GR will bring much higher productivity than that of traditional agriculture. However, if those two cannot be solved successfully, particularly the first condition (irrigation problem), the GR will be easily changed into a risky type of agriculture with large fluctuation in output, successively large fluctuation in the harvest and consumption levels. It is because in the GR type of agriculture (modern agriculture or rice production with high yield rice varieties), (1) in case of not completing enough irrigation system (drainage problem including), peasants will face up with the higher risk than in the case of the traditional rice varieties (traditional agriculture) whenever natural disasters occur (such as a flood, a drought, etc.) ⁽²⁵⁾. And (2) in case of not guaranteeing enough pesticides, those high yield rice varieties are more susceptible to pests than in the case of traditional rice varieties. Besides, in case of not guaranteeing enough chemical fertilizers, those new rice varieties also will not achieve the required yield, and probably can even produce smaller amount of rice than traditional rice varieties (traditional agriculture) ⁽²⁶⁾.

Those above things have the following meanings:

(1) In the process of carrying out the GR, between the GR with the above two necessary conditions (pre and post-conditions), there is a type of complementarity in terms of agricultural technology ⁽²⁷⁾.

(2) And if economic subjects carrying out the GR are small-scale household economies - those suitable for labor-intensive agriculture and also those who avoid agricultural risk - then in the process of implementing, between the household economies and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation - an institution to share agricultural risk and average the harvest and consumption level at their household level - also has another type of complementarity as well, meaning the (concept of) institutional complementarity.

Therefore, it can be said that the period requiring agricultural cooperatives to expand their scale was the very period that those

cooperatives should have conducted labor-intensive agriculture to increase land productivity by means of the GR towards solving the problem of food and population. It means that it was the very period that the institutional complementarity between the GR with small-scale household economies and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation increased much more than before. Therefore the very benefits of implementing the deregulation towards the collectivization of agriculture also became much lower. In other words, the benefits for carrying out the GR based on such institutions as the household economies and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism became very higher, meaning that the necessity in restoring and regenerating the land distribution function at the village level through the way of land allocation in egalitarianism also became higher and higher. Moreover, for Vietnam, a developing country, the above necessity to share agricultural risk maybe became even higher because the GR in Vietnam in that period was forced to carry out in the severe situation of high agricultural risk, partly caused by the shortage of both pre and post-conditions (the irrigation system in terms of technology and the chemical fertilizers and pesticides to use modern rice varieties to increase agricultural production) due to the wartime and the semi-wartime conditions continuing incessantly in the 1970s ~ 80s.

2.2.2. Actual situation of the application of the Green Revolution in Vietnam and Necessity of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

1. But, the application of modern rice varieties in the Northern Vietnam in that period was just the beginning, although IRRI 8 and other (traditional) high-yield rice varieties were used in about 70% of the total land area in the winter-spring crop in the late 1970s. According to the World Rice Statistics from 1993 to 1995 by the IRRI in the total land area of the whole Vietnam, that area which was introduced/ applied the modern rice varieties such as IRRI 8 in 1977 was still only 6% ⁽²⁸⁾. It means that even Vietnam used IRRI 8 in all the areas of the winter-spring crop in that year, but that percentage of 70% was only about 28.6%, and the left 71.4% were still traditional high-yield varieties self-improved by Vietnamese agricultural scientists. Besides, regarding “those high yield rice varieties which were produced and introduced in rural areas in the Northern provinces of Vietnam

in that period, each of the locality there often used a different high yield variety and there had also the phenomenon that peasants often used different varieties of high yielding rice on the same plot of their land was also a fairly predominant/ popular phenomenon”⁽²⁹⁾.

The completion of the irrigation system in the North of Vietnam in that period was also not considered enough to meet the whole demand of the GR fully. In that period, it was always the most critical task for the North of Vietnam. In fact, from 1955 to 1975 (for 20 years), the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam spent most of its agricultural development budget on the construction of irrigation systems⁽³⁰⁾. In the above 20 years, the localities also made an effort to build small and medium-sized irrigation systems by mobilizing the labor force of cooperative members and of their family members⁽³¹⁾. However, those efforts until that time had not been enough yet because, in that period, while peasants in the North of Vietnam who produce rice with traditional rice varieties usually needed 10 tons/ha to 30 tons/ha of irrigation water per hectare, the amount of irrigation water which those peasants needed in introducing/ applying modern rice varieties for production increased 1.3 times compared with before⁽³²⁾. Therefore, the number of small and medium-sized canals built by those localities was much far from their actual irrigation demand. Besides, in the total rice production area of 2,400,000 ha in the North of Vietnam in 1977⁽³³⁾, there was still 300,000 ha not having been irrigated⁽³⁴⁾.

In addition, the supply of chemical fertilizers in that period also did not keep up with the increasing demand of those peasants. Partly due to the above severe situation and the abuse of using chemical fertilizers often causing negative impacts on the whole land, the Vietnamese government also often advocated that peasants in cultivation should use inorganic fertilizers (chemistry fertilizers) and organic fertilizers in a balanced way. Nevertheless, in reality, the localities still relied on chemical fertilizers more than organic fertilizers because they were impatient to get immediate results and increase rice production very quickly⁽³⁵⁾. Regarding chemical fertilizers in that period, the North of Vietnam had to import a lot of chemical fertilizers, mainly urea and phosphorus. However, due to the shortage of foreign currencies⁽³⁶⁾, it was very difficult for the then Vietnamese authorities to meet that demand timely and adequately.

2. In the above process, what made even severer the inefficiency of agricultural cooperatives (suffered from “the diseconomy of scale originated/ derived from specific characteristics in agricultural production” in the process towards implementing the scale expansion combined with the mechanization of agriculture, which is not suitable for labor-intensive agriculture towards increasing land productivity as the GR type of agriculture style) was “the diseconomy of scale in management”- a type of other diseconomy of scale as I explained in Section 1 of Chapter I, which any of the former socialist countries also experienced.

In such the situation of “the diseconomy of scale in management” getting more and more serious, the leaders of the Cooperative Management Board were also required to increase the intensity to monitor whether cooperative members worked hard or not on the farms whose size had been also expanded in the process of collectivization. Therefore, they (the leaders) fell into the situation of increased monitoring costs, a type of transaction cost to solve the “moral hazard” that cooperative members in that period may cause in the production process, partly because the cooperative members lost their incentive due to the unified distribution system in/ according to egalitarianism, making “the diseconomy of scale in management” in the cooperatives more serious.

In consequence, due to the very disadvantage of “the diseconomy of scale originated/ derived from specific characteristics in agricultural production” with that of “the diseconomy of scale in management”, the whole Vietnam immediately after unifying the two regions in 1976, especially the North in 1978 and 1979 (two consecutive years) eventually dropped down to serious food shortages in natural disasters and constant weather instability.

And just as explained above, the solution offered by the Vietnamese authorities in that period to overcome “the diseconomy of scale in management” with the failure of the distribution system in/ according to egalitarianism was to implement the expansion of the application of the products contract system to agricultural production in rural areas according to the Directive of No.100 in 1981. But in that process, the economic reform in rural areas did not only carried out the products contract system in those areas spontaneously but also led it to the recovery and the regeneration of the household economies, and also the appearance of the way of land

allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation - the “modern version” of the Cong dien system. Regarding this whole process, I presented and explained thoroughly, so here I do not repeat it.

Anyway, in order to describe and explain the whole process of the Cong dien system has undergone (through the Land Reform and the collectivization of agriculture) thoroughly and successfully, I should think that the whole process needs to be described and to be explained as follows: (1) Indeed, in that period, the role of the Cong dien in socio-economic aspect did minimize. However, by the time the government advocated implementing the products contract system, that process had led to the appearance of the “modern version” of the Cong dien system, or “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation” having the same function of distributing land at the village level as the Cong dien system. And we also need to depend on the concept of historical dependency and comparative institutional analysis to explain further as follows: (2) Besides “the diseconomy of scale in management” and the failure of the distribution system in/ according to egalitarianism, “the very diseconomy of scale originated/ derived from specific characteristics in agricultural production” can explain the above whole historical process more consistently, comprehensively and systematically.

2.3. The way of land allocation in egalitarianism and Historical dependency

By the way, if we are based on the concept of historical dependency, then we can also describe that: in those regions and localities in which the tradition of the old Cong dien system was strong, particularly in those regions and localities in which there were a lot of household economies had to specialize only in rice production to improve their living standards, the expected pay off/ profit to carry out the GR would be very high while those regions and localities had not had both of enough pre and post-conditions of the GR yet, and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, which basically has the same socio-economic function of land distribution of the Cong dien system, would appear easily, too.

2.3.1. Active carrying out of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism in regions and localities which were with a high percentage of the Cong dien area in the traditional society

1. As I mentioned in Section 2 of Chapter I, in August 1982, Nguyen Ai Quoc Institution held the Conference to evaluate the situation of the expansion of the application of the final products contract system in regions and localities. In the Conference, besides the general process of implementing the products contract system in those regions and localities, the speakers were also concerned about those districts and agricultural cooperatives which had achieved remarkable results in expanding the application of the products contract system until then (August 1982). According to those speakers, those districts and cooperatives were mainly located in those regions and localities which were with a high percentage of the area of the Cong dien at the end of the French colonial period, specifically: the regions and localities of Hai Phong city (in the new delta zone), Ha Nam Ninh province (now Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh provinces) and Thai Binh province.

If we mention Hai Phong city and Ha Nam Ninh province in particular, those two provinces which we can easily get some of the specific statistics, the situation of those 2 provinces were as follows: If we try to divide the cooperatives of those two provinces into the following 3 types respectively: good, normal and weak ones, before the period of the products contract system, then the ratio of those 2 provinces was as follows: Hai Phong city was 36%, 34% and 30%; and in Ha Nam Ninh province 31%, 47% and 21%. But since those two provinces started to expand the application of the products contract system, the above ratio changed completely: those were in Hai Phong 51.2%, 40.5% and 8.5%; in Ha Nam Ninh province 41%, 50% and 9%. It means that since the expansion of the application of the products contract system began to be carried out, the percentage/ ratio of those cooperatives classified into weak ones decreased, and the percentage/ ratio of cooperatives classified into good and normal ones increased ⁽³⁷⁾.

Table 2-1 below contains the names of those districts and cooperatives which were highly appreciated by the speakers in the Conference as their outstanding and quick results in some aspects of implementing the products contract system such as: increasing food production; increasing land

productivity; expanding the application of agricultural techniques, specifically using a lot of modern rice varieties in cultivating, or expanding the canal system (irrigation), etc. Referring to Mr. Gourou⁽³⁸⁾, I also added the ratio of the land of the Cong dien in those districts and localities in the colonial period to the Table. In addition, in order to compare with those districts and cooperatives which achieved good results, I also mentioned the names of some districts and cooperatives which were difficult to achieve good results in the same period according to the evaluation of the above speakers.

Table 2 – 1 : The implementation situation of the products contracts in some localities.

○Localities attaining good results

Region/Province ¹	A.C. ² /Commune	District ³	Period attaining good results	Page ⁴
Some provinces in the North of Vietnam			Winter harvest season 1978	41
Vĩnh Phú(Vĩnh Phúc,Phú Thọ)			Winter harvest season 1978	41
HSB ⁵ (Hà Tây)	Phú Cát A.C.	Quốc Oai	After more than 1 year	42
Hải Phòng			After more than 1 year	42
Hải Phòng			After 3 harvest seasons	42
Hải Phòng	Cống Trung Trang	Kiến An: 20~40	After 2 years	43
Hải Phòng	Cống Rỗ	Tiên Lãng: 40~	After 2 years	43
Hải Phòng	Thượng Đồng	Vĩnh Bảo: 20~40	After 2 years	43
Hải Phòng		Vĩnh Bảo: 20~40	After 2 years	44
Hải Phòng	Thụy Hương A.C.	Đồ Sơn: 20~40	-	110
Hải Phòng	Cống Rỗ	Tiên Lãng: 40~	-	114
Hải Phòng	Trung Trạng	Kiến An: 10~20	-	114
Thái Bình		Đô Lương: 20~40	After 2 years	43

Thái Bình	Nguyên Xá A.C.	Vũ Thư: 20~40	After more than 1 year	43
Thái Bình		Hưng Hà:10~20/20~40	Monsoon harvest season 1981	67
Thái Bình	Đông Dương A.C.	Đông Hưng: 20~40	Monsoon harvest season 1981	67
Thái Bình	Thái Hưng A.C.	Thái Thụy: 40~	Monsoon 81 - Winter-Spring 82 harvest season	70
Thái Bình	Quang Lịch A.C.	Kiến Xương: 20~40	Monsoon 81 - Winter-Spring 82 harvest season	70
Hà Nam Ninh			After more than 1 year	42
Hà Nam Ninh			1981	114
HNN ⁶ (Nam Định)	Hải An A.C.	Hải Hậu: 40 ~	1980-1981	110
HNN (Nam Định)	Thượng Kiệt A.C.	Kim Sơn: 20~40	1980-1981	110
HNN (Nam Định)		Kim Sơn: 20~40	-	111
HNN (Nam Định)		Kim Sơn: 20~40	-	111
HNN (Nam Định)	Thượng Kiệt A.C.	Kim Sơn: 20~40	-	117
HNN (Nam Định)	Giao An A.C.	Xuân Thủy: 40~	-	117
HNN (Nam Định)	Nam Hải A.C.	Nam Trực: 20~40	1981	119
HNN (Ninh Bình)	Khánh Hải A.C.	Yên Khánh: 20~40	1981	119
Nghệ Tĩnh (Nghệ An, Hà Tĩnh)			Winter harvest season 1978	41
Nghệ Tĩnh(Nghệ An)		Nghi Lộc	After 2 years	44
Nghệ Tĩnh(Nghệ An)		Nghi Lộc	1981-1982	52
Quảng Nam Đà Nẵng (Đà Nẵng, Quảng Nam)			-	43
Nam Bộ cũ			-	42

○Localities attaining poor results

Thái Bình	9 A.C.s including Vũ Thắng	Kiến Xương: 20~40	Monsoon harvest season 1981	68
Thái Bình		Quyền Phụ: 20~40/40~	Monsoon harvest season 1981	68
Thái Bình	Vũ Thắng A.C.	Kiến Xương: 20~40	Monsoon 81 - Winter-Spring 82 harvest season	69
Thái Bình	Vũ Thắng A.C.	Kiến Xương: 20~40	-	70
HNN (Hà Nam)	Mỹ Thọ A.C.	<i>Bình Lục</i> : ~10	1981	119
HNN (Nam Định)	Hải Vân A.C.	Hải Hậu: 40~	Monsoon 81 - Winter-Spring 82 harvest season	69
HNN (Nam Định)	Hải Vân A.C.	Hải Hậu: 40~	1982	74
HNN (Nam Định)	Khánh Phú A.C.	<i>Yên Khánh</i> : 40~	1982	74
HNN (Nam Định)	Mỹ Thắng A.C.	<i>Mỹ Lộc</i> : 20~40	1981	119
HNN (Ninh Bình)	Khánh Phú A.C.	<i>Yên Khánh</i> : 40~	Monsoon harvest season 1981	68

【Source】 Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm và Chế độ Quản lý mới trong Nông nghiệp*, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật, Hà Nội.

(Note) 1. The words in () mean the present name of the province. 2. A.C. means “Agricultural Cooperative”. 3. 3-1. The number after the district name means % of the Cong dien (common land) of all the cultivating land of the district. 3-2. The italic word is the district name complemented by the author referring to Lê Phước Dũng, Thế Thị Phương (chủ biên) (2010) *Tập bản đồ Hành chính Việt Nam/ Administrative Atlas*, Nhà xuất bản đồ, Hà Nội. 4. Page means the page(s) of the Source 1 mentioning the respective locality. 5. HSB means Hà Sơn Bình province. 6. HNN means Hà Nam Ninh province.

As I mentioned in Section 5 of Chapter I, those three provinces of Thai Binh, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh are all the 3 provinces, which are located along the sea coast of the Pacific Ocean had not been fully exploited until the reign of Minh Mang King of Nguyen Dynasty from 1820, and just the same as Ha Nam province (the province bordering all those three provinces), all of these 3 provinces (also) had a very high percentage of the area of the Cong dien before the Second World War. As we can see from the above Table

2-1 above, that percentage of most districts and cooperatives in those four provinces were between 20% - 40%, and there were also some of those districts and cooperatives whose ratio of the area of the Cong dien exceeded 40%. And the same can be said of the case of districts and cooperatives in Hai Phong: the percentage/ ratio of the area of the Cong dien of a lot of the cooperatives in the province in the colonial period was usually between 20% - 40%, but, also in some of the districts and the cooperatives, this rate/ ratio exceeded 40%. But, although the similarity between those above 3 provinces and Hai Phong city, I do not evaluate the cases of all those 4 at the same time. Because those above 3 provinces located along the sea coast while Hai Phong belongs to new delta area, therefore there are a number of different natural conditions among those which will be difficult for us to compare and evaluate them at the same time.

Besides Hai Phong city and the above four provinces Thai Binh, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh, in the Red River Delta region at the end of the colonial period, there was also another region that had a very high percentage of the area of the Cong dien, which was such a vertical region located in the left of the bank/ the right of the bank into the middle stream of Red River, specifically, the area from the southern part (of the present Tu Liem district) to the southeastern part of Hanoi city and the western part of Hung Yen province now ⁽³⁹⁾.

When comparing the above 2 regions, namely, (1) those regions of Hanoi city and Hung Yen province with (2) the regions of Hai Phong city and the above 4 provinces (Thai Binh, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh), we can see that those of the two regions have some different outstanding characteristics with each other as follows:

The regions (1) are those which were early exploited and were also parts of the outskirts of Hanoi city (formerly known as Thang Long), so in those regions and the surroundings, the early formation and development of a lot of craft villages there accordingly led to the early growth and development of the division of labor in agricultural sector and industrial sector, in other words, the deal in local markets was early developed to a certain extent in those regions, although not very high yet. 2. And even in those rural areas which specialized in agriculture in those regions, there are not a few of localities that are as early as provided with adequately enough water sources for irrigation, because since the establishment of the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, specifically since 1958, a modern irrigation project named Bac Hung Hai supported by the former Soviet Union was built and has been providing enough water sources for irrigation in those localities ⁽⁴⁰⁾.

Meanwhile, the regions (2) in Hai Phong city and 4 above provinces (Thai Binh, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh), which were fully exploited just until the 19th century as I mentioned above, and the settlers in those regions were mostly in poor class, such as poor and landless peasants, migrants, etc., and until now also are still very poor regions with almost hardly any prominent/ well-known craft villages, meaning the level of division of agri-industrial labor, or the development level of market has been very low. Therefore, in those regions, a lot of people had to specialize only in agriculture with self-sufficiency with high risk to continue their living. And about the irrigation system in those regions, from the 16th century onwards, after building a number of dykes and embankments on both of the sides of Red River, peasants often made an effort to utilize this irrigation system by repairing it over and over again, and until now there have still some rudimentary parts in the system ⁽⁴¹⁾. Therefore, in order to develop agriculture in those (2) regions, the Vietnamese authorities now have a plan to as early as building a modern irrigation project named Bac Ha Nam just as Bac Hung Hai. Nevertheless, according to a Vietnamese source, this modern irrigation project will only start at the earliest from 2020 onwards ⁽⁴²⁾.

Because of the above-mentioned characteristics, in the districts of those 4 provinces Thai Binh, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh of the regions (2) performing the organization of the household economies as co-op members in the period of collectivization, some districts strived to build a lot of advanced cooperatives under the strong support of the Vietnamese government, typically Thai Binh province ⁽⁴³⁾, while a lot of other districts only had a lot of cooperatives classified as weak ones. However, there is the following worth mentioning: those above districts which had to have a lot of weak cooperatives (before the reform) are the very districts did not only give birth to such cooperatives ⁽⁴⁴⁾ that early responded to the expansion of the application of the products contract system but also spontaneously formed peasants' household economies that carried out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, and from then on those districts themselves quickly achieved

outstanding results in terms of agricultural output, or productivity increase, etc.

2. Table 2-2 below is a reference to compare the status of rice production of those two groups: Good cooperatives and weak cooperatives in Ha Nam Ninh province (classified in the period before the rural reform) in 5 years, from 1976 to 1981 (the year when the products contract system started). In that Table 2, I also list the percentage of the area of the Cong dien of those localities in the colonial period. Just as we can see easily from that table, the total output of paddy/ rice per capita of those cooperatives which had been previously classified as weak ones increased much more rapidly than those cooperatives which had been previously classified as good ones. And in terms of/ regarding rice production only, the output of those cooperatives which had been previously classified as weak ones even surpassed (in terms of level) that of those cooperatives which had been previously classified as good ones. And the paddy output per capita also has the same tendency. That is: Although until 1981, the production of those cooperatives which had been previously classified as weak ones did not reach the level of those cooperatives which had been previously classified as good ones, but (we could also evaluate) that level since the rural reform was almost no less than that of those cooperatives which had been previously classified as good ones.

Table 2-2 : Paddy production situation of some agricultural co-operatives in Ha Nam Ninh province in 1981

Agricultural Co-operative	Former situation	The total amount of paddy production (tons)	% compared with the average products in the past 5 years	The amount of paddy production/co-op member (Kg)	% compared with the average products in the past 5 years
Mỹ Thắng	Good	2281 t	+ 4 %	467 kg	-1.2%
Nam Hải	Weak	2400 t	+ 57%	404 kg	+ 42%
Mỹ Thọ	Good	1865 t	+ 10%	603 kg	+ 5%
Khánh Hải	Weak	2860 t	+ 85%	580 kg	+ 95%

【Source】Nhà xuất bản Sự thật (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm và Chế độ Quản lý mới trong Nông nghiệp*, Nhà xuất bản Sự thật, 1983, tr.119.

Therefore, it can be said that the products contract system, or to be

more precise, “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation” and the household economies taking that way of land allocation as their basis for agricultural production were not that which the members of advanced cooperatives tried to expand its application to take advantage of good chances in market to be richer as some Vietnamese economists advocates ⁽⁴⁵⁾. In contrast/ on the contrary, that way of land allocation with the household economies was a very suitable institution for poor co-op members of those cooperatives formerly called weak ones in those regions and localities in which 1. the development level of market was low and 2. the area of the Cong dien in the colonial period was very high. Because of such circumstances in some of those regions and localities where peasants had to specialize only in self-sufficiency agriculture with high risk and they had to carry out the GR to apply modern rice varieties into their land in order to get out of poverty in the absence of both of pre and post-conditions, particularly the lack of pre-conditions (the irrigation system), the very way of land allocation played an important role as an institution with institutional complementarity to complement the GR while the institutions on agricultural technology were still not enough. And it made a significant impact not only on the household economies with their cooperatives, meaning their villages to share agricultural risk and average the level of harvest or consumption, but also on the performance of their products contract system by creating incentives, from which they could achieve outstanding results in their agricultural production.

To confirm those above things in more detail, let me examine the case of the districts of Thai Binh province, which with the central government had helped a lot of cooperatives become advanced cooperatives in the period of collectivization ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

In the Conference mentioned above, the speakers were also concerned about the situation of agricultural production in some districts and cooperatives in Thai Binh province. Those speakers who surveyed that situation found that: the results of those districts and cooperatives which expanded the application of the products contract system are very remarkable. The reason that we say “very remarkable” is because:

In the 6 districts mentioned by the speakers in that Conference, in the years from 1964 to 1975, 5 of those 6 districts (except Do Luong district) reached the production level of as much as 5 tons/ ha per year. It means that

the above 5 districts are those districts which helped the cooperatives in the district become the most advanced cooperatives ⁽⁴⁷⁾. But from the beginning of the expansion of the application of the products contract system, only 3 of those 5 districts (Dong Hung, Hung Ha, Vu Thu) continued to be classified into those districts which achieved outstanding results. It means that those 3 districts still hold the title as advanced districts, and the left two districts (Kien Xuong, Quynh Phu) began to be classified into those districts which did not have outstanding results, specifically as follows: Just as the case of the above 4 cooperatives in Ha Nam Ninh province (Table 2-1), the cooperatives in the 3 districts (Dong Hung, Hung Ha, Vu Thu) in Thai Binh province, typically in Hung Ha district, there were 10 cooperatives previously classified as weak cooperatives. However, in the process of implementing the expansion of the application of the products contract system, by the fall crop of 1981, those 10 succeeded in increasing agricultural productivity by 28% compared with that in 1979, therefore, the whole district began to be classified into that which achieved remarkable results, although other cooperatives in that district only increased productivity by 10% ⁽⁴⁸⁾. Meanwhile, the other two districts (Kien Xuong, Quynh Phu) had a lot of cooperatives in originally achieving high productivity easily before 1981. But, in the process of implementing the products contract system, those cooperatives competed to make a plan (contract) to achieve too high a level of productivity, so a lot of those cooperatives were unable to complete the contract planned and finally those two districts were categorized into those which did not have outstanding results ⁽⁴⁹⁾.

The case of Kien Xuong district is a very typical one. This district is the district having an extremely advanced cooperative in the collectivization movement in the North of Vietnam, called Vu Thang Cooperative. Therefore, in the period of collectivization, when the authority organized socialist emulation movements, Vu Thang Cooperative always achieved outstanding results, thus it was always classified as an advanced cooperative ⁽⁵⁰⁾. Therefore, the authority of Thai Binh province in 1979, based on the above supreme experiences of the cooperative and issued a policy to call for all cooperatives in the province to implement the “Vu Thang Hoa movement” ⁽⁵¹⁾. However, when the time came to expand the application of the products contract system, because of the above outstanding advancement, Vu Thang

Cooperative, which had the obligation to make an ambitious plan, had to face up with difficulties to carry out the plan successfully and eventually dropped into the situation that it could not be classified into advanced cooperatives any longer. Specifically, the number of households in the cooperative exceeding the level of contract was only 50% and the amount of their exceeding output was also not much. Meanwhile, in the left 50% of the households in the cooperative, 20% (in that 50%) did not complete the contract/ could not reach the level contracted ⁽⁵²⁾.

In the case of Quynh Phu district, the situation was even more serious. The cooperatives in this district until the organization of that Conference had not applied any of the products contract system yet. Therefore, the rice output in fall crop in 1981 in that district was only 96.2% compared with that in 1979, also could not reach the average output of the whole Thai Binh province in that year with 102% ⁽⁵³⁾.

3. Therefore, we can sum up/ summarize as follows:

(1) In the period of collectivization towards large-scale agriculture combined with the mechanization of agriculture, along with the household economies at the family level (Family Community), the function of land distribution at the village level (Village Community) under the Cong dien system has been minimized indeed.

(2) But, by the time (when) Vietnam, which is a developing country with a very high population/ land ratio, needed to quickly solve population and food problem by the GR (a kind of labor-intensive agriculture which can increase land productivity prominently but can cause a lot of agricultural risks), along with the household economies, the function of land distribution at the village level began to “restored and regenerated” through the appearance of “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation”. This way of land allocation is an institution characterizing institutional complementarity to complement the GR in sharing risk and average the level of harvest or consumption, toward creating incentives for peasants to increase agricultural output, while the GR was short of institutions with institutional complementarity of agricultural technology, typically short of irrigation system.

(3) Therefore, in the above content, we can say that: that “appearance” (“restoration and regeneration”) was even easier to “realize” in the very

poorer regions - such regions that were not technically sufficient in terms of institutional complementarity to complement the GR - those regions which had a higher percentage of the area of the Cong dien in the colonial period.

2.3.2. Possibility of the sameness of the Cong dien system and the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

Even though I have mentioned above, just as I excused in Section 5 of Chapter I, I here do not intend to advocate that the Cong dien system in the traditional society and “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation” at present in the Northern Vietnam are those 2 institutions which are exactly the same.

Even so, I think that here I can emphasize at least one truth about this matter. That truth is:

There are a lot of Vietnamese who believe that the Cong dien in traditional villages in the North of Vietnam had been all distributed to poor peasants in the period of the Land Reform until 1956. And then in the period of agricultural collectivization, the Cong dien became the common land of collective farms (Cooperatives) used and managed by those cooperatives. However, meanwhile, in some provinces of the Northern Central region, until 1975, the year when the Vietnam War ended, there had still existed the land areas used and managed according to the Cong dien system, and the total area of that land (the land according to the Cong dien system) in 1975 was up to 19% in the total land area of the Northern Central region ⁽⁵⁴⁾.

As mentioned in Section 5 of Chapter I, regarding the area of the Cong dien in the Northern Central region before the Land Reform, it was supposed to be contracted to 20% ~ 25% of the total land area, therefore, we could say that the total area of the Cong dien (land) in that region really/ actually did not change much until 1975.

In a document, the Vietnamese author says that, unlike the Red River Delta, the Northern Central Region in that period - the period of the civil war - was the battlefield to directly fight against the Republic of Vietnam, so taking account of the tactical necessity to expand/ reinforce the revolutionary power in the territory of the Southern Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam authority only implemented the first phase of the Land Reform, but did not dare to carry out the next second phase in that area ⁽⁵⁵⁾.

One thing related to the above truth that I here would like readers to understand properly is:

Nghe Tinh Province, a province in the Northern Central Region (now Nghe An and Ha Tinh Province), actually carried out the products contract system since 1978 winter crop season for secondary crops, and then rice cultivation/ production ⁽⁵⁶⁾ as a kind of an “underground” contract system (*khoán chui*), while the central authorities had not officially allowed the expansion of the application of the products contract system yet.

Just as I confirmed from the above Table 2-1, Nghi Loc district in Nghe Tinh province is a district that the speakers in the above Conference were also concerned about as a district achieving outstanding results in expanding the application of the products contract system since 1981 ⁽⁵⁷⁾.

Just as some cooperatives in the districts of Hai Phong city, Thai Binh province and other three provinces (Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh), which I mentioned above, not a few of the cooperatives in that district in Nghe Tinh province before the products contract system were often classified into weak cooperatives, too. However, it was not because of the shortage of capital of those cooperatives, but because although the People’s Committee of Nghe Tinh province every year provided (Nghi Loc district) a budget of 4 million ~ 5 million VND for that district in order that the district could build more irrigation systems, that district (probably the budget did not create any incentives for that district) did not care about that budget at all and also did not use up the whole of the budget every year.

But until 1980 and 1981, in the then serious economic situation, when the province became difficult to provide enough budget as before and was determined to reduce it to only 300 ~ 400 thousand VND/ year, the cooperatives in that district did not only use up the whole budget but also depended on the co-op members’ contributions to build 5 new water pumping stations, and restore and build 70 water reservoirs for the water source for agricultural production, made an effort to popularize and use the modern rice varieties into the agricultural land in those cooperatives... ⁽⁵⁸⁾

The above story in Nghe Tinh province in general and that in Nghi Loc district in particular makes it easy for us to realize that the products contract system in that period was promptly effective in agricultural production in that region at once. At the same time, another surprising thing of the above story is: it (that story) happened in 1978 indeed, only three years after 1975

in the very same region (that) might still have a lot of the Cong dien (land) until 1975. Therefore, in the process of expanding the application of the products contract system, if there are some villages in the Northern Central Region carrying out the land allocation under the products contract system according to “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation”, it can be said that the appearance of that way of land allocation in egalitarianism in those villages in that region is the very “restoration or regeneration” of the Cong dien system itself more than the appearance of the “modern version” of the Cong dien system. Naturally, whether the above comment of mine is true or not, I will have to go on my further research on it, but as far as based on the above truth/ facts, I should think that it is surely possible that my above-mentioned comment will be “correct” to a certain extent.

Notes of Chapter II

- (1) 青木昌彦 (1995) 『経済システムの進化と多元性 比較制度分析序説』 東洋経済新報社 79～80 ページ。
- (2) 瀧澤弘和 (2018) 『現代経済学 ゲーム理論・行動経済学・制度論』 講談社 203 ページ。
- (3) 青木 (1995) 前掲書 91 ページ。

2.1.

- (4) 瀧澤 (2018) 前掲書 196～203 ページ。
- (5) 同上書 199～202 ページ。
- (6) M. エルマン (佐藤経明・中兼和津次訳) (1982) 『社会主義計画経済』 岩波書店 (Michael Ellman (1979) *Socialist Planning*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 110 ページ。
- (7) 同上。
- (8) 荏開津典夫 (2020) 『農業経済学 第5版』 岩波書店 45～47 ページ、52～56 ページ。
- (9) 同上書 45～47 ページ。
- (10) Thế Đạt (1981) *Nền Nông nghiệp Việt Nam từ Cách mạng Tháng tám Năm 1945*, Nhà xuất bản Nông nghiệp, Hà Nội, tr. 160.
- (11) *Sách trên*, tr. 157.
- (12) *Sách trên*, tr. 145-146.
- (13) *Sách trên*, tr. 146.
- (14) *Sách trên*, tr. 147.

2.2.

- (15) Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo (2017) *Địa lý 12 Tái bản Lần thứ 9*, Nhà xuất bản Giáo dục Việt Nam, Hà Nội, tr. 68, Hình 16.1.
- (16) About the Green Revolution, refer to 速水佑次郎 (2004) 『新版 開発経済学』 (第2刷) 創文社 第4章、渡辺利夫 (2010) 『開発経済学』 東洋経済新報社 第4章、荏開津 (2020) 前掲書 第10章。
- (17) Also refer to 戸堂康之 (2015) 『開発経済学入門』 新世社 235 ページ。
- (18) 瀧澤 (2018) 前掲書 205 ページ。

- (19) 同上書 203~206 ページ。
- (20) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 185.
- (21) Lâm Quang Huyền (2007) *Vấn đề Ruộng đất ở Việt Nam*, Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr. 284.
- (22) *Sách trên*.
- (23) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*.
- (24) 荏開津 (2020) 前掲書 164~165 ページ。
- (25) Also refer to 速水 (2004) 前掲書 98 ページ。
- (26) 荏開津 (2020) 前掲書 165 ページ。
- (27) Also refer to 戸堂 (2015) 前掲書 235 ページ。
- (28) 渡辺 (2010) 前掲書 76 ページ 図 4-3。
- (29) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 252.
- (30) 白石昌也 (1993) 『東アジアの国家と社会 5 ベトナム 革命と建設のはざま』 東京大学出版会 106 ページ。
- (31) Thế Đạt (1981) : *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 105.
- (32) *Sách trên*, tr. 103.
- (33) Bùi Huy Đáp – Nguyễn Diên (1996) *Nông nghiệp Việt Nam từ Cội nguồn đến Đổi mới*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 181.
- (34) Also refer to Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 109.
- (35) *Sách trên*.
- (36) *Sách trên*, tr. 108~109.

2.3.

- (37) Khoa Minh (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm, Một động lực Mạnh mẽ để Phát triển Sản xuất và Đưa Nông nghiệp Một bước lên Sản xuất lớn Xã hội Chủ nghĩa*, Nhà xuất bản Sự Thật (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm và Chế độ Quản lý mới trong Nông nghiệp*, Nhà xuất bản Sự Thật, Hà Nội, tr. 42.
- (38) Refer to ピエール・グルー (村野勉訳) (2014) 『トンキンデルタの農民－人文地理学的研究－』 丸善プラネット (Pierre Gourou (1965) *Les paysans Du Delta Tonkinois; étude de géographie humaine*, Waite De-Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston) 345 ページ 図 112.
- (39) 同上。
- (40) Bùi Huy Đáp – Nguyễn Diên (1996) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 217.
- (41) Refer to *Sách trên*, tr. 205~210.
- (42) Refer to <http://bacnamha.com/default.aspx?user=0&pro=thongtu02>
- (43) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 245~246.
- (44) Lê Xuân Tùng (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm trong Nông nghiệp và Vấn đề Thực hiện Các lợi ích*

kinh tế, Nhà xuất bản Sự Thật (1983) *Khoán sản phẩm và Chế độ Quản lý mới trong Nông nghiệp*, Nhà xuất bản Sự Thật, Hà Nội, tr. 69.

(45) Refer to 竹内郁雄 (2004) 「ベトナムにおける市場経済化を伴う経済発展の考察－北部のムラ・村にみられる’均等主義’の検討・評価を通じて－」(石田暁恵・五島文雄編 (2004) 『国際経済参入期のベトナム』 独立行政法人 日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所) 193～194 ページ.

(46) About the detail, see Lê Xuân Tùng (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn, tr. 62~90.

(47) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 101.

(48) Lê Xuân Tùng (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn, tr. 67.

(49) Bài viết trên, tr. 68, tr. 69~70.

(50) Thế Đạt (1981) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 101, 108, 112, 116, 129, 190, 194, 236, 245, 258 etc., for example.

(51) *Sách trên*, tr. 129, tr. 195.

(52) Lê Xuân Tùng (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn, tr. 68.

(53) Bài viết trên.

(54) Phan Đại Đoan (Chủ biên) (1996) *Quản lý Xã hội Nông thôn Nước ta Hiện nay – Một số Vấn đề và Giải pháp (Sách tham khảo)*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 244, for example.

(55) ホアン・ヴァン・チー (1966) 『植民地主義から共産主義へ』 自由アジア社 (Hoang Van Chi (1964) *From Colonialism to Communism – A Case History of North Vietnam*, Frederick A. Praeger Inc. New York) 314~315 ページ。

(56) Khoa Minh (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn, tr. 40~41. Also refer to 村野勉 (1987) 「ベトナム農業における生産物請負制 その仕組みと実態」(『アジアトレンド 1987-IV』) 65 ページ.

(57) Khoa Minh (1983) Bài viết đã dẫn, tr. 44.

(58) Bài viết trên, tr. 52.

Chapter III The Land Consolidation and The Way of Land Allocation in Egalitarianism

By the end of 1993, Vietnam had basically achieved macro-economic stability. Therefore, from 1994 to the present, Vietnam has been implementing a subsequent task, which is Industrialization and Modernization of the Country, a type of intensive socio-economic development.

Objectively speaking, the above process of Industrialization and Modernization is also a long-term process towards the formation and development of markets, because the level of economic development is a function of the development level of those markets. It means that, since Vietnam had basically formed goods and service markets until 1993, so the formation and development of market of production factors is the next task that Vietnam needs to carry out from 1994 until the present. But it is a very process requiring a lot of time. Therefore, it is also an objective truth that the formation and development of the land market as a type of production factors market is considered a long-term task.

On the other hand, for the Vietnamese authorities, the formation and development of the land market in rural areas - the transaction of agricultural land and cultivating land - is also considered as an essential task that should be carried out as quickly as possible. Therefore, (as I mentioned above), the Vietnamese authorities advocated the quick formation and development of the land market in rural areas in the Resolution of No.10 in as early as 1988. Indeed, in 1993, the Vietnamese authorities issued the Land Law of 1993, which legally recognizes five types of rights and obligations, ensuring long-term Land use right for peasants. Since then, the Vietnamese authorities have been always mobilizing peasants or their households in regions and localities to implement the land re-adjustment quickly in order to directly allocate peasants the right of using land as soon as possible through land market deals, such as exchange, transfer, rent, lease, etc. And through that process, the land concentration and accumulation would be promoted in order to create favorable conditions for talented peasants to specialize in agricultural

activities to expand their business, or in other words, in the current period to say, to carry out at least large-scale commercial agriculture broadly, aiming at using land efficiently.

Therefore, the above thing means that: for peasants and their households in the North and the Central of Vietnam, those who have been allocated land according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation - an expression of the function of common resource management at the village level through the land adjustment according to the Resolution of No.10 -, would have to redistribute their allocated land through the land market.

In that situation, the Resolution of the 5th Communist Party Central Committee of the 9th Session in 2002 officially decided that: (1) To promote the land concentration and accumulation in rural areas in the whole country; (2) In promoting this task, to link peasants and enterprises in using land together more efficiently. In the same year of 2002, the Vietnamese authorities also issued the Resolution of No. 94 of the Prime Minister - a document intimately related to the Party's Resolution, which advocated that the rural areas in three regions: the Red River Delta (in the North), the Northern Central region and the Southern Central Coast region (in the Central) should implement a movement called the "land consolidation".

Specifically, the land consolidation is a movement that requires the peasants or their households in those three regions to (1) firstly exchange with each other their small and dispersed plots of land which were the results of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation; (2) then turn those small and dispersed plots into a larger plot with a smaller number of them.

In fact, by far, the land consolidation has been the most important/critical land policy to abolish the way of land allocation in egalitarianism in those above three regions. Concerning this movement, in 2003, based on the Resolution No. 26 of the 9th Communist Party Central Committee in the same year, the former Land Law was revised (in a lot of contents) into the Land Law of 2003, which added such new articles as 1. to provide land rights and obligations in general to be clearer; 2. to expand some rights and obligations for foreign objects, etc. regarding/ concerning long-term use of land...

3.1. Background of the land consolidation

3.1.1. From experiments of exchanging land in some localities

1. By the way, as for the above movement, there is one thing that we need to know: in fact, the land consolidation, with the initial name of exchanging land or plots of land, began to carry out as experiments in some localities in the North and the Central of Vietnam since 1993. According to Ms. Tran Thi Minh Chau, those experiments were carried out in some localities as follows:

On the occasion of the implementation of the land re-adjustment according to the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 1994, because some local authorities were early aware of the need to develop commercial agriculture from then on along with the requirement in concentrating land use, those local authorities actively exchanged ideas/ discussed with peasants in their localities, then identified and allocated the small and dispersed plots of land to each household in the implementation of the above land re-adjustment policy. After that, they mobilized those households to exchange their plots for each other to be reallocated smaller number of plots with larger area of them.

The typical case of that above experiment is the one of Ung Hoa district, Ha Tay province (now a part of Hanoi city). The experiment in this district started from Tram Long commune, specifically: during the process of land re-adjustment in this commune from the end of 1993 to the beginning of 1995, the local authority there mobilized the peasants to exchange actively their small and dispersed plots of land that they would be reallocated according to the land re-adjustment movement, aiming at those plots not being small and dispersed plots. According to the experience of Tram Long commune, by December 1996, the Leadership Committee of Ung Hoa district began to advocate that peasants of all the communes in the district should exchange their small plots of land which they were using. And then, based on the experience of Ung Hoa district, in February 1997, the local Party Committee of Ha Tay Province outlined an instruction on the exchange of agricultural land in the whole province, followed by that, Ha Tay Provincial People's Committee issued the specific guidance on this task.

Therefore, Ha Tay province is regarded as one of the advanced provinces in this task/ movement, which later became officially known as the land consolidation ⁽¹⁾.

Besides, in that period, in some other localities in the North and the Central of Vietnam, the peasants' household also tried to carry out land exchange spontaneously (without the direct guidance and management of their local authorities) in order to promote their agricultural activities, although the movement was not on a large scale and continuous ⁽²⁾.

In addition, based on the success of the above movement in Ha Tay province, from July 1997 onwards, some other provinces and cities also advocated or directed the guidance on the exchange of agricultural land in the districts and communes in their provinces and cities, through the resolutions of the provincial committees, the city committees and the implementation plans of the People's Committees of those provinces and cities. Those provinces and cities are Thanh Hoa, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Bac Ninh, Hung Yen, Hai Duong, and Hai Phong ⁽³⁾.

2. The names of the above six provinces and a city give us an understanding as follows:

In Ha Tay and the above 6 provinces and 1 city, when we compare them with those provinces and cities located in the basin and around the Red River basin such as TB, HN, ND and NB, which I mentioned in Section 3 of Chapter II above, most of the above 6 provinces and the city border the capital Hanoi, which means that those provinces and the city all belong to the region with quite different characteristics than that of the 4 provinces TB, HN, ND and NB, those which quickly responded to the expansion of the application of the final products contract system since 1981 and shifted the movement to the carrying out of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation. And the restoration of the household economies, which spontaneously took that way of land allocation as their basis, quickly achieved outstanding results in increasing rice production, increasing agricultural productivity, etc. Those different characteristics are as follows:

(1) In the above 6 provinces and 1 city (except Hai Phong city), the percentage of the Cong dien at the end of the colonial period, typically that of Bac Ninh and Hai Duong provinces, was generally not extremely high.

For example: the percentage of the Cong dien in the districts of Bac Ninh in that period was usually from 1% ~ 10%, and with a maximum of 10% ~ 20%. And for Hai Duong province, that percentage in all the districts was only 10% ~ 20% ⁽⁴⁾. Just as I confirmed in Section 3 of Chapter II, the rural areas in Bac Ninh, Hai Duong and Hung Yen provinces, as we can easily guess after their names, since 1958 have been directly benefiting the enough/sufficient water source from the modern irrigation project called Bac Hung Hai - a kind of technical institution in terms of institutional complementarity to complement the GR. In addition, from the end of 1960s, both Bac Ninh and Hai Duong provinces actively took the initiative to introduce agricultural machinery into the agricultural fields, then led a lot of cooperatives in those 2 provinces to become advanced cooperatives in terms of agricultural mechanization in the period of collectivization of agriculture ⁽⁵⁾.

(2) Among those three provinces of Bac Ninh, Hung Yen and Hai Duong, only Hung Yen province is rather like the former Ha Tay province in characteristics because both 2 are in the lower middle basin of the Red River. Therefore, the characteristics of Hung Yen and the former Ha Tay province are different from those of Bac Ninh and Hai Duong provinces. Indeed, those 2 provinces of Hung Yen and the former Ha Tay had a relatively high ratio of the Cong dien in the colonial period. Specifically, that ratio of the West of Hung Yen province was more than 40%, and that of the Northeast of the former Ha Tay province, now the Southeast in the inner city of Hanoi, was from 20% ~ 40% ⁽⁶⁾. However, as I mentioned in Section 3 of Chapter II above, in the pre-modern era, there were a lot of rural areas around those 2 regions with a variety of traditional villages specializing in small and handicraft industries all year round or off-season, where the level of division of agri-industrial labor or the development level of market had been relatively high. On the other hand, talking about Ung Hoa district, Ha Tay province, where the land exchange movement was firstly carried out spontaneously, the percentage of the Cong dien area in that district at the end of the colonial period was only 10% ~ 20% ⁽⁷⁾, meaning that region is not really a region with a strong existence of the Cong dien as some other districts in the same province.

(3) Regarding the above 6 provinces and 1 city, apart from the above specific characteristics, all of those 6 provinces and 1 city also have another common characteristic that they are now all located in the Northern Key

Economic Region (*vùng kinh tế trọng điểm*), that region which has been selected as the region to develop key manufacturing industries intensively since Vietnam began to that implementation of Industrialization and Modernization of the Country in 1994, by taking Hanoi, Hai Phong City and Quang Ninh Province to be the “center” ⁽⁸⁾ and people there can easily find a lot of jobs outside the agricultural sector. Therefore, in the process of industrialization and urbanization, the rural areas in those provinces and cities are relatively easy to form and develop commercial agriculture with agricultural diversification, particularly the suburbs (specializing in producing vegetables and husbandry to supply for people in the urban areas).

To sum up, different from those 4 provinces of Thai Binh, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh - some of the advanced provinces in expanding the application of the products contract system before, the above 6 provinces and 1 city, in general, can be described that all of them are located in that region in which: 1. The ratio of the Cong dien in the colonial period was not very high; 2. The development level of market was relatively high, meaning that the formation and development of commercial agriculture were relatively easy and 3. The getting jobs from the non-agricultural sector were also not difficult. In other words, those 6 provinces and 1 city all located in that region which has relatively favorable conditions for exchanging land to promote the land concentration and accumulation into the hands of talented peasants specializing in agricultural activities (to expand their business toward commercial agriculture). Therefore, it is quite natural for those 6 provinces and 1 city to become advanced ones in implementing the exchange of agricultural and cultivating land.

3.1.2. Reasons why the exchanging land/ plots of land’s movement was not popular

However, when talking more specifically about the movement of exchanging agricultural land and cultivating land - from here called the land consolidation -, in the first 10 years, that movement in the Northern and the Central regions was mainly implemented at the local level only, but did not become a wide movement on a large scale across regions and localities. Speaking of which reasons, we can point out the following three ones:

1. In order that peasants can exchange land successfully, at least Land use right of each small and dispersed plot needed to be defined legally in a definite way first and then to be issued to them. For assuring/ solving this issue, the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 1994 advocated to issue to peasants Certificate of Land use right for each small and dispersed land plots which had been allocated to them, in parallel with the implementation of land re-adjustment. But, on the nationwide scale, it was not until the late 1990s that the issue of Certificate of Land use right had just ended. Therefore, if that movement of the land consolidation was to apply to all localities in the Northern and the Central region, excepting for the provinces which actively carried out the movement of exchanging agricultural land and cultivating land, the authorities had to wait until 2002, the year that the Vietnamese government issued the Decision of No. 94 of the government, a document to implement the movement of the land consolidation officially and formally.

2. But what is more essential is, as mentioned above, that above period (from 1993, or 1994 to 2002), for a lot of localities in the Northern and Central Vietnam, was the period in which the most important task was the implementation to adjust and re-adjust, or distribute and redistribute land according to the Resolution of No.10 in 1998 and the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 1994, but it was the implementation which the peasants' households at the village level had actively carried out the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation. And also just as I mentioned above, in that period, the peasants and their households in a lot of localities, particularly those in the Red River Delta region in the North, were indeed eager to implement the land distribution and redistribution according to that way of land allocation in egalitarianism, or in other words, they had been satisfied with the results of that way of land distribution. Therefore, their needs for exchanging land, then the land consolidation, were not strong any more.

For better understanding this issue, I need to repeat the reason for it as follows:

For the peasants and their households, particularly the small-scale household economies in not a few of localities in the Northern and Central Vietnam - 1. are those which had not been equipped with sufficient irrigation

systems, which are institutional complementarity in terms of technical conditions to complement the GR; 2. because of it, are also those which were classified into “non-advanced” ones in the movement of exchanging land, partly because the distribution of land there had been carried out according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism and the role of its as institutional complementarity to complement the GR was very important/significant. Therefore, according to the survey of the peasants in the Red River Delta in 2002 (cited), which I mentioned in Section 3 of Chapter II, 96.5% of the surveyed peasants no longer wanted to readjust land, followed by the land consolidation anymore. And the level of necessity to maintain the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism for peasants and their households in such regions and localities as those in the 4 provinces of Thai Binh, Ha Nam and Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh could have been (definitely) very high.

3. Moreover, that period was in the situation that the differentiation between rich and poor became more and more serious as the problem to solve as quickly as possible. Therefore, the implementation of land distribution according to the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism in regions and localities could be much more necessary than the promotion of the movement of exchanging land, then/ followed by the land consolidation. Specifically:

After determining to implement the deregulation of shifting to the market mechanism and thereby achieving macro-economic stability, until the early 1990s, the level of the rich-poor gap between sectors, localities and social classes in the whole country (relative poverty phenomenon) had significantly widened. For example, in urban areas, particularly in the state sectors, a number of/ a lot of the employees had into fallen a difficult/problematic family-economic situation, partly because in that period, the state-run enterprises/ sector had had all types of subsidy policies abolished. At the same time, in rural areas, the gap between rich and poor was also quite serious. Besides the income gap between urban and rural areas with the ratio of 2:1, in rural areas themselves also existed the gap between advanced rural areas and backward rural ones, which was more and more widen with the ratio of 3:1 ⁽⁹⁾.

By the way, I here would like to say more: the reason why the

Vietnamese authorities in that period had to focus on the above issue of the rich-poor gap and the reason why the necessity of the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism was higher and higher, was partly because the backward rural areas and those areas called “remote and isolated areas” were still poor and had not enjoyed the outstanding results of Doi Moi renovation since 1986 yet. And those areas are also the residential areas of ethnic minorities as well as the former revolutionary bases that contributed very much to the success of the revolutionary tasks before ⁽¹⁰⁾.

In that period, the World Bank - which had been applying the structural adjustment policy to a lot of developing countries to help those countries implement macro-economic stability - began to recommend those developing countries to implement such policies as reducing the relative poverty level, etc., aiming at helping those countries maintain socio-political stability for their economic development. Therefore, in that period - specifically in 1993 and 1994, when the first Land Law and the Decision of No. 64 of the government were issued - and Vietnam had also been stabilizing the economy at the macro level partly based on the above structural adjustment policy, the reduction of the relative poverty situation and the solution of the rich-poor gap also became one of the nation-wide important and urgent tasks for VN to maintain the solidarity of ethnic groups/nationalities ⁽¹¹⁾. Therefore, the Vietnamese authorities also called for people to realize not only intensive socio-economic development with the industrial development and the rapid economic restructure shift but also social fairness with the reduction of the rich-poor gap right from the beginning of the implementation of Industrialization and Modernization of the Country since 1994, aiming at maintaining the political and social stability in general, particularly at sustaining the national solidarity ⁽¹²⁾.

The above policy at the right beginning of Industrialization and Modernization process also had a significant impact on the implementation of the agricultural and rural development policies in that period. That is, on the occasion that the 5th Communist Party Central Committee of the 7th Session at the end of 1993 issued the Resolution to solve the existing problems in agriculture and rural development, the situation of the land re-adjustment in the regions and localities was not mentioned as that of “small-scale and dispersed” ones in the Resolution of No.10 in 1988, but only mentioned as “dispersed” ones in General Secretary Do Muoi’s speech ⁽¹³⁾

and Poli-Bureau's opinion ⁽¹⁴⁾. In other words, the situation of the way of land allocation of small-scale dispersion to the peasants or their households, which was the result of the carrying out of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism, was not severely criticized in the above Resolution in 1993 ⁽¹⁵⁾.

In addition, although the above Resolution in 1993 did not totally neglect the significance of implementing the movement of the land concentration and accumulation, which the Resolution of No.10 in 1988 emphasized, what the Resolution emphasizes more was to realize the social fairness thoroughly in land allocation ⁽¹⁶⁾, meaning that the land distribution should be implemented in egalitarianism. Particularly, the priority should be given to the families/ households of contributors to the former revolutionary activities ⁽¹⁷⁾, especially those in the former revolutionary bases in backward rural areas and "remote and isolated areas". It can be said that the above Resolution highly appreciates the informal insurance function or the social security net function of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, although that Resolution is not fully aware of the necessity and usefulness of such way of land allocation in helping the peasants or their households to realize agricultural risk sharing.

In summary, according to the above viewpoint, the very situation in that period eventually "supported" the spontaneous "movement" in regions and localities in the North and the Central of Vietnam - the carrying out of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism -, more than the movement of "land exchanging" there, followed by then the land consolidation.

3.1.3. New trend and Implementation of the land consolidation

1. However, by the beginning of the 21st century, in the context that Vietnam had been accepted as a member of the international community, the Vietnamese government began to realize the benefits of the qualitative change of the main contents of the strategy of Industrialization and Modernization of the Country since 1994 ⁽¹⁸⁾, particularly that of agricultural and rural development policies. Specifically, since 1995, Vietnam had been successfully allowed to join the international community again through such activities/ aspects as: (1) normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States of America in 1995; (2) joining the Union of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). But when the 21st century came, by the time Vietnam had been required to participate in world-wide international free trade, particularly in integrating into the institutions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Vietnam officially joined it in 2007), those international circumstances required Vietnam to be aware of the new perspectives to create favorable conditions for the shift of the economic structure in the process of Industrialization and Modernization of the Country. To be more precise, the shift of the economic structure according to the international division of labor under the guidance of the WTO should be carried out in the following directions/ ways:

It should be carried out according to the type of intensive development rather than that of extensive one in order to increase productivity as a result of technological innovation, particularly increasing knowledge capital (or developing knowledge industries) through technology transfer from enterprises, especially foreign enterprises, aiming at increasing products or added value of those products having international competitiveness; or developing those industries which can produce/ yield those competitive products ⁽¹⁹⁾.

Therefore, in this new trend, the implementation of Industrialization and Modernization in agriculture - the sector that had been continuing to produce/ yield products with comparative advantage, and rural areas - those which had taken agriculture as the key sector (to develop) - became the most important task in the whole process of Industrialization and Modernization of the Country, in which the shift of the agricultural structure in order to increase the added value of agricultural products, particularly that of exportable ones, would play a central role ⁽²⁰⁾.

In this new trend, the Vietnamese government also began to advocate a policy of promoting the formation and development of the land market and the movement of the land concentration and accumulation, which up to that period had become the most important work in the agricultural policies with the revision of the former Land Law (1993) into the Land Law of 2002, in parallel with the implementation of the above shift of the agricultural structure in regions and localities, particularly where the large-scale commercial agriculture could be performed such as the Mekong Delta region, etc. And regarding the land concentration and accumulation respectively, the Resolution of the 5th Communist Party Central Committee of the 9th Session

in 2002 also outlined a new form of the implementation - the interlinkage between peasants and enterprises - to use land more efficiently for expanding the consumption market of agricultural products towards promoting the land concentration and accumulation more intensively ⁽²¹⁾. Based on that, in 2002, the Vietnamese government also issued the Resolution of No. 94 of the Prime Minister to implement the above Resolution (of the Communist Party Central Committee) ⁽²²⁾. In the Resolution of No. 94, the 3 regions of the Red River Delta, the North Central Coast and the South Central Coast regions, which rural areas had had a lot of small and dispersed plots of land as the result of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, were formally stated/ decided to carry out a movement creating the favorable conditions for the land concentration and accumulation. And the very movement was the land consolidation (formerly the movement of exchanging agricultural and cultivating land).

2. Since then, the former movement of exchanging agricultural and cultivating land began to be called the land consolidation which those above 3 regions should promote by referring to the successful experience of Tho Xuan district, Thanh Hoa having expanded the implementation of the movement of exchanging cultivating land since July 1997. The remarkable characteristics of the movement carried out by Tho Xuan district were as follows: That movement not only actively promoted cultivating land exchange among peasants or their households at the district level but also fairly accomplished other related tasks at the same time. Those tasks were:

(1) Exchanging cultivating land to overcome/ solve the small-scale situation of land plots and reducing the number of plots that the households had been allocated to use.

(2) Re-planning cultivating land in accordance with the necessary requirements of commercial agriculture.

(3) Concentrating the common land or the Cong dien at the commune level, which used to be distributed as “enclaves” among the plots of households, at the same time strictly managing and efficiently using the common land or the Cong dien.

After experimenting in 2 communes of the district, in early 1998, the district began to name/ title that movement of exchanging cultivating land the movement of the “land consolidation” and then expanded the application

of the movement to all the towns and communes in the whole district.

After 3 months of the implementation, from March to May in 1999, all the towns and communes in the district ended the land consolidation. The results were as follows:

(1) The number of plots in the whole district before had been 329,000, then was down to 152,000 plots (equally/ equivalent to/ meaning a decrease of 54%).

(2) (After implementing that movement) The average number of plots of the households used was only 3.2 plots.

(3) The average plot area was expanded from 272 m² to 587 m² ⁽²³⁾.

3. Accordingly with the policy of the 10th Party Committee in 2006 emphasizing the importance of Industrialization and Modernization of Agriculture and Rural Development in the process of Industrialization and Modernization of the Country, the Resolution of the Communist Party Central Committee of the 10th Session in 2008 advocated solving the “Tam Nong” (*tam nông*) problem, related to agriculture (*nông nghiệp*), peasants (*nông dân*) and rural areas (*nông thôn*), which became an important task of the whole country ⁽²⁴⁾. This Resolution cited/ pointed out a new task was to implement the National Targeted Programs for New Rural Development (NTPNRD) (*chương trình quốc gia xây dựng nông thôn mới*), a solution towards the successful achievement of rural development/ construction with the implementation of Industrialization and Modernization at the commune level in rural areas in the whole country, including those 3 regions of the Red River Delta, the North Central and the South Central Coast region ⁽²⁵⁾.

Since then, the land concentration and accumulation in general, particularly the interlinkage and the land consolidation, have been promoted to implement as an important part of the above National Program. Specifically:

(1) In the plan that the communes should develop/ plan to implement the National Program in the first phase, from 2011 to 2020, the plan of land use was considered one of the most important tasks directly related to the promotion of the land concentration and accumulation in general ⁽²⁶⁾. And the continuous implementation of the land consolidation in the North and the Central of Vietnam was also clearly mentioned in the above plans ⁽²⁷⁾.

(2) Based on it, from 2008 to 2010, the regions and localities in the above three regions made an effort to implement the first phase of the land consolidation - a part of the National Targeted Programs for New Rural Development and continued to implement the 2nd phase of the land consolidation from 2013 to 2014 (on the occasion of the issuance of the Vietnamese government's 3rd amended Land Law - Land Law of 2013) ⁽²⁸⁾.

3.2. The land consolidation - Towards overcoming the way of land allocation in egalitarianism

From the end of the 2010s until now, some of the Vietnamese scientists have been insisting that the land consolidation should continue to be carried out in the second phase of the NTPNRD from 2020 onwards ⁽²⁹⁾. Those comments may be partly right. But, meanwhile, the reports on the land concentration and accumulation at the conference organized by the Communist Journal - the theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party - in July and August 2017 ⁽³⁰⁾ points out that: 1. In the land consolidation's movement in a lot of regions and localities until that period, the average number of plots used by peasants and their households has been reduced remarkably and in some regions and localities even down to less than 3 plots. Therefore, this movement seems to have reached a point where it will be difficult to move forward ⁽³¹⁾. Therefore, I (maybe) also should think that: it is time for us to temporarily evaluate to a certain degree about the whole implementation process, the attained results, the present situation and the problems of the movement of the land consolidation. Therefore, below, from this Section till the final, I would like to describe in detail the whole implementation process, the attained results, the present situation, and the problems of the land consolidation in a specific and concise way.

3.2.1. Goals of the land consolidation

1. The common goals of the movement of the land consolidation which started to implement since 2002 in all the three regions of the Red River Delta in the North region, the Northern Central and the Southern Central

Coast regions in the Central of Vietnam were as follows:

(1) To reduce the number of those plots which would be allocated to peasants and their households (to a maximum of 5 plots).

(2) To expand the area of each of the allocated plot (at least 500m² / plot).

(3) To concentrate the common land or the Cong dien in one place (or at the most several places) in the village ⁽³²⁾.

In addition, after fulfilling/ completing/ reaching those goals, the Vietnamese government would issue or re-issue to peasants and their households Certificate of Land use right for each of those plots which had been reallocated to them for their use ⁽³³⁾.

However, the level of the actors' interest in the above goals of the movement of the land consolidation in each region and locality was not entirely the same, so was even in the cases of the same internal region and locality, or the same internal commune and village ⁽³⁴⁾. For example, according to the results of the survey conducted by Mr. Dao The Anh and his colleagues, in the villages and communes of Hai Duong and Ha Nam provinces, peasants and their households carried out the land consolidation to realize their interest in promoting the diversification of the agricultural production towards shifting to commercial agriculture after the land consolidation rather than the above goals/ tasks ⁽³⁵⁾. Meanwhile, the most significant concern of the commune and village authorities in the above two provinces was the completion of irrigation systems and ridges between the rice fields, and the concentration of the common land (in one or at the most several places in the village), while for the district authorities, their primary concern was to strengthen/ enforce the management and supervision of agricultural land, that is, to reduce the number of plots and expand the size/ area of each of those plots to reduce monitoring costs. But referring to the above common goals, the concern of the district or the commune and the village level was the most priority ⁽³⁶⁾.

2. Regarding the way of implementing the land consolidation in regions and localities in general, there were mainly the following 2 types/ models:

(1) Type/ model of the land consolidation that the peasants in localities actively carried out in their voluntary way.

(2) Type/ model of the land consolidation under the (administrative) guidance of local authorities, sometimes under the direct organization by them.

According to the survey results of Mr. Anh and his colleagues, the regions where the land consolidation carried out according to the type/ model 1 were mainly those regions which aimed to shift the agricultural structure from rice to fruit trees or aquaculture to carry out the agricultural diversification on a large scale, typically, Thanh Xa commune, Thanh Ha district of Hai Duong province shifting to litchi cultivation; Nam Cuong commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province shifting to aquaculture, etc. ⁽³⁷⁾.

As for the type/ model 2, the model can be further divided into 2 types/ ways of implementation as follows: (called by type (2.1) and type (2.2))

Type (2.1): Local authorities mobilized the peasants and guided for them to help their households actively carry out the land consolidation. The regions and localities carrying out the land consolidation in/ according to this type were mainly those where the level of the dispersion/ fragmentation of small and dispersed plots of land was not severe, and irrigation systems and ridges (between the rice fields) had been also completed to some degree ⁽³⁸⁾.

Type (2.2): local authorities themselves directly guided and committed the implementation of the land consolidation in combination with the completion of irrigation systems and ridges. The regions and localities implementing the movement in/ according to this type/ way were mainly those where the level of the dispersion/ fragmentation of small and dispersed plots of land was severe and irrigation systems and ridges had not been completed yet ⁽³⁹⁾. Therefore, for those regions and localities, the most important task when implementing the land consolidation was the completion of irrigation systems and ridges. Specifically, when implementing the land consolidation, along with overcoming/ solving the disadvantages of the land re-adjustment conducted under the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 1994, those localities (where the administrative unit level is at the commune level) focused on rebuilding and completing the much more plans directly related to the land re-adjustment, particularly those related to the further construction of irrigation systems and ridges. In this case, the above plans were also rebuilt to increase the area for the successful completion of the irrigation systems and ridges ⁽⁴⁰⁾.

About the above two models/ types (2.1) and (2.2), in general: 1. In the localities based on the models/ types (2.1), the land consolidation was carried out through the active activities of the peasants and their households. But the number of those localities which carried out in this way/ type was not large. 2. In most other localities, the land consolidation which aimed to continue rice production or partially shift the agricultural structure only in the winter season (the season when it was difficult for peasants to apply high yield rice variety to agricultural production), the implementation of the land consolidation was more or less organized under the direct guidance and management of the local localities.

3.2.2. Implementation process of the land consolidation

1. Because of the above context, the localities implementing the land consolidation according to the type/ model 2, particularly the (2.2), encountered not a few of problems during the implementation process.

Firstly, right from the beginning of the implementation, those localities had a lot of difficulties, particularly in rebuilding the land readjustment's plan to decide how to implement the land consolidation or the reallocation of land and plots having been allocated in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation. It was because, at the very beginning of the land consolidation, those localities had been in a complicated situation of coping with the peasants' insecurity feeling in sharing agricultural risk after abolishing the way of land allocation in egalitarianism⁽⁴¹⁾.

In fact, where the localities decided to continue with rice production, the peasants themselves were not generally willing to implement the land consolidation (from the authorities' point of view, it is because the peasant's awareness of the land consolidation was not high)⁽⁴²⁾.

As a result, in the process of implementing the land consolidation in those localities, the households of Party members and of mass organizations, etc. were mobilized to play an active role in the implementation of those goals⁽⁴³⁾.

2. Secondly, in those localities, in the above context, the time to start the land consolidation was rather/ quite late, and the speed of the implementation was also slow/ not high. And in those localities which are

located in the regions with the strong tradition of the former Cong dien system, that situation was even more prominent, for example, such regions as the Red River Delta region, etc., including Thai Binh, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh provinces. According to the results of my field research, the situation there was specifically as follows:

(1) In Q commune, Duy Tien district, Ha Nam province, before or after the Decision of No. 64 of the government issued in 2002, some peasants' households in the commune tried spontaneously carrying out the land consolidation and changed small and dispersed plots into larger area of them. But this experiment could not be disseminated, and it was not until the Resolution of the Communist Party Central Committee of the 10th Session in 2008 was issued, and the Vietnamese authorities advocated the implementation of the NTPNRD, in which one part was the first wave of implementing the land consolidation movement in 2009 and 2010 that the whole Q commune had not started to implement the land consolidation widely/ broadly at the commune level ⁽⁴⁴⁾.

(2) In T commune, Duy Tien district, Ha Nam province, the speed was even slower, meaning that it was not also until the Vietnamese authorities started to implement the second wave of implementing the land consolidation movement in 2013 and 2014 according to the Land Law of 2013 that the whole T commune had not started to implement the land consolidation formally at their commune level ⁽⁴⁵⁾.

On the other hand, in the Central Region, where the proportion of the Cong dien occupied in the colonial period was also high, the situation was almost the same as that in the low basin area in the Red River Delta. For example, after several years when the Vietnamese government issued the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 2002, meaning that until the last years of the first decade of the 21st century, Thua Thien Hue province just advocated formally that the localities in the province should start to implement the land consolidation ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

More or less, the above situations may be one of the major reasons that the Vietnamese central government had to call for the regions and localities to implement the land consolidation a lot of times repeatedly/ again and again: The first time was on the issuance of the Decision of No. 64 of the government in 2002; the second time was when (the decision on) issuing the guidelines/ guidance for the implementation of the NTPNRD in 2008; the

third time was when the most significant revision of the second Land Law replaced by the third in 2013.

3. Thirdly, as we can easily guess from the above two sections, during the process of implementing the land consolidation officially, those above localities often tried to maintain as much of the characteristics of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation as possible, particularly the most typical was the way of redistributing plots of land to the peasants or their households. Specifically, after the land consolidation, the level/ degree of dispersion/ fragmentation of the land plots in those localities was solved to a certain degree. But when it was time to redistribute those larger plots to the peasants or their households, almost all (of) the localities redistributed the land just in the same way in egalitarianism as that in the land adjustment according to the Resolution No. 10 of the Politburo of the Central Communist Party of Vietnam in 1988 and that in the land re-adjustment since 1994.

For example, in the investigation places of Mr. Dao The Anh and his colleagues, after the land consolidation, when it was time to redistribute plots of land to the peasants in the commune, the local authority there (of the commune) thoroughly instructed them to reallocate the land in priority to those households who were the subjects of social policy, including the contributors for revolutionary activities ⁽⁴⁷⁾.

In Ha Tay province (now Hanoi city) - one of the most advanced provinces in the land consolidation movement - the situation was basically the same. For example, in Dan Phuong district, former Ha Tay province, located in the suburban area to the about 20 km northwest of Hanoi, as well as other districts in the province, the authority in the district basically ended/ finished the land exchanging process (meaning the land consolidation) from 1998 to 2000 with a total of 14 out of the 16 communes in the district achieving good/ excellent results. However, just as in the above case of Cho Tot commune, the guidance in redistributing new plots to the peasants or their households after the land consolidation was also the same, for example, such as in priority to those households who were the subjects of social policy, including the contributors for revolutionary activities. As a result, those subjects of social policy had priority at allocating the highest fertile plots. Moreover, in Phuong Dinh commune in this district - one of the most

advanced communes in the district in the land consolidation movement in the period -, after implementing the land consolidation, 160 households in the commune succeeded in arranging/ turning the small and dispersed plots of land that they had used before into a larger plot, meanwhile 659 households successfully reduced the number of plots down to 2 plots and 1480 households reduced (the number of plots) down to 3 plots. But regarding the above 1480 households - equivalent to two-third of the total households in the commune, those households did not dare to turn their small plots into only a larger plot and tried to keep 3 plots or more than 3 plots. It was because: although the new larger plots (the result of the land consolidation) decreased the level of land dispersion/ fragmentation to a certain degree compared with the past. But, according to the explanation of the chairman of Dan Phuong commune, for the very reason that each of those larger plots differs from each other in terms of natural conditions such as the level of soil fertility, the types of crops that can be produced, geology, etc., it means, those larger plots may not be able to avoid agricultural risk rather than the previous land dispersion/ fragmentation, so those households did not dare to implement the land consolidation thoroughly and redistribute all their small and dispersed plots turned into larger plots ⁽⁴⁸⁾.

Considering how to redistribute the land in the process of implementing the land consolidation, we can also describe that the land redistribution continued to be in the way of periodical land reallocation in egalitarianism as before (meaning that it was a part of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation). Specifically, in the investigation places of Mr. Dao The Anh and his colleagues, particularly Quoc Tuan Commune, Nam Sach district, Hai Duong province, when implementing the land consolidation, the commune distributed a part of the common land or the Cong dien in the commune to newly born babies in those households which had not been allocated the land when implementing the land re-adjustment according to the Decision of No. 24 of the government in 1994 ⁽⁴⁹⁾. Meanwhile, in those localities which were delayed in officially deciding to implement the land consolidation because the related procedures at the district and province authorities' level were too complicated, the People's Committee of commune or villages in those localities made an effort to redistribute land to all the members of the households in the process of implementing the land consolidation by helping the households submit a

copy of their latest family registration (to the People's Committee of commune or villages), including the information of the number of the babies born after 1994 onwards until that time ⁽⁵⁰⁾.

In some other communes, the ratio of the common land or the Cong dien in the total land area of the village there also continued to increase. Specifically, in the process of officially implementing the land consolidation, the common land or the Cong dien of those communes actually had belonged to the autonomy of those villages there as I explained above, therefore, in those villages, the common land or the Cong dien sometimes maintained with more than 5% of the total land area of the villages according to the Land Law. And a part of the common land or the Cong dien continued to be used for the land redistribution to carry out the periodical land reallocation through bidding ⁽⁵¹⁾.

And what is most important is that even when officially implementing the land consolidation, as previously, villages were still the real subjects carrying out the land consolidation.

To be more precise, when starting the implementation of the land consolidation, the localities, meaning the People's Committee of the commune, needed to complete the task of determining the following information; 1. The number of each of the households in the village/ the commune; 2. The specific/ detail number of its members; 3. The land area allocated to those households when implementing the land re-adjustment according to the Decision of No. 64 of the government; 4. The area of the common land or the Cong dien under the management of the People's Committee of the commune (in principle); 5. The land area converted into the land to use for the construction of irrigation systems and ridges and more by changing the purpose of the land use; 6. The number of the new plots of land after implementing the land consolidation; 7. The average area of those plots of land; 8. The whole area of the land for implementing the land consolidation.

However, regarding the above tasks, after confirmed by the district authorities, it was quite usual that those were all assigned to the village or the hamlet (*hàng xóm*). And it was the very village (or the hamlet), not the commune, that would redistribute the land to the peasants or their households at the village level in the land consolidation ⁽⁵²⁾. Therefore, it can be said that just as the land adjustment and re-adjustment before, the land consolidation

in not a few localities was carried out as one of the very task related to the land redistribution, to say, as a form of the function of common resource management at the village level, so the land consolidation in those localities was still a traditional and informal activity of the village community itself, rather than an official task of the People's Committee of the commune.

3.3. Some results of the land consolidation

The movement of the land consolidation, up to the present, has been still implemented in the three regions of the Red River Delta in the Northern Vietnam, the Northern Central and the Southern Central Coast regions in the Central Vietnam. But, as I mentioned above, the Communist Journal - the theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party - held a conference in summer 2017 to review and evaluate the whole process of the implementation of the land concentration and accumulation until that time, including the land consolidation ⁽⁵³⁾.

By the end of the 2010s, the land consolidation movement in the Northern and the Central regions has progressed to a certain extent, specifically as follows:

In those localities where the land consolidation was implemented, they has succeeded in reducing the number of plots that the peasants' households had been allocated to use before.

In the above conference held by the Communist Journal, that journal summarizes those results as follows: by 2017, the average number of plots of each of the household in those localities which basically finished/ ended the land consolidation movement has reduced (even) down to less than 3 plots (it was also the original target/ goal of the movement). At the same time, that journal also points out that it would be almost impossible to reduce the more number of those plots in those localities ⁽⁵⁴⁾.

3.3.1. General situation - Implementation of the land concentration and accumulation to some extent

After the land consolidation implemented and has achieved the above results, the movement of the land concentration and accumulation in general

in all the three regions of the Red River Delta in the North, the Northern Central and the Southern Central Coast regions in the Central Vietnam within these 20 years (from 1992 to 2012) has been also carried out successfully to a certain extent/ degree.

Table 3-1 and 3-2 below, which is built on reference to a work of Mr. Kinh published in 2018 ⁽⁵⁵⁾, indicates the trend of changing the total agricultural area and the average land area of each of the households in the above three regions within these 20 years (from 1992 to 2012). By the way, to compare more easily, I added the data of/ about that (changing) trend in/ of other regions in the whole country. According to those 2 tables (Tables 3-1 and 3-2), we can see that: 1. In both the Northern Central region and the Southern Central Coast region (the Central Vietnam), over these 20 years, the land concentration and accumulation has been carried out in a very continuous and transparent trend. Meanwhile, in the Red River Delta region, the trend like that was only in the first 10 years of the 21st century, when the land concentration and accumulation had just begun to a certain degree.

Table 3-1 : Household's agricultural land area divided by socio-economic regions (Unit: ha)

	1992/93	1997/98	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
Northern midland and mountainous Regions	1.525	1.820	2.275	2.230	2.418	2.488	2.770	2.710
Red River Delta Regions	0.641	1.324	0.661	0.682	0.768	0.765	0.743	0.652
Northern Central and Southern Central Coastal Regions	0.760	1.025	1.091	1.285	1.202	1.284	1.485	1.827
Central Highlands Regions	1.819	2.357	2.838	2.768	3.277	3.364	2.965	3.063
Southern Eastern Region	1.465	2.091	1.644	1.953	2.013	1.672	1.883	1.789
Mekong Delta Region	1.711	1.768	1.741	1.847	2.012	2.417	1.839	1.840
Average	1.120	1.503	1.411	1.503	1.613	1.709	1.682	1.738

【Source】 Đỗ Thiên Kinh [2018] *Bất bình đẳng Mức sống ở Nông thôn qua Sử dụng Đất nông nghiệp của Hộ gia đình*. Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr.52~53.

Table 3-2 : Household's agricultural and cultivating land area divided by socio-economic regions (Unit : ha)

	1992/93	1997/98	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
Northern midland and mountainous Regions	1.238	1.073	1.232	1.310	1.375	1.403	1.286	1.340
Red River Delta Regions	0.608	0.677	0.560	0.609	0.615	0.624	0.606	0.574
Northern Central and Southern Central Coastal Regions	0.707	0.744	0.773	0.989	0.952	0.966	1.015	1.140
Central Highlands Regions	1.817	2.269	2.559	2.706	3.005	3.051	2.850	2.970
Southern Eastern Region	1.384	1.998	1.604	1.868	1.970	1.669	1.757	1.762
Mekong Delta Region	1.661	1.729	1.473	1.548	1.709	1.969	1.458	1.471
Average	1.041	1.118	1.085	1.205	1.278	1.325	1.222	1.266

【Source】 Đỗ Thiên Kính [2018] *Bất bình đẳng Mức sống ở Nông thôn qua Sử dụng Đất nông nghiệp của Hộ gia đình*. Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr.53.

Anyway, as a result, such private companies as Vincom Co., Ltd., TH True Milk and so on have rent the cultivating land from peasants to develop large-scale raw material production areas. In those cases, Vincom Co., Ltd. has realized the activity on a widespread scale throughout Vietnam, while TH True Milk in Nghe An province in the Northern Central Region. Besides, in such areas as the Northern Mountainous Region of Son La and Lai Chau provinces, and the Northern Southern Region of Thanh Hoa province and so on, there are also such trends as some enterprises have started to use the cultivating land contributed by peasants to develop coffee farms on a large-scale ⁽⁵⁶⁾.

3.3.2. Some other concrete situations

After implementing the land consolidation, the area of each of the plots allocated to the peasants in the investigation places of Mr. Dao The Anh and his colleagues has also increased ⁽⁵⁷⁾ as in Table 3-3 below.

Table 3-3 : Some main results after the implementation of the land consolidation in research

models

Communes	Total number of plots	Number of plots per household		Average area per plot	
		Average (plot)	Decrease rate (%)	Average (m ²)	Increase rate (%)
Quốc Tuấn	6124	3.5	58.2%	580	135.0%
Mỹ Thọ	3529	4.3	70.0%	1186	650.0%
Ngũ Kiên	7180	4.3	63.2%	430	220.0%
Đông Quý	7189	2.3	50.0%	934	200.0%
Thanh Xá	—	3.7	20.5%	557	130.0%
Nam Cường	1990	3.0	50.0%	1000	200.0%

【Source】 Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Đồn điền Đối thừa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr:70.

The above Table compares the difference between the area of each of those plots before and after the implementation of the land consolidation in the 6 communes where Mr. Anh and his colleagues conducted the direct investigations. Through the Table, we can see that in any of those 6 surveyed communes, after implementing the land consolidation, the area of each of the plots in those communes, particularly that in My Tho commune, Binh Luc district of Ha Nam province has all increased.

According to Mr. Anh and his colleagues, the above trend is popular in the localities that have been trying to continue rice production. Meanwhile, in those localities which have been trying to carry out the shift of the agricultural structure, the results differ according to each of those localities because depending on the type of crops, the scale of production is different. Specifically, compared with the localities carrying out the shift of the agricultural structure from rice to other agricultural products, typically the case of Thanh Xa commune, Thanh Ha district of Hai Duong province and that of Nam Duong commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province (both of those communes which implemented the land consolidation according to the type/ model 1, the type/ model of the land consolidation that the peasants in localities actively carried out in their voluntary way), or in the localities shifting (from rice) to fruit trees, or even those in the same group of the

localities shifting (from rice) to aquaculture, the level/ degree of expanding the area of the plots allocated to the peasants (in each of those localities) is not very prominent. Specifically, while the area of those plots in Nam Duong has increased to a certain degree, in other communes such as Thanh Xa commune, the situation is not the same at all ⁽⁵⁸⁾.

However, the land area per capita of peasants after implementing the land consolidation has basically decreased ⁽⁵⁹⁾. It is partly because in the process of implementing the land consolidation, 1. Apart from the localities saved a part of the agricultural land which the peasants were allocated before the land consolidation for the completion of irrigation systems and ridges then 2. That part of the land may also be saved for the construction of residential areas, and 3. (As we mentioned above), the area of the common land or the Cong dien in communes has also increased ⁽⁶⁰⁾ (See Table 3-4 below).

Table 3-4 : Cultivating land area before and after the land consolidation

Communes	Cultivating land area per peasant before the land consolidation (m2)	Cultivating land area per peasant after the land consolidation (m2)	Increase Rate (%)
Mỹ Thọ	1355	1337	-1.33%
Ngũ Kiên	418	423	+1.20%
Nam Cường	748	709	-4.83%
Đông Quý	618	610	-1.29%
Quốc Tuấn	679	627	-7.66%
Thanh Xá	960	915	-4.59%

【Source】 Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đổi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr.70.

Talking about the common land or the Cong dien, localities has been relatively successful in concentrating the common land or the Cong dien on one place (or at the most several places) in the village ⁽⁶¹⁾. Therefore, those localities have decreased the level of the land dispersion/ fragmentation (to a certain degree) compared with that in the period before the land consolidation. That phenomenon is very prominent in those regions where the land consolidation was implemented/ carried out according to the type/

model (2.2), meaning that in those localities where the local authority actively implemented the land consolidation ⁽⁶²⁾.

And what is even more striking is that the area of the common land or the Cong dien itself in those localities/ villages has also increased ⁽⁶³⁾. As I mentioned in the previous section, localities in the process of implementing the land consolidation often tried to keep/ maintain the area of the common land or the Cong dien with more than 5% of the total land area of the villages according to the Land Law. And that trend/ phenomenon after (the end of) the land consolidation has basically not changed much. Based on the survey results of Mr. Anh and his colleagues in Table 3-5 below, we can easily see that out of the 6 communes (which are the survey subjects in their work), besides some communes occupying the common land or the Cong dien with a rate of more than 10% of the total land area in the village such as Dong Quy commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province, etc., some other communes occupying the area of the common land or the Cong dien up to 20% (of the total land area of the village). And that level/ ratio is not much different from that in the localities described as having a strong tradition of the Cong dien system in the colonial period.

Table 3-5 : Ratio of the Cong dien after the land consolidation in communes

Communes	Total area of agricultural land (ha)	Total area of the Cong dien land (ha)	Percentage/ Ratio of the Cong dien land in total agricultural land area (%)
Mỹ Thọ	418.7	70	16.7%
Ngũ Kiên	297.3	34	11.3%
Nam Cường	208.5	22	10.7%
Đông Quý	336.1	61	18.1%
Quốc Tuấn	472.8	52	11.1%
Thanh Xá	391.7	54	13.9%

【Source】Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đổi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr.70.

And also, according to Mr. Anh and his colleagues, thanks to the success in arranging the common land or the Cong dien as mentioned above, the price of the bidding conducted by the peasants or their households to

expand the scale of agricultural business at the family level has been doubled compared with that in the period before the land consolidation ⁽⁶⁴⁾.

In this case, the subjects conducting/ carrying out the bidding are: 1. rich peasants; 2. people related to the People's Committee of the commune. The reason why the bidders are generally rich people is that the common land or the Cong dien used for the bidding is often poor and infertile land. Therefore, to produce good production on that land, the peasants conducting/ carrying out that bidding have to take/ spend a lot of capital. And for the poor peasants with the shortage of capital, that bidding is not attractive ⁽⁶⁵⁾.

But even after implementing the land consolidation, although the common land or the Cong dien has begun to use for the bidding more than before, there are still some localities where the common land or the Cong dien has been actually continuing to play a role as the land to perform/ carry out the periodical land reallocation in egalitarianism such as Q commune, Duy Tien district, Ha Nam province ⁽⁶⁶⁾, etc.

3.4. Problems of the land consolidation

3.4.1. Limitations of the land consolidation and the land concentration and accumulation for increasing peasants' living standards

However, considering the situation of the whole country, the land concentration and accumulation through the land consolidation in the three regions of the Red River Delta, the North Central and the South Central Coast regions, as Table 3-2 above, we can easily see that the scale of the total land area of each of the households in all the above three regions is still very small, particularly that in the Red River Delta in 2012 with only 0.57 ha, the smallest in the country (that situation has not been almost unchanged compared with the previous period).

To be sure, because the land concentration and accumulation has been implemented to a certain extent/ degree above, in those three regions (the Red River Delta in the North, the Northern Central and the Southern Central Coast regions in the Central of Vietnam), the parameters and the proportion of landless peasants has been also in increase gradually and continuously

over the 20 years ⁽⁶⁷⁾ (from 1992 to 2012: See Table 3-6 below).

Table 3 -6 : Ratio of households without agricultural land divided by socio-economic regions (Unit: %)

	1992/93	1997/98	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
Northern midland and mountainous Regions	—	—	4.0	3.2	2.9	3.7	4.8	4.2
Red River Delta Regions	3.1	3.1	11.0	6.3	5.8	7.1	11.0	12.4
Northern Central and Southern Central Coastal Regions	6.5	8.6	14.2	10.8	12.4	13.4	13.7	12.3
Central Highlands Regions	3.9	9.6	4.2	3.8	5.6	4.9	9.7	10.1
Southern Eastern Region	19.7	27.1	43.8	38.8	40.4	46.4	55.8	53.6
Mekong Delta Region	14.9	20.7	27.8	25.1	22.0	19.7	28.8	29.8
Average	7.4	10.0	16.7	13.5	13.4	14.1	19.0	19.0

【Source】 Đỗ Thiên Kính [2018] *Bất bình đẳng Mức sống ở Nông thôn qua Sử dụng Đất nông nghiệp của Hộ gia đình*. Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr.49.

And the Gini coefficient (coefficient in economics to indicate the level of the rich-poor gap) in terms of the total land area in those above three regions over the 20 years (from 1992 to 2012) in general has been basically increased as Table 3-7 below, too ⁽⁶⁸⁾.

Table 3 -7 : The Gini coefficient of cultivating land area (m²/person) of the rural population (Unit : %)

	1992/93	1997/98	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
Northern midland and mountainous Regions	0.348	0.345	0.453	0.460	0.467	0.492	0.511	0.501
Red River Delta Regions	0.267	0.274	0.381	0.347	0.374	0.409	0.455	0.458
Northern Central and Southern Central Coastal Regions	0.396	0.425	0.516	0.570	0.535	0.548	0.580	0.501
Central Highlands Regions	0.448	0.474	0.408	0.422	0.458	0.474	0.486	0.489
Southern Eastern	0.568	0.675	0.720	0.743	0.720	0.787	0.814	0.788

Region								
Mekong Delta Region	0.499	0.553	0.644	0.635	0.641	0.668	0.691	0.700
Average	0.480	0.529	0.594	0.597	0.601	0.629	0.646	0.652

【Source】 Đỗ Thiên Kính [2018] *Bất bình đẳng Mức sống ở Nông thôn qua Sử dụng Đất nông nghiệp của Hộ gia đình*. Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr.65-66.

However, the increase in the number of the landless peasants in the Red River Delta, or the increase of the Gini coefficient, has not been really remarkable compared with that of the Southern East and the Mekong Delta regions in the South of Vietnam, even compared with that of the Northern Central and the Southern Central Coast regions, the situation has been almost the same ⁽⁶⁹⁾.

Regarding the reasons related to the above situation (on the total land area of each of the households) in the North region, particularly in the Red River Delta, Mr. Kinh mentions the following 2 reasons:

1. First of all, the expansion of the (cultivating) land area of the Red River Delta has reached the limit situation because the proportion/ ratio of population per land is now very high, meaning that the population in the rural areas in that region is too high. Therefore, that area will be difficult to decrease the level of the land dispersion/ fragmentation any longer ⁽⁷⁰⁾.

2. Concerning the reason 1, the above dispersion/ fragmentation of land in the region is also a part result of implementing the land allocation according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation ⁽⁷¹⁾.

If I comment on the above 2 reasons, just as I confirmed in the previous section, those reasons can be described that: It is because that the land consolidation has been “in a complicated situation of coping with the peasants’ insecurity feeling in sharing the agricultural risk”, so “during the process of implementing the land consolidation officially, those above localities often tried to maintain as much of the characteristics of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation as possible”. In fact, some business-oriented forms of agriculture have begun to develop in the North of Vietnam as one of the results of the land concentration and accumulation through the land consolidation. However, the most prominent form of the business-oriented agriculture is still the form of “raising, planting

and producing more in the peasants' home gardens" as well as that in other developing countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia, where rice production is an essential agricultural activity. Specifically, that form is: 1. in addition to the rice production, the peasants or their households also carry out the livestock activity at their family level; 2. and the agricultural production in that form does not require a large scale ⁽⁷²⁾.

Some reasons that the land concentration and accumulation in the present in the Red River Delta still stay in the above situation are that 1. as I mentioned above, it is partly because the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation has been playing an important role as informal agricultural insurance or social security net, therefore for the peasants and their households - those who want to avoid risk in general and agricultural risk in particular to continue living - it is very difficult to abolish that way of land allocation completely. And 2. as I explained in the first section of this part, it is partly because the agricultural land or the cultivating land is a very special production factor and in the deal in the land there, typically in the purchase and sale of the agricultural land or the cultivating land always faces up with the situation of imperfect information (the shortage of information), in which the adverse selection often happens ⁽⁷³⁾, so the deal in the land in that region is often limited, it has been only proceeding in the inside of families, relatives, acquaintances, etc. ⁽⁷⁴⁾. Therefore, the formation and development of the land market itself have been difficult.

Therefore, in those three regions of the North and the Central regions that I mentioned above, particularly in the Red River Delta, the conditions and living standards of the peasants or their households in the process of implementing the land concentration and accumulation through the land consolidation have not been improved remarkably yet.

Regarding that situation in the Red River Delta, according to the survey results of Mr. Kinh, within these about 10 years, specifically from 2004 to 2012, the peasant's per capita income through their agricultural/cultivating land has increased to a certain degree. However, their income in 2012 was the lowest in the whole country, meaning that it was lower than that in both the Northern Central and Southern Central Coast regions ⁽⁷⁵⁾ (See Table 3-8 below).

Table 3-8 : Income from the cultivating land of households divided by socio-economic regions (Unit 1000 dong)

	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
Northern midland and mountainous Regions	1799	2136	3235	3396	5384
Red River Delta Regions	1727	2074	3221	3556	4763
Northern Central and Southern Central Coastal Regions	1451	1802	2829	7390	4794
Central Highlands Regions	2918	3909	5255	22060	12669
Southern Eastern Region	2953	4937	7127	6371	20432
Mekong Delta Region	2758	3389	5507	5359	8575
Average	1985	2523	3900	5469	6968

【Source】 Đỗ Thiên Kính [2018] *Bất bình đẳng Mức sống ở Nông thôn qua Sử dụng Đất nông nghiệp của Hộ gia đình*. Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr.71.

Besides, according to Mr. Kinh, the increase in the peasant's per capita income in the Red River Delta within these 20 years, from 1993 to 2012, does not entirely result from the implementation of the land concentration and accumulation through the land consolidation, but from other factors/ reasons ⁽⁷⁶⁾. Specifically, it is not much from the results of the shift of the agricultural structure from rice to other products - which was one of the peasants' concerns during the implementation of the land consolidation - but rather from the results of the fact that the peasants and their households partly have shifted from specializing only in agriculture with self-sufficiency to working in the non-agricultural sectors along with the agricultural sector ⁽⁷⁷⁾. In those factors which have enabled the peasants and their households to shift to the semi-agricultural household economies (both working in the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sectors), the factors related to the increase in the peasant's per capita income are:

(1) The peasants are at a high education level, meaning that the peasants have a certain ability to apply for jobs outside the agricultural sector ⁽⁷⁸⁾.

(2) In surrounding areas where the peasants live, there are a lot of places/ facilities that can create jobs for them, such as business and

production facilities outside the agricultural sector, or traditional villages specializing in small and handicraft industries, etc. ⁽⁷⁹⁾. However, for the peasants and their households in the Red River Delta, the most important places creating jobs outside the agricultural sector are still state agencies, where they can work as the governmental employee ⁽⁸⁰⁾.

Regarding the factors directly related to the increase/ decrease of the land area of the peasants or their households during the process of implementing the land concentration and accumulation through the land consolidation, Mr. Kinh mentions one interesting factor that has helped to increase peasants' income, although the correlation level of that factor with the increase peasants' income is not as high as the 2 above ones. That factor is the complete level of the transportation infrastructures in general ⁽⁸¹⁾, including the irrigation system and ridges - a kind of technical institution in terms of institutional complementarity.

In fact, as I mentioned above, for the localities implementing the land consolidation according to the type/ model 2, those localities in general have not been entirely successful in building fully irrigation systems and ridges and more. In even some localities, that work has been still at the planning stage, partly due to the shortage of budget ⁽⁸²⁾.

For example, in those localities where Mr. Anh and his colleagues conducted their investigations, those which tried to continue rice production, meaning (that) those which were forced to complete more irrigation systems and ridges to continue rice production according to the GR style as Dong Quy commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province and My Tho commune, Binh Luc district of Ha Nam province, the level of the completion of the irrigation systems and ridges has been still low. Specifically, Dong Qui commune is 1.79 %, My Tho commune 6.19 % ⁽⁸³⁾.

The above fact can prove that when expanding the implementation of the land consolidation, not a few of localities "dared" to start to implement the movement while the complete level of the irrigation systems and ridges - a kind of technical institution in terms of institutional complementarity, meaning the degree/ ability to cope with agricultural risk (which was a significant concern for the peasants and their households) - there has not been enough yet indeed. Therefore, it has been one of the factors affecting to a certain degree the increase in the peasant's per capita income in those localities after the land consolidation.

Based on what I explained above, in the next section, I would like to present the differences in the results of the land consolidation in the two “types” of the localities - those which tried to carry out the shift of the agricultural structure, including some of the localities that only carried out that shift in the winter (crop) season -, and those which tried to continue (to specialize in) rice production, by referring to the research results of Mr. Anh and his colleagues.

3.4.2. Differences in results of the land consolidation and the land concentration and accumulation in some concrete cases

1. In the localities trying to carry out the shift of agricultural structure from rice to other agricultural products such as fruit trees, aquaculture, etc. towards the commercial agriculture with agricultural diversification through the implementation of the land consolidation, some of those localities were successful in completing irrigation systems and ridges to a certain degree. In that case, the results of the land consolidation there are as follows: 1. The living standard of the peasants or their households has improved, and 2. The land concentration and accumulation has been also carried out to a certain extent/ degree in which some peasants or their households partly shifted to the semi-agricultural household economies (both working in the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sectors) or totally/ completely left the agricultural sector⁽⁸⁴⁾. Therefore, the gap between rich and poor among those peasants or their households has been also expanded (to a certain extent/ degree).

Based on the survey results of Mr. Kinh and his colleagues, we can see that in some of the localities trying to carry out the shift of the agricultural structure in the winter (crop) season such as Ngu Kien commune, Vinh Tuong district of Vinh Phuc province and Quoc Tuan commune, Nam Sach district of Hai Duong province, etc., those peasants or their households who shifted partly to the semi-agricultural household economies or totally/ completely left the agriculture sector has been using mostly their labor time in working in the non-agricultural sectors⁽⁸⁵⁾ (See Table 3-9 below).

Table 3-9 : The change in income structure before and after the land consolidation in Ngu Kien commune and Quoc Tuan commune

Communes	Before the land consolidation (%)			After the land consolidation (%)		
	Cultivation	Husbandry	Non-agriculture	Cultivation	Husbandry	Non-agriculture
Ngu Kien	36.7	21.6	41.8	27.2	17.0	56.2
Quoc Tuan	25.0	19.0	57.0	21.0	13.0	66.0

【Source】 Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đổi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr. 97.

(Note) The figures of the three localities below are only rough numbers, so the total figures are not necessarily 100%.

Meanwhile, in the localities focusing on carrying out the shift of the agricultural structure (from rice) to other agricultural products such as fruit trees, aquaculture, etc. as Thanh Xa commune, Thanh Ha district of Hai Duong province; in Nam Cuong commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province, etc., the peasants or their households have not shifted entirely/ totally/ completely to the semi-agricultural household economies or leave the agriculture sector, but they have been spending/ using most of their labor time in producing fruit trees or aquaculture more than in rice production ⁽⁸⁶⁾ (See Table 3-10 below).

Table 3-10 : The change in income structure before and after the land consolidation in Thanh Xa commune and Nam Cuong commune

Communes	Before the land consolidation (%)			After the land consolidation (%)		
	Cultivation	Husbandry	Non-agriculture	Cultivation	Husbandry	Non-agriculture
Thanh Xa	34.0	35.0	31.0	48.0	25.0	27.0
Nam Cuong	45.1	26.7	32.8	11.4	68.0	20.7

【Source】 Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đổi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr. 97.

(Note) The figures of the three localities below are only rough numbers, so the total figures are not necessarily 100%.

Besides, in those localities, 1. The rich peasants or their households by/ through the bidding on the common land or the Cong dien in the village have been promoting the investment in their land with a larger area ⁽⁸⁷⁾. And the middle-income peasants or their households also have come to rent their land to the above rich ones ⁽⁸⁸⁾, so the land concentration and accumulation also has been carried out to a certain degree ⁽⁸⁹⁾. At the same time, the speed of the income increase of those peasants in general, particularly that of the rich peasants in particular, has surpassed that of the poor peasants or their households ⁽⁹⁰⁾. Therefore, in those localities, the trend of widening the gap between rich and poor has also become more remarkable/ dominant.

The following two Tables (Tables 3-11 and Table 3-12) show the situation of Thanh Xa and Nam Cuong communes, which focused on promoting the shift of the agricultural structure to fruit trees and aquaculture, etc. in the process of the land consolidation. Through those two tables, we can clearly see that in both of those communes, the rate/ ratio/ proportion of profit per production cost that the rich peasants or their households enjoy is higher than that of the middle-income peasants or their households. And compared with the poor peasants, that rate/ ratio/ proportion of the middle-income peasants or their households is also higher ⁽⁹¹⁾.

Table 3-11 : Agricultural business structure of the peasants' households in Thanh Xa commune after the land consolidation

Index	Types of peasants' households			Average in the locality
	Rich peasant	Middle-income peasant	Poor peasant	
Investment amount per unit cultivating land (dong)	4000	3500	2500	3000
Total cost per unit cultivating land (dong)	191	176	133	167
Total income per unit cultivating land (dong/ sao)	956	849	594	800
Profit per unit cultivating land (dong/ sao)	765	673	461	633
Profit per unit cost (times)	4.78	4.61	3.45	4.2

【Source】 Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch

Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đổi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr. 95.

(Note) 1 sao in the Northern Vietnam is 360 m².

Table 3-12: Agricultural business structure of the peasants' households in Nam Cuong commune after the land consolidation

Index	Types of peasants' households			Average in the locality
	Rich peasant	Middle-income peasant	Poor peasant	
Total cost per unit cultivating land (dong)	2698	2585	1933	2840
Total income per unit cultivating land (dong/ sao)	6851	6044	4377	6750
Profit per unit cultivating land (dong/ sao)	4154	3459	2444	3915
Profit per unit cost (times)	1.54	1.34	1.26	1.38

[Source] Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đổi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr.96.

(Note) 1 sao in the Northern Vietnam is 360 m².

Anyway, the above results of the land consolidation in the above localities have been causing a problem related to the phenomenon that the poor peasants or their households abandon their land and become the wandering people. The phenomenon that the poor peasants or their households abandon their land and become the wandering people in the Northern Red River Delta has begun to arise since 2005⁽⁹²⁾, and by 2012, the percentage of the poorest peasants with no cultivating land has accounted for 7.5 % of the total number of the peasants in the Red River Delta⁽⁹³⁾. And in those regions where Industrialization and Modernization of the Country has not been carried out intensively yet, that phenomenon has become one of the main reasons for the speed increase of migration of those poor peasants to urban areas. Just as in other developing countries, that phenomenon in

Vietnam has started to emerge since Vietnam entered Doi Moi renovation from 1986, and it has been also one of the serious problems that the Vietnamese authorities are forced to focus on for the solution ⁽⁹⁴⁾.

2. Meanwhile, the problem of the localities trying to continue rice production after the land consolidation is that which the land consolidation itself in those areas has had some limitations. For example, before the implementation of changing the purpose of the land use to expand the land area, those localities also had to get permission/ to ask for the acceptance of the local authorities (at the province or the district level). Therefore, that movement has not entirely brought about improving the living standards of the peasants or their households. Moreover, it has not really/ entirely lead to the widening of the rich-poor gap among the peasants or their households ⁽⁹⁵⁾.

Here, as in the previous section, according to the survey results of Mr. Anh and his colleagues, the situation of those localities can be roughly described as follows: in the localities trying to continue rice production after the land consolidation such as My Tho commune, Binh Luc district of Ha Nam province and Dong Quy commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province, the situation is different from that of Ngu Kien commune, Vinh Tuong district of Vinh Phuc province and Quoc Tuan commune, Nam Sach district of Hai Duong province. That is, the labor time of the peasants or their households there has not mostly been used for the works in the non-agricultural sectors. At the same time, in those communes of My Tho and Dong Quy, also different from Thanh Xa commune, Thanh Ha district of Hai Duong province and Nam Cuong commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province, the labor time of the peasants or their households in those two communes also has not been mostly used for the production of other agricultural products except for rice production ⁽⁹⁶⁾ (See Table 3-13 below).

Table 3-13 : The change in income structure before and after the land consolidation in My Tho commune

Communes	Before the land consolidation (%)			After the land consolidation (%)		
	Cultivation	Husbandry	Non-agriculture	Cultivation	Husbandry	Non-agriculture
My Tho	52.7	23.3	23.5	50.2	22.4	27.3
Dong Quy	51.3	22.7	25.9	50.1	22.4	27.5

【Source】 Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch

Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đổi thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr.97.

(Note) The figures of the three localities below are only rough numbers, so the total figures are not necessarily 100%.

Therefore, in those localities, the implementation of the land consolidation, which was also the process of continuing to expand the scale of the GR type of agriculture, has been successful to a certain extent/ degree in increasing agricultural land productivity. However, it does not mean that it has been able to completely solve the problem of the ratio of population per land, which is (always) a long-standing problem in those regions. Therefore, the land consolidation there has not entirely created favorable conditions for agriculture to promote/ take (their) advantages of scale widely/ broadly, typically to increase the total income of the peasants or their households ⁽⁹⁷⁾.

For example, observing the situation of My Tho commune, Binh Luc district of Ha Nam province, we can see the following things: 1. Through the land consolidation movement, that commune has succeeded in increasing the area of each of the plots in reallocating them to the peasants or their households; 2. Accordingly, the intensive labor types of agriculture and the labor input required on each of those plots also have both increased; 3. Therefore, the level of solving the labor shortage by means of increasing the hired labor force has also increased. It means that after the land consolidation, a trend of constant returns to scale in agricultural production in that commune has hardly changed any.

Therefore, as Table 3-14 below, 1. The service cost - the cost of hiring the agricultural labor in the total cost of rice production - has also increased to 150% (before the land consolidation, that cost (calculated on a specific unit area) was only 20,000 VND; but after the implementation of the land consolidation, it has increased to 50,000 VND)); 2. Therefore, the total cost of production per (land) area has also increased from 110,000 VND to 130,000 VND, an increase up to 18.2%; 3. Thanks to the above results, in that commune, the productivity of land per area of the peasants or their households has also increased from 1.8 kg/ ha to 2.1 kg/ ha after the land consolidation; 4. And the total profit per area has also increased to 16.0%,

specifically before the land consolidation was 250,000 VND, and after that is 290,000 VND; 5. However, the ratio of profit per production cost has decreased by 1.8%, specifically, before the land consolidation, it was 2.27 (times), but after the land consolidation, it is only 2.23 times. Those numbers show us that the land consolidation in that commune has not entirely lead to the improvement of the living standards of the peasants or their households in the commune ⁽⁹⁸⁾.

Table 3 -14 : Cost level for 1 sao of rice production before and after the land consolidation in My Tho commune

	Unit	Before the land consolidation	After the land consolidation	Increase Rate (%)
Total cost	1000 dong	110	130	+18.2%
Service fee	1000 dong	20	50	+150.0%
Productivity	kg	180	210	+16.7%
Total profit per unit area	1000 dong/sao	250	290	+16.0%
Total profit per total cost	times	2.27	2.23	-1.80

【Source】 Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyển, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng [2004] *Nghiên cứu Thực tiễn và Đề xuất Chính sách Khuyến khích Dồn điền Đốt thửa Nâng cao Hiệu quả Sử dụng Đất ở Đồng bằng Sông Hồng*, Quỹ nghiên cứu ICARD-MISPA, Hà Nội, tr.90.

(Note) 1 sao in the Northern Vietnam is 360 m².

In summary, in such localities as My Tho commune above, the poor peasants or their households generally have sufficient conditions of quickly increasing their income more than the rich and middle-income ones. Because those poor peasants or their households do not have to solve the labor-intensive issues on a large scale of land by/ through hiring more agricultural labor when carrying out the GR type of agricultural production as the rich and middle-income peasants or their households ⁽⁹⁹⁾.

What I mentioned above can be also described/ envisioned is as follows: the above phenomenon (in the localities continuing to produce rice as My Tho commune) in Vietnam is also a common phenomenon in the regions specializing in the GR type of rice production just as that in other developing countries located in East Asia and Southeast Asia. The same can be said of that: regarding the expansion of the land area through the bidding

of the common land or the Cong dien in those localities, those subjects who are willing to carry out that task/ work are often the poor and middle-income peasants or their households rather than the rich ones ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾. By the way, the reason why that phenomenon is so prevalent in the localities continuing to produce rice after the land consolidation such as My Tho commune, Binh Luc district of Ha Nam province and Dong Quy commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province, is partly because, compared with the localities trying to carry out the shift of the agricultural structure, the amount of the necessary fund/ capital for the bidding for the reallocation of more land is generally smaller, or in other words, the poor and middle-income peasants or their households in those localities are (also) able to participate in the bidding more easily ⁽¹⁰¹⁾.

3.4.3. Problems after the land consolidation - Weakening of sharing risks' function of the way of land allocation in egalitarianism and Increasing of insecurity feeling of the peasants

According to the survey results of Mr. Anh and his colleagues, both the localities which carried out or implemented the land consolidation according to the type/ model 1 and 2 also have prolonged the following existing problems:

1. In those localities which carried out the land consolidation according to the type/ model 1, or those localities which carried out the shift of the agricultural structure, as I mentioned above, the peasants carried out the land consolidation spontaneously. It means that what they (the peasants) were concerned about in the land consolidation was to realize to diversify agricultural production rather than to complete irrigation systems and ridges, which were the most significant concern of the commune or village, or the district authorities ⁽¹⁰²⁾.

Therefore, regarding the dispersion/ fragmentation of plots (of land), depending on the differences of agricultural products, in the process of the promotion of the land consolidation, though some localities made an effort to a certain degree to overcome that situation of fragmentation, the situation in other localities was entirely not so/ the same ⁽¹⁰³⁾. For example, in the process of Nam Cuong commune, Tien Hai district of Thai Binh province

shifting from rice production to aquaculture, the situation of fragmentation there has been successfully solved more than Thanh Xa commune, Thanh Ha district of Hai Duong province to shift from rice to fruit trees ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾.

As for the issue of the common land or the Cong dien, different from those localities which implemented the land consolidation according to the type/ model 2, those localities carried out the land consolidation according to the type/ model 1 have not succeeded in arranging and concentrating the common land or the Cong dien on one place (or at the most several places) in the village ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾.

2. In those localities which implemented the land consolidation according to the type/ model 2, or the localities continuing to produce rice or partly shifting the agricultural structure in the winter (crop) season, the implementation of the land consolidation, specifically that of the land reallocation in egalitarianism to the peasants or their households through the land consolidation, was challenging, partly because of the high level of satisfaction of the peasants or their households in the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation before. For example: in My Tho commune, Binh Luc district of Ha Nam province, the level of satisfaction of the peasants or their households in the commune for the result of the land reallocation via/ through the land consolidation is only 30% and the level/ percentage that the peasants reveal their dissatisfaction for the above result is up to 20% ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾. That rate (of dissatisfaction) in Quoc Tuan commune, Nam Sach district of Hai Duong province, which implemented the shift of the agricultural structure only in the winter (crop) season, meaning that the agricultural risk in the commune after the land consolidation is likely to have increased, up to 30%. And that rate/ level (of dissatisfaction) of the poor peasants or their households is often higher than that of the middle-income and rich peasants or their households ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾.

2-1. Meanwhile, for the localities implementing the shift of the agricultural structure, compared with the requirement to develop commercial agriculture, the land consolidation and the land concentration and accumulation in those localities has not been able to be envisioned widely yet ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾. According to a Vietnamese expert, it is partly because the authorities in those localities were not active in grasping those specific needs of the peasants when implementing the land consolidation ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾. That problem of the

local authorities is partly because the quality of the administrative staff of those local authorities have not been high yet, and partly due to their shortage of budget ⁽¹¹⁰⁾.

In fact, in those localities, the land reallocated to the peasants or their households through the land consolidation has not been suitable for their new needs towards the implementation of agricultural diversification ⁽¹¹¹⁾.

Other requirements related to improving the agricultural production conditions of the peasants or their households, which were attempted to implement by the local authorities in parallel with the land consolidation, have not been envisioned to a successful degree.

Specifically, those localities were in a hurry to implement the quick shift of agricultural structure. Therefore, they have not met the following needs of the peasants or their households: (1) To extend the autonomy in production and business of the peasants or their households; (2) To solve the problem of shortage of capital and to expand/ develop the consumption place/ market of the agricultural products, which is a great concern of the peasants; (3) To solve the surplus agricultural labor, which is a consequence of the land concentration and accumulation (through the development of non-agricultural activities) ⁽¹¹²⁾.

Besides, according to my direct survey, in some communes such as N village, Duy Tien district, Ha Nam province (in contrast to the localities mentioned above), the land consolidation in those communes has already ended, but, in the very process of the implementation, the local authorities there did not have the sufficient abilities to give useful/ beneficial guidance about how to carry out agricultural diversification for the peasants or their households in their communes ⁽¹¹³⁾.

From the above impacts and the existing problems of the land consolidation, in those localities, some of such negative phenomena have been arising as even the land has been concentrated and accumulated to a certain degree, meaning that those land areas have not been used for the promotion/ the development of commercial agriculture, but only resulted in the purchase and sale of those land areas without registration and that phenomenon also has been more and more serious ⁽¹¹⁴⁾.

2-2. About the impacts of the land consolidation, there is another problem that I think is (probably) the most serious. That is, in both of the localities carrying out/ implement the land consolidation according to the

type/ model 1 and 2, the new plots with a smaller number of plots and larger in area than before reallocated to the peasants or their households through the land consolidation seems to have reduced the agricultural risk-sharing function to a certain degree, compared with those former smaller and dispersed plots which had been allocated to them according to the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation.

It is partly because that while the completion of irrigation systems and ridges - a kind of institutional supplement in terms of technology - in those localities was not enough yet (partly due to the shortage of budgets ⁽¹¹⁵⁾), those localities “dared” to implement the land consolidation, and after that, they were determined to reallocate to the peasants or their households those plots of land with a smaller number and larger in area of them than before, which can be different from each other in land productivity. For example, some plots can share risks because those have good irrigation conditions, and other plots cannot share risk because those do not have good irrigation conditions, etc. ⁽¹¹⁶⁾

As a result, the implementation of the land consolidation in those localities which did not complete the irrigation systems and ridges adequately has not been able to abolish the peasants or their households’ insecurity feeling in sharing agricultural risk ⁽¹¹⁷⁾. In fact, regarding those peasants or their households in the very 5 out of all the 6 communes where Mr. Anh and his colleagues conducted/ carried out the investigation thoroughly, what made them feel dissatisfied in all the results of the land consolidation is, they did not know what kind of plots they would be reallocated through/ after the lottery, while/ in the situation that the irrigation systems and ridges there were still incomplete, meaning that they had to be concerned about whether the agricultural risk level of the plots reallocated to them would be higher or not ⁽¹¹⁸⁾.

Regarding those impacts and existing problems of the land consolidation which I mentioned above, Mr. Anh and his colleagues frankly evaluate as follows: In the situation that the completion of irrigation systems and ridges is not enough yet, if the localities dare to carry out the land consolidation, then the peasants, whose status are different from the previous, will no longer be able to keep such small and dispersed plots often described as “we have/ are allocated good plots, bad plots, near plots, far plots...” and sometimes as: “high plots, low plots...”. “Therefore, those peasants who are

afraid of agricultural risk (meaning that those peasants have the tendency of avoiding risk) will have their psychology of not wanting to be reallocated the new plots concentrated on one or a few places in their village, instead of the smaller and dispersed plots as before”⁽¹¹⁹⁾.

I can surely say that the above insecurity feeling of the peasants or their households is one of the most important reasons why those peasants have not been entirely satisfied with the results of the land consolidation.

Notes of Chapter III

3.1.

- (1) Trần Thị Minh Châu (2007) *Về Chính sách Đất nông nghiệp ở Nước ta Hiện nay*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 191-192.
- (2) *Sách trên*, tr. 192-193.
- (3) *Sách trên*, tr. 193-194.
- (4) ピエール・グルー (2014) (村野勉訳) 『トンキン・デルタの農民—人文地理学的研究』丸善プラネット (Pierre Gourou (1965) *Les paysans Du Delta Tonkinois; étude de géographie humaine*, Waite De-Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston) 345 ページ・図 112.
- (5) Thế Đạt (1981) *Nền Nông nghiệp Việt Nam từ sau Cách mạng Tháng tám Năm 1945*, Nhà xuất bản Nông nghiệp, Hà Nội, tr. 152, 154.
- (6) グルー (2014) 前掲書 345 ページ・図 112.
- (7) 同上。
- (8) 竹内郁雄 (1997) 「ベトナム共産党第 8 回大会と新経済開発戦略」(『アジア経済』第 38 巻第 8 号) 12~13 ページ。
- (9) 同上論文 7 ページ。
- (10) 同上論文 13 ページ。
- (11) 同上論文 18 ページ、竹内郁雄 (2017) 「グローバル化のなかのベトナム経済—ドイモイの 30 年—」(『アジア研 ワールド・トレンド』第 23 巻第 3 号 通巻 257 号) 5~6 ページ。
- (12) Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (1997) Báo cáo Chính trị của Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa VII tại Đại hội Đại biểu Toàn quốc lần thứ VIII của Đảng, Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (1997) *Văn kiện Đại hội Đại biểu Toàn quốc lần thứ VIII*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 72-73.
- (13) Đỗ Mười (1993) Tiếp tục Đổi mới và Phát triển Mạnh Mẽ Kinh tế - Xã hội Nông thôn, Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Văn kiện Hội nghị Lần thứ năm Ban chấp hành Trung ương Khóa VII*, Nhà máy in Tiến bộ, Hà Nội, tr. 3-34.
- (14) Bộ chính trị (Trung ương Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam) (1993) Ý kiến của Bộ chính trị về Những vấn đề Trung ương Thảo luận, Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (1993) *Sách trên*, tr. 35-52.
- (15) Đỗ Mười (1993) Bài tiết trình đã dẫn, tr. 28, Bộ chính trị (Trung ương Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam) (1993) Ý kiến đã dẫn, tr. 42.
- (16) Đỗ Mười (1993) Bài tiết trình trên.
- (17) Bài tiết trình trên, tr. 28-29.

(18) Vũ Văn Phúc (2018) Đường lối, Quan điểm của Đảng, Pháp luật, Chính sách của Nhà nước về Phát huy Nguồn lực Đất đai cho Phát triển Kinh tế ở Việt Nam qua Hơn 30 năm Đổi mới, *Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Kinh tế*, số 3 (478) – Tháng 3/2108, tr. 8.

(19) Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2001) Phát huy Sức Mạnh Toàn Dân tộc, Tiếp tục Đổi mới, Đẩy mạnh Công nghiệp hóa, Hiện đại hóa, Xây dựng và Bảo vệ Tổ quốc Việt Nam Xã hội Chủ nghĩa (Báo cáo Chính trị của Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa VIII tại Đại hội Đại biểu Toàn quốc Lần thứ IX của Đảng), Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2001) *Văn kiện Đại hội Đại biểu Toàn quốc Lần thứ IX*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 64, 90, Nông Đức Mạnh (2006) Nâng cao Hiệu lực Lãnh đạo và Sức chiến đấu của Đảng, Phát huy Sức mạnh Toàn Dân tộc, Đẩy mạnh Toàn diện Công cuộc Đổi mới, Sớm đưa Nước ta Ra khỏi Tình trạng Kém Phát triển, Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2006) *Văn kiện Đại hội Đại biểu Toàn quốc Lần thứ X*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr.28-29.

(20) Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2002) Nghị quyết về Tiếp tục Đổi mới, Phát triển và Nâng cao Hiệu quả Kinh tế Tập thể, Ban Tư tưởng – Văn hóa Trung ương (2002) *Tài liệu Nghiên cứu các Nghị quyết Hội nghị Lần thứ năm Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng Khóa IX*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 96-97, Nông Đức Mạnh (2006) Bài tiết trình đã dẫn, Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2006) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr.29-30.

(21) Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2002) Nghị quyết về Đẩy mạnh Công nghiệp hóa, Hiện đại hóa Nông nghiệp, Nông thôn thời kỳ 2001-2010, Ban Tư tưởng – Văn hóa Trung ương (2002) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 77-112, Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2002) Nghị quyết về Tiếp tục Đổi mới, Phát triển và Nâng cao Hiệu quả Kinh tế Tập thể, Ban Tư tưởng – Văn hóa Trung ương (2002) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 11-45, particularly refer to tr. 30, Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2002) Nghị quyết về Tiếp tục Đổi mới Cơ chế, Chính sách, Khuyến khích và Tạo Điều kiện Phát triển Kinh tế Tư nhân, Ban Tư tưởng – Văn hóa Trung ương (2002) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 46-76.

(22) Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (2002) Nghị quyết về Tiếp tục Đổi mới, Phát triển và Nâng cao Hiệu quả Kinh tế Tập thể, Ban Tư tưởng – Văn hóa Trung ương (2002) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 40.

(23) Trần Thị Minh Châu (2007) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 194-195.

(24) Hội đồng Chỉ đạo Xuất bản Sách Xã, Phường, Thị trấn (2014) *Hỏi và Đáp về Chương trình Xây dựng Nông thôn mới*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 12-13, 18, 23.

(25) *Sách trên*, tr. 15-17, 24-25.

(26) *Sách trên*, tr. 70.

(27) *Sách trên*, tr. 104.

(28) Tạp chí Cộng sản (2017) Tích tụ, Tập trung Ruộng đất ở Việt Nam trong Điều kiện mới: Những vấn đề Lý luận và Thực tiễn, *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, Số 899 năm 2017, tr. 63.

3.2.

- (29) Đỗ Thị Thanh Loan (2016) *Chuyển dịch Cơ cấu Kinh tế Nông nghiệp Vùng Đồng bằng sông Hồng trong Bối cảnh Hội nhập Quốc tế*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, tr. 1-308, Phạm Thị Thanh Bình (chủ biên) (2018) *Nghiên cứu So sánh Chính sách Nông nghiệp ở Trung Quốc, Thái Lan, Israel và Bài học Kinh nghiệm cho Việt Nam*, Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội and so on.
- (30) *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, số 896~ 899 năm 2017.
- (31) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyền, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 69.
- (32) *Sách trên*, tr. 67.
- (33) *Sách trên*, tr. 74.
- (34) *Sách trên*, tr. 75-76.
- (35) *Sách trên*, tr. 76.
- (36) *Sách trên*, tr. 42-69.
- (37) *Sách trên*, tr. 43.
- (38) *Sách trên*, tr. 50.
- (39) *Sách trên*.
- (40) *Sách trên*, tr. 61.
- (41) *Sách trên*, tr. 47 Hộp 1.
- (42) *Sách trên*.
- (43) *Sách trên*.
- (44) Based on the interview in a field survey conducted by Mr. Ikuo Takeuchi in September 2018 in Q village, Duy Tien Commune, Ha Nam Province.
- (45) Based on the interview in a field survey conducted by the author in September 2018 in N village, Duy Tien Commune, Ha Nam Province.
- (46) Regarding this, refer to Trần Thị Minh Châu (2007) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 197-198.
- (47) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyền, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 58~59 Bảng 12.
- (48) 竹内郁雄 (2004) 「ベトナムにおける市場経済化を伴う経済発展の考察－北部のムラ・村にみられる‘均等主義’の検討・評価を通じて－」(石田暁恵・五島文雄編 (2004) 『国際経済参入期のベトナム』 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構 アジア経済研究所) 186~187 ページ。
- (49) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyền, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 62.
- (50) *Sách trên*, tr. 58~59 Bảng 12.
- (51) *Sách trên*, tr. 82.
- (52) *Sách trên*, tr. 55-56.

3.3.

- (53) *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, số 896-899 năm 2017.
- (54) *Tạp chí Cộng sản* (2017) Bài viết đã dẫn.
- (55) Đỗ Thiên Kính (2018) *Bất bình đẳng mức sống ở Nông thôn qua Sử dụng Đất nông nghiệp của Hộ gia đình*, Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội. tr. 1-192.
- (56) *Tạp chí Cộng sản* (2017) Bài viết đã dẫn, tr. 64-65. About Vincom, see <https://vincom.com.vn>: TH True Milk, see <https://vietnam.vnanet.vn/japanese/th-true-milk%E3%83%88%E3%83%AC%E3%83%BC%E3%83%88%E3%82%99%E3%83%9E%E3%83%BC%E3%82%AF/190042.html>.
- (57) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyên, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 69.
- (58) *Sách trên*, tr. 71.
- (59) *Sách trên*, tr. 78.
- (60) *Sách trên*, tr. 79.
- (61) *Sách trên*, tr. 69.
- (62) *Sách trên*, tr. 71-72.
- (63) *Sách trên*, tr. 82.
- (64) *Sách trên*, tr. 83.
- (65) *Sách trên*, tr. 83~85.
- (66) Based on the interview with a person from Q village, Duy Tien District, Ha Nam province conducted by Mr. Takeuchi Ikuo in September 2018 in Hanoi, Vietnam.

3.4.

- (67) Đỗ Thiên Kính (2018) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 69.
- (68) *Sách trên*, tr. 50.
- (69) See *Sách trên*, tr. 50 and tr. 64, 66.
- (70) *Sách trên*, tr. 55, 73.
- (71) *Sách trên*, tr. 66.
- (72) Trần Thị Minh Châu (2007) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 202-205. トラン・ヴァン・トゥ (2010) 『ベトナム経済発展論 中所得国の罫と新たなドイモイ』 勁草書房 191~192 ページ。
- (73) 原洋之介 (2002) 『開発経済論 第2版』 岩波書店 111 ページ。
- (74) *Tạp chí Cộng sản* (2017) : Bài viết đã dẫn, tr. 64.
- (75) Also refer to Đỗ Thiên Kính (2018) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 73.
- (76) *Sách trên*, tr. 109.

- (77) *Sách trên*, tr. 109~136.
- (78) *Sách trên*, tr. 114~115.
- (79) *Sách trên*, tr. 122~123.
- (80) *Sách trên*, tr. 123.
- (81) *Sách trên*, tr. 131.
- (82) *Sách trên*, tr. 110.
- (83) *Sách trên*, tr. 78-80 (Also refer to Table 20 in *Sách trên*, tr. 80) .
- (84) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyên, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 97.
- (85) *Sách trên*, tr. 98.
- (86) *Sách trên*.
- (87) *Sách trên*, tr. 94, 102.
- (88) *Sách trên*, tr. 94.
- (89) *Sách trên*.
- (90) *Sách trên*, tr. 100, 101.
- (91) Also refer to *Sách trên*, tr. 95, 97.
- (92) Trần Quốc Toàn (2017) Thúc đẩy Lưu chuyên, Tích tụ, Tập trung Ruộng đất cho Phát triển Nông nghiệp Hàng hóa, *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, Số 897 (tháng 7 năm 2017), tr. 36.
- (93) Đỗ Thiện Kính (2018) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 85, Bảng 3.2.
- (94) Regarding this issue, also refer to ゴー トゥー ハー・竹内郁雄「都市移入者の食の安全に関する「共同体」の役割と特徴ーベトナム・ハノイ市における安全な野菜に係る調査を基礎にー」(『共生社会システム研究 (第 15 卷 第 1 号)』(印刷中；2021 年 5 月刊行予定)) .
- (95) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyên, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 103.
- (96) *Sách trên*, tr. 98, 103-104.
- (97) Refer to 速水佑次郎 (2004) 『新版 開発経済学』(第 2 刷) 創文社 202~209 ページ, etc.
- (98) Also refer to Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyên, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 89-90.
- (99) *Sách trên*, tr. 101.
- (100) 速水 (2004) 前掲書 particularly 203~205 ページ.
- (101) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyên, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 101.
- (102) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyên, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 64.
- (103) *Sách trên*, tr. 115.

- (104) *Sách trên*, tr. 64-65.
- (105) *Sách trên*, tr. 65.
- (106) *Sách trên*, tr. 111-112.
- (107) *Sách trên*, tr. 112-113.
- (108) *Sách trên*, tr. 115.
- (109) *Sách trên*.
- (110) *Sách trên*, tr. 115-116.
- (111) *Sách trên*, tr. 112, 121.
- (112) *Sách trên*, tr. 113.
- (113) Based on the interview in a field survey conducted by the author in September 2018 in N village, Duy Tien Commune, Ha Nam Province.
- (114) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyền, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 115.
- (115) *Sách trên*, tr. 110, 115 and 121.
- (116) *Sách trên.*, tr. 110.
- (117) Refer to Bảng 1 in *Sách trên.*, tr. 118-119, particularly the part in tr. 119.
- (118) The same as the above.
- (119) Đào Thế Anh, Lê Đức Thịnh, Đinh Đức Tuấn, An Đăng Quyền, Lê Sơn Thành, Bạch Trung Hưng (2004) *Sách đã dẫn*, tr. 77.

Conclusions

1. Utilization of the institution of cooperative activities, or Community Institution's potential through the way of land allocation in egalitarianism - Preliminary

1. As I mentioned in the previous chapters, Community - a kind of cooperative activities - is an informal institution of the collective peasants of the village or the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation, which is an expression of the function of common resource management at the village level, and it has been impacting significantly and consistently just as well as, or sometimes more than the peasants' household - Community at the family level - for the process of the rural reform in Vietnam at present.

It can be said that, in fact, for the Vietnamese government, the whole process of the rural reform, starting from the expansion of applying the products contract system to agriculture in 1981, particularly from the recognition of the products contract system at the peasant's household level in 1988, following by the implementation of the land consolidation movement from 2002 up to now, is the very process that the Vietnamese government always has to manage to deal with and overcome/ abolish the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism quickly.

Although in the above whole process, some commenters have often been criticizing the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism for being "inefficient", and sometimes "irrational". But as I explained above, that way of land allocation sometimes can be justified/ envisioned as "efficient", or "rational", because it is an institution that can share peasants' agricultural risk and average their harvest and consumption level and even improve their economic situation, thus it can contribute to economic development in general, particularly to agricultural and rural development. And since the process of expanding the products contract system needs to be carried out in parallel with the implementation of high-risk modern agriculture - the GR in rice production - in the low level of the completion of irrigation systems, the

above way of land allocation in egalitarianism has quickly become popular in a lot of regions and localities, particularly those regions and localities having a very high percentage of the Cong dien area in the past in order to complement the GR while such technological complementary factors as irrigation systems have not been successfully completed yet.

The process of the land consolidation movement, which has been implemented since 1993, officially since 2002, is also a process towards overcoming and abolishing the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism directly and quickly. Therefore, that process has been also facing up with the same difficulties as mentioned above, I mean, whether regions and localities can solve the problem of technological complementarity or not, meaning that of irrigation systems. And as I mentioned in the last part of the previous chapter, in those regions and localities where the irrigation systems and ridges did not complete enough/sufficiently yet, and as I classified in the last Section of Chapter III, the land consolidation movement was indeed difficult to carry out successfully and sometimes also made the peasants in those regions feel insecure about whether the level agricultural risk in their cultivation would be higher or not.

2. In the situation like that, if Vietnam is still to continue implementing the land consolidation, then the problems to solve in the coming years will be (obviously) as follows:

As I mentioned once above, the implementers or the actors who carry out the land consolidation need to classify their regions and localities in the following direction:

(1) First, they need to identify those agricultural products which are produced there can realize the advantages of scale in agriculture or not, in other words, they need to identify whether their regions and localities can carry out the land consolidation successfully or not, and then:

(2) In case (1): If they find their regions and localities are in the group of those which is difficult to realize the advantages of scale, they need carry out more careful policies or measures in order that the land consolidation there can be carried out more firmly and steadily, in other words, they need to recommend that their regions and localities if necessary, should “admit” the part existence of the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism.

(3) In case (2) - 1: If they find their regions and localities are in the

group of those which can realize the advantages of scale in agriculture, they need to carry out such policies or measures that their regions and localities can continue completing irrigation systems and ridges more fully/ adequately, naturally enough, along with further improving the circulation system related to the supply of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc.

(4) In case (2) - 2: If they find their regions and localities have hardly any conditions to complete irrigation systems and ridges quickly, they need to carry out such policies or measures that their regions and localities will know how to utilize the potential of the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism in a given time, to a certain degree.

As I also mentioned above, those three regions of the Red River Delta in the North, the Northern Central region and the Southern Central Coastal region in the Central, particularly the Red River Delta in the North, which are the main objects of the land consolidation movement, are those having a very high proportion of the population/ land. Therefore, in not a few of the localities in those regions up to the present, the peasants have been often specializing in rice production, a kind of agricultural products which are difficult to realize the advantages of scale in agriculture. Therefore, we can guess that there are a lot of regions and localities there, particularly those located in the Red River downstream/ low basin area, which are certainly classified into the group of case (1). And even in the regions and localities categorized in the group of case (2), I should think that there are also a lot of those regions and localities which can be categorized in the group of case (2) - 2, meaning the group of those regions and localities which have hardly any conditions to successfully complete their irrigation systems and ridges, particularly those in the backward rural areas and those areas called “remote and isolated areas”.

Therefore, those regions and localities are also at a low level of economic development, meaning that the development level of rural/ local markets there is not high yet. Therefore, those markets can often cause market failures, particularly risk and imperfect information. And partly because the level of economic development there is not high yet, most of those regions and localities by now have not had enough conditions to complete irrigation systems and ridges. Therefore, the best solution for those regions and localities in the present period/ stage is to make an effort to utilize the potential of Community or that of the way of land allocation in

egalitarianism with periodical reallocation to complement those markets in a given time, to a certain degree. And in parallel with it, those regions and localities also need to make an effort to develop industries and services at their own local level so that those industries and services can create many more jobs, reducing the amount of surplus agricultural labor in their very rural area. It is also one of the necessary conditions or requirements for those regions and localities to carry out the land consolidation successfully towards the implementation of economic development in general, particularly that of agricultural and rural development in their own rural areas. And I will take the above comment as the brief conclusions of this whole research of mine.

2. Failures of Community Institution - Next study subject

Although I just have remarked that Vietnam or the implementers/ the actors who carry out the land consolidation need/ needs to know how to utilize the potential of Community or “the way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation in a given time, to a certain degree”, but in reality, it would be suitable to add one more sentence to the comment above. That is, in parallel with utilizing the potential of Community, Vietnam also needs to minimize the failures of that institution at the same time. The reason why I dare to say so is, in the process of actively implementing the above way of land allocation, in some of the regions and localities, there have been sometimes occurring negative phenomena which are envisioned as “Community failures”. And the Vietnamese government has been often pointing out the existence of those failures/ negative phenomena, too. Those phenomena are not so much pure socio-economic issues as administrative, sometimes political ones. In addition, if I am to investigate, analyze and clarify those issues fundamentally, I anticipate that I will probably have to do another research with the same volume as this whole research, because in Vietnam at present, there have been a lot of documents on those issues published or released than I expected. Therefore, in the below part, I would like to briefly describe and evaluate some of those negative issues/ phenomena related directly to this research, as the final words.

1. I should think that the word of “Community” sounds beautiful, but it does not always have beautiful aspects.

Once we get into the territory called “village”, we can immediately see that, in addition to the negative phenomena which are always envisioned as “sectionalism” (*cục bộ*), “localism” (*địa phương*), etc., there clearly exists a multi-stratified society, in which there is a relationship between the privileged few and a lot of ordinary peasants, or a relationship between those who seize power and those who are subject to such of influence, too ⁽¹⁾. And the case of Vietnamese villages is not the exception. In/ During the period of traditional society with the existence of the Cong dien system in the past, the oligarch’s autocratic regime of some of the powerful (the person having high social status) organizing the Village Council (*hội đồng kǐ mục*) in those villages had existed explicitly indeed ⁽²⁾.

In fact, such phenomena as the privileged in the village often turn collective interests into personal interests still existed during the period of collectivization of agriculture, when the Cong dien system was considered to have been abolished entirely. And as to some Vietnamese researchers, it was also one of the serious problems which caused some of the weaknesses or the shortcomings in the governance of those cooperatives in that period ⁽³⁾.

In this research, I believe/ think that the carrying out of the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism is one of the symbols of the village’s restoration, or more precisely to say, it is one of the functions of common resource management related to land, a production factor at the village level. But because the whole process of the above village’s restoration is that of the restoration/ recovery of almost all of the characteristics called “the village”, so not only the above function of common resource management but the cultural and traditional practices of the village in general, including the oligarchs’ autocratic regime has also restored at the same time. For example, (1) the problem of “new influential persons” (*“cường hào mới”*) in the village, which problem is pointed out by Mr. Furuta, is one of the typical examples of the above-mentioned phenomena ⁽⁴⁾; (2) the book named “Vietnamese villages” (*Làng Việt*) by John Kleinen, a foreign researcher (translated by the Vietnam’s Association of Historical Science) also describes in detail and meticulously the story of one authoritarian person in a certain rural village in the Northern Vietnam. Specifically, in the period of collectivization, that person was the Chairman of the Management Board of

the cooperative in his village, and by the time the village started to implement the rural reform, he had moved to the position of the Vice-Chairman of the Commune People's Committee there, continuing to take that village as a place to carry out his personal autocratic regime or as a tool to serve his personal interests ⁽⁵⁾.

From the economic point of view, the phenomenon like the above can be explained as a kind of principal and agent relationship - in those cases concerned, peasants in villages are "principles" and the leaders are "agents" - derived/ originated from asymmetric information.

2. And it is often said that in the very process of implementing the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism, in not a few of the villages, there were some cases where those influential persons distributed the land intentionally/ unfairly according to their will.

Indeed, the restoration of the oligarch's autocratic regime above have also been quite popular in the implementation of the land consolidation movement to overcome and abolish the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism with periodical reallocation. As I wrote in Section 2 and 3 of Chapter III, the way of carrying out the bidding such as 1. those people who have a relationship with the staffs of the Commune People's Committee are often the bidding candidates; 2. or the land used for the bidding often distributed internally by people relevant to the Commune People's Committee staffs, etc. are some typical examples in the case.

It is not only the case, but there are also other cases: in some villages in implementing the land consolidation, the land distribution/ allocation was often given priority to those influential persons, meaning that those persons would be often allocated the good plots first. Meanwhile, as for those peasants who had used those good plots before the land consolidation, they wanted to continue using those plots and appealed the denunciations, but in vain ⁽⁶⁾. In fact, the newspapers of the Communist Party at the local level have been regularly providing the news like those in detail, too ⁽⁷⁾.

Here we can immediately see that the above negative phenomena that those influential persons often caused in the implementation of the land consolidation are obviously illegal. Because as I mentioned in chapter 3, when peasants in villages carry out the land consolidation, it is usual/ normal that they will have to accept the plots reallocated by the lottery. In fact, the

Vietnamese government has released an official report detailing the corruption and bribery phenomena in the process of implementing land consolidation ⁽⁸⁾. But one reason that those negative phenomena have been still lasting is partly because of the very “closeness” of the village themselves, and the land consolidation itself in not a few villages are/ has been often carried out in a “closed” form ⁽⁹⁾, therefore, even the central authority has been difficult to intervene and solve them thoroughly ⁽¹⁰⁾.

From the economic point of view, if we are to evaluate the above negative phenomena, those phenomena can be considered to be a kind of Community failures, because those phenomena will clearly reduce the useful/ beneficial function of the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism - an informal cooperative activity, or Community - specifically reducing the economic efficiency in economic development in general, particularly agriculture and rural development.

3. This research demonstrated the existence and the role of Community in the process of the rural reform in Vietnam, particularly those in the Northern region at present, also emphasized the necessity to utilize Community positively/ actively. However, in order to clarify further some necessary and important conditions which enable Community or the above way of land allocation in egalitarianism to have quicker and more significant impacts, another research in this field, including mine, will have to be done for the analysis of Community failures as I wrote above.

If I am allowed to temporarily describe a kind of solution to cope successfully with Community failures, it must be the thorough realization of “democracy at the grass-root level”, just as the Vietnamese government has been advocating the importance of the realization since the early years of the 1990s.

In order to minimize Community failures and to achieve many more results in actively/ positively utilizing the potential of Community, rural areas in Vietnam, particularly the Northern Vietnam, need to continue to carry out the movement toward the realization of democracy at the grass-root level more thoroughly and firmly. And that is the very problem which in what way does Vietnam have to complete a steady/ firm local administrative system and to build a modern centralized rule-of-law state quickly and successfully.

Notes of Conclusions

2.

(1) Refer to ジョセフ・E・スティグリッツ/カール・E・ウォルシュ (藪下史郎/秋山太郎/蟻川靖浩/大阿久博/木立力/宮田亮/清野一治訳) (2014) 『スティグリッツ マクロ経済学 (第4版)』 東洋経済新報社 (Joseph E. Stiglitz and Carl E. Walsh (2006) *Economics, 4th Edition*, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York) 531 ページ, for example.

(2) 桜井由躬雄・石澤良昭 (1995) 『東南アジア現代史 III ヴェトナム・カンボジア・ラオス 第2版』 山川出版社 23~25 ページ。

(3) Văn Tạo (1977) *Máy Suy nghĩ Bước đầu về Giai cấp Công nhân và Làng xã Việt Nam*, Ủy ban Khoa học Xã hội Việt Nam, Viện Sử học (1977) *Nông thôn Việt Nam trong Lịch sử (Nghiên cứu Xã hội Nông thôn Truyền thống) Tập 1*, Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, Hà Nội, tr.35-36, tr.38, for example.

(4) 古田元夫 (1998) 『ドイモイの現在』 158~160 ページ。

(5) John Kleinen (2007) *Làng Việt (Đối diện Tương lai Hồi sinh Quá khứ)*, Nhà xuất bản Đà Nẵng, Đà Nẵng.

(6) Nhóm PV/VOV.VN, Sai phạm dồn đien đổi thửa ở Nam Định: Mất dân chủ và sai nguyên tắc, *Báo điện tử Đài tiếng nói Việt Nam* 06:00, 23-03-2017 <https://vov.vn/xa-hoi/sai-pham-don-dien-doi-thua-o-nam-dinh-mat-dan-chu-va-sai-nguyen-tac-605567.vov>;

Báo Kinh tế & Đô thị (Điện tử) 08:08 03-11-2014 <http://kinhthedothe.vn/khong-the-de-thon-giai-quiet-viec-don-dien-doi-thua-42605.html>, for example.

(7) *Báo Hà Nội mới (Điện tử)* and such other newspapers online of the local branches of the Communist Party of Vietnam as *Báo Hà Giang (Điện tử)*, *Báo Thái Nguyên (Điện tử)*, *Báo Nghệ An (Điện tử)*, etc.

(8) Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia (2011) *Nhận diện và Giám thiểu Các Rủi ro dẫn đến Tham nhũng trong Quản lý Đất đai ở Việt Nam*, Nhà xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội.

(9) Refer to *Báo Nhân dân Điện tử* 14:11 10-08 2014 <https://nhandan.com.vn/dieu-tra-qua-thu-ban-doc/chan-chinh-tieu-cuc-trong-don-dien-doi-thua-210433/>, for example.

(10) About other problems concerned in the implementation of rural reform in general, see 竹内郁雄 (2004) 「ベトナムにおける市場経済化を伴う経済発展の考察－北部のムラ・村にみられる‘均等主義’の検討・評価を通じて－」(石田暁恵・五島文雄編 (2004) 『国際経済参入期のベトナム』 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構 アジア経済研究所) 203 ページ.

(11) Also refer to 古田 (1998) 前掲書 161～167 ページ, 竹内 (2004) 前掲論文 203～204 ページ.

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